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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2005, after continued unrest and social mobilizations, the Bolivian people 
elected their first indigenous president: Evo Morales. Since then, indigeneity has become 
an integral part of how the Bolivian state defines itself and explains its policies and 
objectives.  
There are many indigenous groups in Bolivia. Some indigenous nations have 
traditionally lived in the highlands, in the Andes, from where the federal government 
operates. However, many other indigenous peoples have their ancestral territories in the 
lowlands, in the East of the country and far from the heights of the Andes. Their lands are 
located in hilly dry forests, and even further east, in the Amazon basin. These lowland 
nations have been an essential part of the coalition that brought Evo Morales’ 
government to power, and that passed a new Bolivian Constitution in 2009. This 
Constitution is the first in Bolivia’s history to recognize the self-determination rights of 
indigenous nations and to also effectively establish an indigenous autonomy regime. 
The strength and accomplishments of the indigenous rights movement in the last 
few decades is not unique to Bolivia, but part of a larger wave that has soared throughout 
Latin America.  As it’s the case in Bolivia, for most of the 20th century indigenous groups 
throughout the region mobilized on the basis of class-based identities, mostly as part of 
peasant movements and organizations. However, during the 1980s and by the early 
1990s, indigenous identities became salient and were the basis of wide mobilizations. 
The specialized literature has identified two main causes to explain the salience of 
indigenous identity as a mobilizing tool during the 1980s and 1990s: (1) the creation of 
national and international networks that stimulated the formation of indigenous coalitions 
and the articulation of common goals, with indigenous autonomy taking center stage 
(Brysk, 1996); and (2) the implementation of neoliberal policies that deeply transformed 
the relationship between states and their citizens. As states transitioned from a corporatist 
to a neoliberal mode of governance, indigenous citizens also organized around new axes 
to claim their rights and oppose the effects of neoliberalism (Postero, 2010b). 
The newly formed indigenous coalitions protested, marched and demonstrated to 
demand territorial rights, the capacity to manage the natural resources existing in their 
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lands, and the protection and promotion of their cultures, practices and languages. While 
indigenous autonomies have existed in Latin America throughout history, by the early 
1990s indigenous organizations gave the concept a new, politicized meaning that 
encompassed their goals. Demanding autonomy from the state became synonymous with 
claiming the right to self-determination of indigenous nations. Implementing indigenous 
autonomy was then understood to mean the establishment of territorial jurisdictions with 
the following attributes: 
 
(i) a significant transfer of independent decision-making capacities and  
administrative competencies to local –indigenous or multiethnic– elected  
authorities; (ii) the creation of self-governing political structures within a  
recognized legal jurisdiction; and finally (iii) the delimitation of a territory in  
which collective rights to land and natural resources are granted and they can  
be exercised (González, 2015, pg. 17). 
 
Due to the pressure exercised by the highly mobilized indigenous coalitions, the 
neoliberal administrations governing Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, and also Bolivia 
enacted Constitutional reforms in the 1990s that recognized some indigenous rights. 
These reforms centered on decentralizing state competencies to regional governments, 
mostly municipalities. At different levels, these reforms allowed for the election of local 
representatives following indigenous decision-making procedures, limited levels of 
territorial control, and some recognition of indigenous languages and cultures.  
However, they did not come close to the understanding of autonomy of 
indigenous organizations. While in some cases –such as Ecuador and Colombia– these 
reforms stated the aspiration to create indigenous autonomies in the future, they remained 
vague and were never fully implemented. In the mentioned Ecuadorian and Colombian 
case, the laws that would allow for the implementation of indigenous autonomies were 
never passed (González, 2015). 
By the early 2000s the demand of indigenous autonomy, linked to the right to 
self-determination of indigenous peoples, reached a new momentum. Indigenous 
organizations participated in the election of left-wing candidates throughout the region, 
leading, as it did in the case of Bolivia, to indigenous autonomy being incorporated into 
the state’s administrative system. 
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This thesis will analyze the case of the Monkoxt of Lomerío, a Bolivian 
indigenous nation from the lowlands, specifically the Santa Cruz province. The Monkoxt 
are currently pursuing autonomy from the central state, and are only a referendum away 
from being able to form their own indigenous government in their territory, Lomerío. 
However, the Monkoxt have been organizing to claim their rights over their 
territory, and also to demand the respect and protection of their language and culture, 
since the early 1980s. It was then that they formally created the CICOL, the Central 
Indígena de Comunidades Originarias de Lomerío (Indigenous Central of the Originary 
Communities of Lomerío), the organization that has represented the Monkoxt vis a vis the 
state1.  
During the 1980s, many indigenous organizations formed in other areas of the 
Bolivian lowlands, just as they were appearing throughout Latin America. By 1990, they 
came together to organize the Marcha por el Territorio y la Dignidad (March for 
Territory and Dignity), which “without a doubt, changed the face of Bolivia forever” 
(Postero, 2007, p. 49). More than 800 men, women, and children walked for 34 days 
from the Beni province in the lowlands to the capital, La Paz, to claim their right to 
control and govern their ancestral territories. They were received in La Paz “by the 
waving of wiphala flags2 by the Aymaras and Quechuas of the CSTUCB3” (Albó, 2008a, 
pg. 42).  
 The march brought the rights of lowland indigenous peoples to the forefront of 
national politics and highlighted their struggle for territorial rights, a claim that would be 
adopted by the Aymara and Quechua communities in the highlands. The mobilization of 
                                                
1 For more on CICOL, see Flores Gonzales (2018).  
2 The wiphala is an emblem, normally used as a flag, that represents indigenous nations in the Andes. It is 
used in the states of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile and Colombia. President Evo Morales made 
the Bolivian version of the wiphala an official flag of the State, and has since also been used to represent 
lowland indigenous nations. See “The Wiphala” (2018) for the flag’s meaning, and Calpin (2011) for its 
use in Bolivia after Morales.  
 
3 The CSUTCB, the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unified 
Syndical Federation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) was a union created to support rural indigenous 
workers from the highlands. Their leaders and founders belonged to the Katarista movement. This 
movement wanted to reclaim the indigenous identity of rural workers of the Andes, particularly from the 
Aymara nation. The CSUTCB would be extremely influential in pushing for the recognition of indigenous 
rights in the 1990s, and its leader in the 2000s, Felipe Quispe, would play an essential role in the uprisings 
that would lead to Evo Morales’ presidency in the early 2000s. See Albó (2008a) section 2.4. 
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indigenous groups to claim their collective rights would deeply shape the policies passed 
by several neoliberal administrations in the 1990s, wen the Constitution was changed to 
officially declare Bolivia as a “multicultural” state4. 
 The Monkoxt made use of these multicultural policies. For example, they 
collectively titled their territory, Lomerío, and instituted a municipality to govern it5. 
However, dissatisfied with the limits the traditional liberal state still imposed on them, 
they supported Evo Morales’ claim to the presidency. They trusted that Morales would 
transform the state, and the Monkoxt would then be able to declare Lomerío an 
indigenous autonomy within a new, plurinational Bolivian state. 
Shortly after his election, President Morales fulfilled his commitment to 
indigenous nations such as the Monkoxt, and called a Constitutional Assembly to write a 
new Magna Carta. The Assembly met between August 2006, and December 2007, and 
was contentious from the beginning. Despite the controversies, and after lengthy 
negotiations, a new Constitution was passed and approved in a referendum in 2009. Since 
then, the Bolivian State has had the mandate of decolonizing its structures and 
transitioning from a traditional liberal model to a plurinational model – the basis of which 
are indigenous autonomies (“Constitución Política del Estado,” 2009). 
The Bolivian case is particularly relevant to the indigenous autonomy debate as 
“Bolivia is perhaps today the country with the most advanced and comprehensive 
conceptualization of territorial autonomies in Latin America” (González, 2015, pg. 17). 
However, the term autonomy has been particularly contested in Bolivia, and it has been 
wielded by various sectors of society pursuing different, if not opposing, projects. At the 
state level, these different understandings became obvious during the drafting of the 2009 
Constitution, and deeply influenced the new Magna Carta. This thesis will explore the 
limits of Bolivia’s plurinational model and autonomy regime, contrasting them with the 
demands of indigenous organizations.  
The meaning of autonomy, however, is not only contested at the state level, there 
are also disjunctures and different understanding among individuals from indigenous 
                                                
4 For more on Bolivia’s multiculturalism, see Postero (2007) introduction, chapters 4 and 5. 
 
5 For more on the collective titling of Lomerío, and the municipality established by the Monkoxt, see Flores 
Gonzales (2018), and Peña, Tubari, Chuvé, Choré, & Ipi (2016). 
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communities. This thesis will also analyze the case study of the Monkoxt of Lomerío, 
who are currently pursuing autonomy from the central state.  
To Monkoxt of Lomerío are a particularly noteworthy case study to explore the 
various understandings and implications of indigenous autonomy at the local level. They 
were the first indigenous group in Bolivia to pursue autonomy from the central state. 
They actually drafted their statute, the law governing an autonomy, in 2009: one year 
before the Bolivian state drafted and passed the Ley Marco de Autonomías y 
Descentralización (Framework Law of Autonomies and Descentralization), the law 
regulating the creation of indigenous autonomies in Bolivia.  
Because of this mismatch, the Monkoxt had to overcome further bureaucratic 
complications and their original statute was deeply modified by the Bolivian 
Constitutional Court (TCP). Their experiences, and the analysis of the modifications 
demanded by the Court, offer great insight into the differences between the top-down 
legislation pushed by the state, and the bottom-up hopes and expectations that prompted 
the Monkoxt to pursue autonomy in the first place. 
Most academic literature on indigenous autonomy focuses on the different 
understandings of autonomy at the state level. This thesis will certainly enter this debate. 
It will explore the diverse meanings attached to the concept of autonomy in Bolivia, 
analyzing how different sectors of society at the state level understand the concept. 
However, this thesis will also analyze how individuals from indigenous nations at the 
local level –in particular the Monkoxt of Lomerío–, attach different meanings, 
expectations and hopes to autonomy. It will analyze how the different understandings 
have impacted the implementation of the autonomy system, and it will also explore how 
they may influence the future of the autonomy model in Bolivia.  
 
Research Question 
 
 This thesis will answer the following research question:  
How have various actors in Bolivia, both at the state level and at the local level, 
differently interpreted autonomy, and with what impact on the definition and 
implementation of the autonomy model? 
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 I will start answering the research question by addressing the issue from the 
macro perspective: the understandings of autonomy at the state level. In the second 
chapter, Autonomy from the State’s Perspective, I will discuss the views of the three main 
actors that defined the meaning and implementation of autonomy at the state level: (1) 
social movement organizations, represented by Evo Morales’ MAS party6; (2) identity 
based indigenous organizations; and (3) Media Luna7 elites. During the drafting of the 
2009 Bolivian Constitution, these groups contended to have their view of the Bolivian 
state, and the autonomy system, enshrined in the new Magna Carta. Their different 
views, and subsequent negotiations, impacted the final autonomy model defined in the 
2009 Constitution. Social movement organizations had allied with identity based 
indigenous organizations to topple Bolivia’s neoliberal government, and had supported 
their autonomy proposal. However, once Evo Morales was elected to the presidency and 
a new Constitution had to be drafted and passed, social movement organizations and 
Media Luna elites reached strategic agreements that marginalized the goals defended by 
identity based indigenous groups, including their proposed autonomy regime. 
 In this chapter I will also discuss how the conflicting ideologies within the MAS 
government have also affected the implementation of the 2009 Constitution and the new 
autonomy system. Originally, Morales’ government was formed by members from the 
three sectors that had supported him in gaining the presidency: (1) the indigenista sector, 
formed by cabinet members belonging to identity based indigenous organizations; (2) the 
populista group, led by Evo Morales, representing social movement organizations; and 
(3) the estatista sector, representing the classical left (Laserna 2010). 
Expanding the power of the central state and the implementation of 
developmentalist policies became the priorities of the populista and estatista sector, 
marginalizing the interests defended by the indigenista sector and, among them, a wide 
                                                
6 The Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS (Movement Towards Socialism) is a socialist party led by Evo 
Morales and founded in 1998. It is constituted by different social movement organizations, from coca 
growers’ unions to neighborhood associations. See Postero (2010b) section: The MAS Phenomenon: A New 
Plebeian Bolivia for the formation of MAS. 
7 The Media Luna (literally translated as the half moon) is a term used to refer to the lowland Bolivian 
provinces of Beni, Pando, Tarija and Santa Cruz. The Andes do not cross through these provinces, which 
have a different social and economic history than the Andes’ provinces. See Crabtree (2005). 
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implementation of the autonomy system. I will illustrate this developments by discussing 
the TIPNIS case. 
 In the third chapter, The Impact of the State’s Perspective on the Monkoxi8 
Autonomy, I will analyze the Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización or LMAD 
(Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization), the law that regulates the 
implementation of the autonomy system. The tensions and contradictions that became 
apparent in the constituent process resurfaced in the drafting of the LMAD, which set an 
extremely complex bureaucratic process for indigenous groups to constitute autonomies.  
I will discuss how the LMAD influenced the Monkoxt’s pursuit of autonomy and the 
final version of the Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío, the legal document that will govern 
their territory once the Monkoxt have held a final referendum on autonomy (“Estatuto 
Autonómico de Lomerío,” 2015). 
In the fourth chapter, Whose Estatuto? I will discuss the drafting of the Estatuto 
Autonómico from the local perspective. I will analyze which actors participated in the 
process, how they influenced the document, and which sectors of the Monkoxt 
community, particularly women, were left out of the drafting of the statute. 
Finally, in the fifth chapter, Autonomy as Identity, I will show that conflicting 
views of autonomy have also appeared at the local level. I will discuss the different 
meanings given to autonomy by individual members of the Monkoxi nation. The 
members of the Monkoxt community I interviewed understand autonomy as a practical 
tool related to the goals they seek to achieve with the implementation of an autonomous 
government. For most interviewees, the most salient goal of autonomy is to promote the 
protection and revitalization of what they define as their “culture:” their language, their 
ancestors’ farming style, and their traditional tales and practices.  
 Throughout this chapter, I will also analyze how women’s understanding of 
autonomy, and Monkoxi culture, departs from men’s. In the case of male interviewees, 
autonomy was understood as a tool to protect traditional Monkoxi practices, and with 
them, men’s power in the community’s current status quo. Males’ discussion of cultural 
conservation and revitalization related to the communal power they derive from their 
                                                
8 Considering Bésiro grammar, and following the model of the Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío, I will use 
the term “Monkoxt” as a noun, and the term “Monkoxi” as an adjective.  
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capacity to speak Bésiro and their engagement with traditional practices. They considered 
Lomerío a paradise threatened by modern transformations. 
 Female interviewees, however, felt disconnected from the autonomy process and 
from political participation and representation in Lomerío. Women do not derive political 
power form their capacity to speak Bésiro or their participation in traditional culture. 
Therefore, while also concerned about the loss of Monkoxi culture and the Bésiro 
language, they discussed the embodied consequences of their loss, considering the 
disjunctures it creates among different generations. Moreover, they also saw certain 
transformations in a positive light, as they enabled women to challenge established 
gender roles and access conventionally male-only spheres.  
Finally, in the Conclusion, I will analyze how the different views at the state 
level, at the local level, and the interactions between these two spheres, have impacted 
the understanding of autonomy in Bolivia and the implementation of the autonomy 
system. I will discuss the views of the different actors involved, as shown in Table I, and 
how these differences have shaped the current system and may impact the future of 
autonomy in Bolivia. 
The aims of this research and the final design of the research question have gone through 
several transformations. My initial goal when I decided to pursue this research topic was 
to identify which characteristics lowland indigenous Bolivians, particularly the Monkoxt 
of Lomerío, considered essential to their identity. I wanted to understand the connections 
between their cultural repertoire9 and their demands of political autonomy and self-
determination, also exploring which policies indigenous groups wanted to see 
implemented to protect and promote their identities.  
 In June 2018, as I will explain in the Methods section later in this chapter, I 
travelled to Bolivia and started participating in community events and having informal 
conversations with members of the Monkoxt community. I realized that my original 
research hypotheses and goals made assumptions that did not correspond to the 
understandings of most individuals. I also recognized that there were significant 
differences in the understanding of autonomy among different actors, which I had not 
accounted for in the original design of my research.  
                                                
9 For more on the relevance of cultural repertoires in social movement research, see Swidler (1986). 
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Table I. Autonomy in Bolivia: Main Actors and their Understanding of Autonomy 
 
Actors Views on Autonomy 
 
I. State level 
I.I Social Movement Organizations 
 
With MAS at the center, social movement 
organizations supported the implementation of 
indigenous autonomy as understood by identity based 
indigenous organizations. However, they did not 
consider it nonnegotiable, and did not believe 
autonomies should limit the centralized power of the 
State.  
I.II Identity Based Indigenous 
Organizations 
 
 
To them, autonomy should be the basis of a new, 
transformed plurinational Bolivia. They believe the 
autonomy system is the key to decolonizing Bolivia 
and abandoning the liberal model of the state. They 
understand autonomy as closely related to indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination, and to governing 
and managing the resources in their ancestral 
territories through their traditional norms and 
customs. 
I.II Media Luna Elites 
 
Threatened by the vision of autonomy defended by 
identity base indigenous organizations, they 
organized to promote an autonomy model based on 
granting more power to regional governments. Their 
goal was to protect their economic and political 
interests. 
 
II. Local Level – The Monkoxt of Lomerío 
 
 
II.I Men 
 
Male interviewees referred to autonomy as a 
practical tool. They discussed resource management 
and the capacity to expel traditional political parties 
from their territory. However, the most salient goals 
for male interviewees were continuing their 
ancestors’ quest for freedom and the conservation of 
their culture. Interviewees over forty years old hoped 
autonomy would compel the younger generations to 
work the land, to use Bésiro in their daily lives, and 
to reject the attraction of the big city, of “modern” 
life. 
II.II Women 
 
Similarly to men, the women interviewed are clearly 
worried by what they identify as the disappearance of 
traditional Monkoxi culture. However, they detect 
that this process creates disjunctures in 
understandings and expectations between generations 
and genders, an issue ignored by the male 
interviewees. Moreover, they see these 
transformations as partly positive, as they allow them 
to gain access to traditionally male-only spheres. 
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 I had assumed that because actors at the state level linked autonomy to indigenous 
peoples’ self-determination rights, individual community members at the local level 
would share that understanding. Firstly, actors at the state level, as explained, had more 
diverse and complex views than my prior research had indicated. Secondly, out of the 
eleven people I interviewed from the Monkoxt nation, only one understood the meaning 
of the concept “self-determination” when directly asked, and he did not link it to the 
Monkoxt’s pursuit of indigenous autonomy.  
 This realization pushed me to reconsider the goals of my research, and what I had 
assumed to be a universal understanding of autonomy. To Monkoxt community 
members, autonomy is a tool to achieve certain goals, not an abstract concept related to 
their rights as indigenous people. To them, therefore, it made no sense to separate the 
definition of autonomy from the policies it would allow them to implement. I 
consequently decided to re-frame my research to analyze the different understandings of 
autonomy at the state and local level, to understand how they have impacted the 
implementation of the autonomy model.  
 
Methods 
 
 The findings presented in this thesis are based on primary, secondary, and field 
research. I have analyzed academic articles and books that reflect on the mobilizations 
that lead to the election of Evo Morales as president of Bolivia; the views of the actors 
that participated in the Constituent Assembly that drafted the 2009 Constitution; and an 
analysis of the two Morales administrations and their relationship with indigenous 
communities and the autonomy system as a whole.  
 These texts belong to different academic disciplines. Some authors, such as 
Nancy Postero or John McNeish, are anthropologists10. Other authors, such as Jason 
Tockman and Jeffrey Webber, are political scientists11. Moreover, I also examined texts 
written by Bolivian authors such as Juan Luís Espada or Elba Flores González, who work 
                                                
10 See Postero (2007), and McNeish (2002). 
 
11 See Tockman & Cameron (2014), and Tockman, Cameron & Plata (2015). 
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for the nonprofit CEJIS12, and also texts written by Monkoxt authors on their history, 
such as Camino hacia la libertad by Peña, Tubari, Chuvé, Choré, & Ipi (2016)13. 
 I have also analyzed primary sources, such as newspaper articles and legal and 
political texts. I analyzed the 2009 Bolivian Constitution (2009), and the law that 
regulates the implementation of the autonomy system, the Ley Marco de Autonomías y 
Descentralización or LMAD (Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization) 
(2010).  
 I also analyzed the declaration put forward by the Pacto de Unidad,14 and the 
texts by social movements’ scholar Álvaro García Linera (2012) on the Morales’ 
administration extractive policies, as he was the vice-president of Bolivia and his 
perspective reflected the views of certain sectors of the left. 
 My conclusions are also based on the research I conducted from June 15th, 2018, 
to August 10th, 2018. The first four weeks I participated in a research project, “Dialogue 
Between Knowledge Systems,” run by Dr. Wendy Townsend. My main role was 
enabling the interaction, as a translator, between indigenous Bolivians from Lomerío and 
three Native American women who participated in the research project with the goal of 
conducting research and engaging in cultural exchange. 
 This experience enabled me to build a relationship with community members, 
both with people involved in political projects and with those who had never participated 
in CICOL. 
 After my participation in Dr. Townsend’s project, I focused on my research. I 
participated in important community celebrations and in weekly events. I attended, for 
example, a game of a local soccer tournament and talked to many people about their 
culture and their views on autonomy while commenting on the game and drinking 
                                                
12 CEJIS, Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social (Center of Judicial Studies and Social 
Investigation) is a Santa Cruz nonprofit that has collaborated with the Monkoxt in the communal titling of 
their lands and in their pursuit of autonomy from the central government. Experts from CEJIS, known as 
técnicos, have provided essential technical and logistical support to CICOL. See chapter IV of this thesis, 
and Flores González (2018). 
 
13 Booklet published by the CICOL with the collaboration of CEJIS, the University of East Anglia and the 
UNASUR university on the history of the Monkoxt nation and their pursuit of autonomy. 
 
14 Federation formed by several identity based indigenous organizations to ask for a Constituent Assembly 
that reformed the Bolivian Constitution to include the rights of indigenous peoples over their territory. See 
Garcés et.al., (2010). 
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chicha15. I helped women pick wood from the forest to fire clay pots, and talked to them 
about their artisanry and daily lives. I organized a workshop to help women work with a 
sewing machine they didn't know how to use. Participating in these community events 
allowed me to connect with both men and women in the community in a more relaxed 
manner. 
 I also talked to several men in charge of important positions in CICOL and in the 
Lomerío municipality. I discussed the questions I had planned on asking before my trip, 
and got suggestions and guidance over whom to interview. Through these conversations 
and through the informal talks I was having with other community members, I refined my 
questions and focused on asking about personal history and experiences, the perceptions 
of gender equality and transformation of gender roles, and the perceptions about what 
autonomy meant to them. I asked open questions and allowed the interviewee to guide 
the conversation. 
 I had designed my in-depth interviews and my research plan following the 
methodological recommendations given by Donatella Della Porta in Methodological 
Practices in Social Movement Research (2014). I chose to conduct long, in-depth 
interviews:  
  
 As a way to ‘give voice’ to the activists: a methodological choice which 
 reflected a theoretical attention given to the subjective construction of 
 meaning [...] in-depth  interviews with activists were combined with 
 participant observation in order to understand the emotional and cognitive 
 dimensions in the creation of grass-roots protest groups movements. As she 
 [Kathleen Blee] observed, ‘observations alone do not provide sufficient data 
 because people don’t talk about what they take for granted.  To correct this, 
 lengthy, semi-structured interviews probed activists’ experiences and 
 interpretations’ (Blee 2012). (Della Porta, 2014, pg. 232). 
 
 I conducted eleven long, semi-structured interviews, of about an hour long each. I 
interviewed six men, and five women, ranging from twenty-seven years old to eighty-two 
years old. In this thesis, all their names will be changed to protect their privacy. They 
were all individual interviews, except for one with a woman in San Lorenzo’s artisanry 
center that started as an individual interview, but two other women joined the 
                                                
15 Drink traditionally made by indigenous communities in South and Central America. It is made of 
fermented corn. See Kulas (2015). 
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conversation. Because it made the interview more lively and interactive, I adapted the 
questions and continued with the interview with the three women. 
Some interviewees had been involved with CICOL and the autonomy process, 
while others had no involvement in political processes. I selected the interviews looking 
for this diversity, based on the experiences and methods described by sociologist Joselyn 
Viterna in Women in War: The Micro-Processes of Mobilization in El Salvador (2011)16. 
In her research on women’s participation in the FMLN, Viterna avoided interviewing 
only the leadership of the movement, or for that matter, only participants, combatants or 
women. To guarantee representativeness, she selected her interviewees as randomly as 
possible, avoiding the concentration of a particular profile, allowing for more diverse, 
complex and representative conclusions. 
However, ten of my interviewees either supported or had a positive view of 
autonomy, except for one single interviewee. I hypothesize this is due to the geographical 
proximity to the seat of CICOL, and therefore to the meetings held to pursue autonomy 
from the central state. Most interviewees had been born or lived either in Puquio Cristo 
Rey –CICOL’s seat– or San Lorenzo de Lomerío, the community where most meetings to 
pursue autonomy had been held. Interestingly, the only interviewee that showed a 
complete rejection of the autonomy process –and political participation in general– was 
from another community, San Antonio de Lomerío, the seat of the municipal 
government17. 
I also attended a meeting of the CICOL directory. CICOL, the main indigenous 
organization of the territory, achieved the communal titling of Lomerío in the name of the 
Monkoxt, and they are currently in charge of pursuing political autonomy from the 
central government. Attending the meeting gave me a chance to observe the inner 
workings and power dynamics in the organization, and I was also able to hear the leaders 
of CICOL discuss autonomy.  
In Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the regional capital, I talked about my experience and 
findings with several experts who have worked with the Monkoxt in different capacities. 
                                                
16 See Viterna (2011) Appendix B: Data and Methods. 
 
17 See the Autonomy from the State’s Perspective chapter in this thesis, section Autonomy versus State 
Control – The Case for the Municipalities, to understand the opposition to autonomy of the municipal 
government and its conflict with CICOL. 
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I talked to Miguel González, who works for the Bolivian nonprofit CEJIS and has been 
the main consultant collaborating with the Monkoxt to achieve autonomy. I also met with 
José Martínez, a sociologist who works in the University of Santa Cruz and has 
collaborated with lowland indigenous communities for decades.  
I also talked to Miguel Aragón, a lawyer who has worked for and with indigenous 
organizations and who directly participated in the collective titling of Monkoxi land and 
territory. I met with Bienvenido Zacu, indigenous leader of the Guarayo nation, who 
served as Congressman and gave me an inside perspective of how the central government 
views autonomy. Finally, I met with Elisa Saldías, sociologist who has worked analyzing 
the gendered attitudes and inequalities existing in several indigenous communities, 
among them the Monkoxt of Lomerío.  
 Once I was back in Eugene, Oregon, the fall of 2018, I started to code my 
interviews, again following the indications in Methodological Practices in Social 
Movement Research (Della Porta, 2014). I transcribed the interviews, highlighting the 
information I considered more relevant to my research question and also the statements 
that re-appeared in different interviews, focusing on the narratives interviewees referred 
to the most.  
 I then elaborated two codes, one to codify and account for the meaning given to 
autonomy by the different interviewees, with the four stated understandings outlined, 
which were the most salient among interviewees: (1) resource management; (2) rejection 
of traditional political parties, and more broadly, political conflict; (3) a quest for 
freedom, related to a historical arc of overcoming exploitation; and (4) cultural 
conservation.  
 Having observed that cultural conservation was the most salient meaning of 
autonomy for interviewees, I created a second code to understand what “culture” meant 
to them, which included traditional farming techniques, and the lifestyle associated to 
them; Bésiro, their language; daily tasks and celebrations –particularly the musical 
instruments used in each–, and creational stories. Interestingly, when discussing their 
culture, they also mentioned the importance and influence slavery had had on their 
ancestors. 
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 Finally, I re-read all the transcriptions and put together all the quotes –with 
accompanying notes– of both men’s and women’s references to gender relations, tasks 
and differences, also recording all the different perceptions of women vis a vis men. 
  Throughout this thesis, I have tried to present the views of the interviewees as 
faithfully as possible, considering that, as stated by anthropologist Katherine Borland 
(1991), as researchers:  
  We identify chunks of artful talk within this flow of conversation, give them  
  physical existence (most often through writing), and embed them in a new  
  context of expressive or at least communicative activity [...]. Thus, we   
  construct a second-level narrative based upon, but at the same time reshaping,  
  the first. (Borland, 1991, pg. 63). 
 
  Therefore, I do not claim that the conclusions presented in this thesis fully 
represent the views of the Monkoxt, or even the complete views of the eleven 
interviewees that worked with me. I have, through my lens, honestly analyzed their words 
and strived to be fair to what they intended to say and the context in which it was said. 
However, I have interpreted and presented them in a way that made sense and fit the 
described research question and methods.  
  Moreover, the conclusions presented in this thesis constitute indications of what 
the majority of the Monkoxt may believe in regards to the autonomy project. However, 
the results cannot be generalized as they are based on eleven interviews, certainly not 
enough to represent the whole population of Lomerío. Nevertheless, the results presented 
open the possibility of new research projects, with more interviewees, to see if the results 
outlined in this thesis are applicable to the general Monkoxi nation, other indigenous 
groups in Bolivia, and even Latin America. 
  I do not believe this diminishes the validity of my conclusions. But I also do not 
claim that this thesis in any way represents the “truth” on the Monkoxt’s views of 
autonomy. I do hope to add my voice to the conversation about the meaning of 
indigenous autonomy in Bolivia and Latin America, hopefully presenting a more nuanced 
view of the issue, and particularly illuminating the inherent power dynamics that exist 
within indigenous communities and that further marginalize certain groups who have less 
power and representation, such as women.  
  Most of all, I hope this thesis can be useful for those seeking to learn about the 
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autonomy regime in Bolivia, with the goal of supporting indigenous peoples’ struggle to 
gain control over their territories, protect and revitalize their languages and their cultures, 
without forgetting the inequalities that exist within these communities. As stated by 
anthropologist Deborah D’Amico-Samuels (2010): 
   
  Our translation of the experiences of the world’s exploited peoples into   
  language understood by those with access to greater power than themselves is  
  useful only insofar as it prompts us to ask questions about the nature of this  
  power in our lives and work and as it spurs our contribution to attempts to   
  alter the global balance of power responsible for their poverty and    
  oppression. (pg. 69). 
 
Positionality 
 
 My view on indigenous autonomy, and my interest in the topic, has definitely 
been influenced by my political beliefs and my experiences as a white, European woman 
from a stateless nation. 
 I identify as a white/Hispanic woman from the Catalan nation, currently under the 
Spanish state. Spain is a state of autonomies. The establishment of the autonomy system 
in the late 1970s, after the death of the fascist dictator Francisco Franco18, certainly 
brought hope to those who, in Catalunya, wanted to have further capacities to govern 
themselves as a nation, protecting their culture and revitalizing their language. However, 
there is currently a deep disappointment towards autonomy in Catalunya, which I feel 
too. Autonomy in Spain has become a tight corset that grants certain governmental 
capacities to Catalan people while never recognizing their nationhood or their right to 
self-determination. 
 When I first started studying indigenous autonomy, I regarded the issue as a great 
success of indigenous peoples throughout Latin America. I particularly admired the 
achievements of indigenous Bolivians, who had their self-determination rights recognized 
and instituted in the 2009 Constitution. However, as I delved into the topic, I started 
seeing similarities with the disappointments my own people have had with autonomy. 
The parallels I can draw with the Catalan case have certainly prompted me to analyze 
autonomy with a more critical lens than I might have had otherwise. 
                                                
18 See Preston (2015). 
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 My identity as a Catalan person became double-edged when conducting research 
in Bolivia. One the one hand, it allowed me to establish connections with members of the 
Monkoxt community. As the members of older generations, Spanish is my second 
language, and I used to be made fun of for speaking it with an accent. Moreover, 
interviewees would tell me about how their parents and grandparents, in school, were 
scolded and beaten for speaking Bésiro, their language, instead of Spanish. My parents 
had similar experiences growing up, which I talked about with some interviewees, 
establishing a common grown.  
 On the other hand, however, these experiences did not erase the power dynamics 
present due to my privilege: although I come from a working class background, I grew up 
as a white woman in Europe, with privileges and possibilities available to me that my 
interviewees could never enjoy. Moreover, even if I don’t identify as such, I am from 
Spain, which still carries a heavy weight in Bolivia. My ancestors participated in the 
plundering and exploitation of the Monkoxi people. Moreover, when I first arrived in 
Lomerío, I was travelling with a group of women from the United States, who are also 
identified with the economic exploitation of Bolivia.  
 This power dynamics were certainly present in my relationship with my 
interviewees. I worked to create close personal relationships with them, so that we could 
discuss these issues freely. While certainly not erasing them, being able to discuss these 
power differences with the interviewees that brought them up certainly facilitated our 
communication and connection as individuals. 
 My experiences doing research as a woman were also double-edged. On the one 
hand, it facilitated my interviews with men, even if there were a few uncomfortable 
moments. Men did not feel threatened by my questions or my presence in community and 
CICOL meetings, since as a woman I was presumed to be innocent and harmless. They 
also wanted to support me in my work and to protect me, as they thought it was their duty 
as good hosts and as men. There were a few uncomfortable moments in which men did 
not fully respect my personal boundaries or sought to turn our relationship into something 
I did not want it to be. However, I never felt in danger or personally threatened, although 
I did feel uncomfortable, and that certainly added difficulty and tension to my research. 
 18 
 My work with men, and their attitudes, did however make establishing 
relationships with women difficult. They did perceive me as a threat. I believe that to be 
because I was not married, and I spent time alone with men, something uncommon in 
Monkoxi culture for an unmarried woman of my age. However, by participating in 
community events and having open, honest conversations, I connected with some of the 
women, which allowed me to establish good relationships with other women in the 
community. 
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CHAPTER II 
AUTONOMY FROM THE STATE’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
 In this chapter, I will show that the drafting of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution was 
extremely contentious. Three main actors participated in the process: (1) social movement 
organizations, represented by Evo Morales’ MAS party; (2) identity based indigenous 
organizations; and (3) Media Luna elites. These three groups collided to defend their own 
view of the Bolivian nation. MAS and identity based indigenous organizations wanted to 
deeply transform Bolivia by drafting a revolutionary Constitution. Media Luna elites, 
however, wanted to maintain the status quo and gain more political and economic control 
over their departments. 
Autonomy was a particularly crucial issue for indigenous organizations and 
Media Luna elites. However, they had opposing understandings of what autonomy meant 
and how it should re-shape the Bolivian State. Identity based indigenous organizations 
wanted to implement an autonomy system that allowed indigenous nations to govern and 
manage the resources of their ancestral territories through their traditional norms and 
customs. Media Luna elites opposed this vision, and mobilized to institute an autonomy 
system that granted more regional autonomy to departments and that benefitted their 
economic interests. Although MAS supported the indigenous groups’ view of autonomy, 
they did not consider it a nonnegotiable issue. At several points during the Constituent 
process, MAS chose to ally with the right-wing, Media Luna elites, a tactic that generated 
disappointment in indigenous organizations.  
The final 2009 Constitution, which was approved by the Bolivian people in a 
referendum, reflects these tensions and conflicting visions. The new Constitution 
certainly breaks with Bolivian republicanism, and establishes the mandate of 
decolonizing the State’s structures. It openly calls for a transition from a traditional 
liberal model to a plurinational model. However, the Magna Carta doesn’t fully embody 
the hopes of identity based indigenous organizations. While the Constitution does 
recognize indigenous autonomies, it limits their political scope and indigenous people’s 
capacity to manage the natural resources that exist in their territories. 
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Moreover, the implementation of the autonomy system has also reflected the 
conflicting ideologies within the MAS government. Expanding the power of the central 
state and the implementation of developmentalist policies have become the priorities of 
the Morales administration. The MAS government, particularly during its second 
administration, has shown that it will sacrifice the decentralization of the state through 
indigenous autonomies if it threatens its hold on regional power. 
 
The Demand for a Constituent Assembly – Alliances, Opposition, and Conflicting Views 
of Autonomy 
 
Shortly after his election, Evo Morales called for a Constituent Assembly to write 
a new Carta Magna. The new Constitution was to start a deep reconfiguration of the 
Bolivian State, in President Morales’ words, “to close the doors to racism, to 
discrimination and to exclusion, by starting to build a Plurinational, intercultural State 
that is authentically democratic and is founded on the cultural plurality of our 
motherland”19 (“Constitución Política del Estado,” 2009, pg. 3).  
There were three main actors that impacted the process of the Constituent 
Assembly and the drafting of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution: (1) a broad base of social 
movements –which would become the founders and main constituency of Evo Morales’ 
party, MAS–, (2) identity based indigenous organizations, and (3) the Santa Cruz elites, 
which built an alliance with the bourgeoisie of other lowland provinces, known as the 
Media Luna.  
 
(1) A Social Movements’ Assembly 
 
The 1980s were an incredibly transformative decade for Bolivia’s economy. In 
1982, former dictator and army general Hugo Banzer was democratically elected to the 
presidency. He put together an economic team composed of technocrats and members of 
the mining and finance sectors, as well as business owners. Banzer and his economic 
team implemented neoliberal structural adjustment policies, which his successor, Víctor 
Paz Estenssoro, continued to apply after 1985. Paz Estenssoro appointed Gonzalo 
                                                
19 Translated by the author. 
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Sánchez de Lozada as his Planning Minister, which meant that Lozada would be the head 
of economic policy in the Bolivian government. Sánchez de Lozada was an outspoken 
advocate of austerity and neoliberal policies, and secured the collaboration of American 
economist Jeffrey Sachs to transform Bolivia’s economy (Postero, 2007). 
 
 As explained by Derrick Hindery (2013): 
 
 In the mid-1980s, Bolivia became kind of a living laboratory for Harvard 
 economist Jeffrey Sachs to test the ideas of structural adjustment and 
 neoliberal trade rules. These reached fruition in the mid-1990s, as  privatization 
 of state sectors, large-scale enclosures, massive reductions of state employment, 
 deregulation, decentralization, and free trade policies were implemented through a 
 sharp recession, increasing inequality and contraction of state services. (Hindery, 
 2013, pg. xi) 
 
 Sánchez de Lozada’s policies were effective in halting hyperinflation, but at a 
huge social costs. The enormous cuts on the state apparatus and industries implemented 
by de Lozada led to massive layoffs and a sharp increase in poverty levels. The effects on 
Bolivian society were deep and all-encompassing: “one striking result of the massive 
layoffs was the migration of the relocalizados [relocated] to urban zones in El Alto, 
Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, as well as to the coca-growing Chapare region, where coca 
cultivation tripled in the late 1980s” (Postero, 2007, pg. 126). 
 By 1993, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada –nicknamed ‘Goni’–, was elected president 
of the Republic. With the support of international funders, ‘Goni’ and Sacks extended the 
application of neoliberal structural adjustment policies. They completely abandoned the 
import substitution model that had characterized Bolivia’s economy until the early 1980s, 
even when the social impacts such economic transformations were having were obvious 
(Webber, 2008a).  
By the mid-2000s, a wide variety of groups had sprung throughout Bolivia 
opposing de Lozada’s neoliberal policies and their effects. I will call these groups social 
movement organizations. They were incredibly diverse and included, for example, 
cocalero trade unions20 –where Evo Morales would start his political career– or 
                                                
20 For more on coca growers’ unions, their origins and influence, see Malá (2008). 
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neighborhood associations21. These organizations would become founders and the main 
constituency of the MAS party. Many of their members identified as indigenous, 
deployed indigeneity as a mobilizing weapon, and supported indigenous autonomy. 
However, their main goals weren’t tied to their ethnic identity: they came together to 
reject de Lozada’s neoliberal policies and their social effects. They demanded the 
transformation of the state’s political structures, and wanted a better distribution of 
Bolivia’s resources and wealth –highly privatized since the 1980s– and more political 
representation. They embraced the demand of a Constituent Assembly to revolutionize 
the Bolivian state, and although they supported indigenous autonomy, they did not 
consider it a nonnegotiable issue. Their main goal was to establish a political system that 
represented and defended the rights of the most marginalized citizens of the Bolivian 
nation. Trade unions and neighborhood associations saw the drafting of a new 
Constitution as a tool to reform the political and economic system of the country, 
particularly to reverse the neoliberal policies that had been applied to Bolivia since the 
early 1980s.  
Paradigmatic of this movement was the conflict over the privatization of water 
that took place in the early 2000s in Cochabamba. The radical liberalization of the 
country’s economy had terrible effects in Bolivia’s countryside. Incapable of competing 
with cheaper foreign products, thousands of farmers and herders went bankrupt and were 
forced to migrate en masse to urban centers such as Cochabamba (Postero, 2007). The 
city massively grew due to the mounting numbers of displaced immigrants that arrived 
looking to find subsistence, normally in the informal economy. Many of them settled in 
areas without basic services, where they dug their own water wells and formed 
cooperatives.  
However, president Hugo Banzer had passed a law allowing the privatization of 
water supplies, which the city of Cochabamba took advantage of. The concession was 
granted to Aguas del Tunari, a company owned by the French Bechtel. By April of 2002, 
massive demonstrations occurred: “a successful alliance between urban workers, rural 
peasant irrigators, members of local water collectives, students, and ordinary 
Cochabambinos was formed, calling itself the Coordinadora en Defensa de[l] Agua y la 
                                                
21 For more on neighborhood associations, see Albó (2008a). 
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Vida (Coalition in Defense of Water and Life)” (Postero, 2007, pg. 194). Although the 
police tried to repress the huge demonstrations, the protesters built barricades and fought 
back, with dozens wounded and even one person killed. The government was forced to 
retreat and cancel the contract with Aguas del Tunari. 
 The Coordinadora had several demands, among them calling a Constituent 
Assembly. Oscar Olivera, the Coordinadora’s most visible leader, stated: 
 
 The Constituent Assembly… should be understood as a great sovereign 
 meeting of citizen representatives elected by their neighborhood organizations, 
 their urban and rural associations, their unions, their communes. There, citizen 
 representatives would bring with them ideas and projects concerning how to 
 organize the political life of the country. They would seek to define the best 
 way of organizing and managing the common good, the institutions of society, 
 and the means that would unite the different individual interests in order to 
 form a great collective national interest [...]. (Webber, 2008b, pg. 84). 
 
As this quote shows, social movement organizations called for a Constituent 
Assembly, just as identity based indigenous organizations would do. However, their core 
demands diverged: social movement organizations’ main goals related to extending more 
economic rights to vulnerable Bolivians, and to reforming the political system; although 
many of them identified as indigenous, their claims centered on economic and political 
claims based on Bolivian citizenship, not ethnic identity. Autonomy was not a central or 
nonnegotiable demand for this sector. On the other hand, identity based indigenous 
organizations wanted a Constituent Assembly to have their rights as indigenous nations, 
based on their ethnic identity, recognized and expanded. 
The first time these tensions erupted was in the design of the Constituent 
Assembly. After his election in 2005, Evo Morales started negotiations to determine 
when and where the assembly would be held, and the election procedures to elect 
representatives to the Constituent Assembly. MAS did not have a majority in the Senate 
and Morales chose to negotiate with the far right elites, mostly from Santa Cruz (Webber, 
2008b). Together, the far right and MAS opposed the identity based indigenous 
organizations’ demand that indigenous organizations could elect delegates though their 
own traditional norms and procedures. MAS prioritized establishing an electoral system 
that guaranteed their party’s control of the assembly. They passed an electoral law that 
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starkly limited the number of indigenous delegates that could attend the Assembly, as it 
was based on political party membership (Postero, 2017).  
Moreover, and to gain the vote of the far right, the electoral law for the 
Constituent Assembly had a: 
 
Dramatically disproportional clause built into the assembly law which ensured 
 that the process would not lead to structural reforms, never mind revolutionary 
 change: in each electoral district the party or organization that comprised the 
 relative majority could only send two representatives, according to a curious 
 ‘minority protection’ rule. In accordance with this resolution, even if a party 
 secures 75 percent of the votes in its district, as long as one of the minority 
 parties receives more than 5 percent, this latter party will get the ‘third’ 
 minority representative  as long as one of the minority parties receives more 
 than 5 percent, this latter party will get the ‘third’ minority  representative. This 
 clause assured not so much the ‘plurality’ proclaimed at the time, as a means to 
 assure representation for a small minority of ad hoc  right-wing organizations with 
 some local clout. Without this clause, these groups would not attain representation 
 in the assembly. (as cited in Webber  2008b, pg. 85). 
 
MAS’ prioritization of their electoral and political interests, far from 
disappearing, would continue to appear during the Constitution’s drafting and in MAS’ 
management of indigenous autonomy.  
 
(2) An Indigenous Assembly 
 
In the 1980s, indigenous federations formed throughout Bolivia to oppose 
neoliberal policies and to claim a wider set of rights for indigenous nations22. I call these 
groups identity based indigenous organizations because they organized on the basis of 
indigenous identity, whether it was belonging to the Aymara or Quechua nations in the 
highlands, or the Guaraní or Chiquitano nations in the lowlands, for example. Their 
members identified as indigenous, and their goals and claims were based on their 
indigeneity. In the early 2000s, social movement organizations would also appear and 
proudly proclaimed their indigenous roots, as explained it the prior section. However, 
their main organizing principle wasn’t indigeneity, and although they may have 
supported indigenous demands, their main goals related to and expansion of economic 
rights and political representation.  
                                                
22 See Albó (2008a). 
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The identity based coalitions that started to form in the 1980s not only demanded 
the recognition of indigenous cultures and languages, they also claimed the right of 
indigenous nations to control and govern their ancestral territories. For the first time, and 
thanks to the support of international NGOs, identity based indigenous organizations used 
the language of international human rights to support their claims: they cited the 169 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention passed by the ILO in 1989, and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples23.  
Paradigmatic of this movement was the Marcha por el Territorio y la Dignidad 
(March for Territory and Dignity), which took place in 1990. More than 800 men, 
women, and children walked for 34 days from the Beni province in the lowlands to the 
capital, La Paz, to claim their right to govern their ancestral territories24. They believed 
that to achieve their goals, a Constituent Assembly had to be called to redefine the 
Bolivian state and its relationship to its indigenous citizens. They envisioned the creation 
of indigenous autonomies, in which indigenous nations governed themselves through 
their traditional norms and customs, and fully managed the natural resources present in 
their lands. Indigenous autonomies would become, in their view, the basis of the new 
plurinational Bolivia (McNeish 2002).  
The mobilizations and strength showed by identity based indigenous 
organizations successfully pressured the Bolivian government. In the mid-1990s, 
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada –nicknamed ‘Goni’–, reformed the Bolivian 
Constitution, declaring the country a multiethnic and pluricultural nation25. Moreover, 
article 171 of the new Constitution established that:  
 
the social, economic, and cultural rights of the indigenous peoples who inhabit 
 the national territory are recognized, respected, and protected within this legal 
 framework, especially the rights to their communal lands of origin, 
 guaranteeing the use and sustainable exploitation of natural resources, and to 
 their identity, values, languages, customs and institutions” (cited in Postero, 
 2007, pg. 52). 
 
                                                
23 See “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention” (1989) and the “United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (n.d). 
 
24 For more on the Marcha por el Territorio y la Dignidad, see Albó (2008a). 
 
25 See Albó (2008b). 
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 Sánchez de Lozada also passed a law establishing the Instituto Nacional de 
Reforma Agraria (National Institute of Agrarian Reform) known as INRA. The law 
established a legal path for indigenous people to gain collective titling for their ancestral 
territories, and expanded their capacity to govern them through the municipal system. 
The titled communal lands, governed by a municipal government, came to be known as 
TCOs, Territorios Comunitarios de Origen (Communal Lands of Origin) (Postero, 2007). 
However, the implementation of INRA was slow and indigenous nations, particularly in 
the lowlands, had great difficulties having their territories recognized as TCOs: it took the 
Monkoxt of Lomerío almost 10 years to have their territory recognized as a Territorio 
Comunitario de Origen (Flores Gonzales, 2018). 
However, the TCO status wasn’t enough to fulfill the desire of self-government 
and self-determination that identity based indigenous organizations desired. In the early 
2000s, representatives from highland and lowland organizations came together to form 
the Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact), an alliance of indigenous and peasant federations26. 
They met in 2004 to continue to demand a Constituent Assembly that would recognize 
their historical rights as indigenous nations (Postero, 2017). They published a Declaration 
that articulated “a theoretical perspective of plurinationalism that transcends the model of 
the liberal and monocultural state based on the individual citizen and specifically 
identifies the creation of indigenous autonomies as the key mechanism for the 
construction of a plurinational state27” (Tockman & Cameron, 2014, pg. 48). For the 
Pacto, autonomy was the key to transitioning from a neoliberal, multicultural state, to a 
plurinational system in which autonomies would have the same legal status as the central 
government.  
According to the Pacto de Unidad’s proposal, once autonomies had been 
constituted, indigenous peoples would elect their political representatives through their 
traditional usos y costumbres28 (norms and customs). They would design their own 
judicial systems, and would have complete control over their land and resources, both 
renewable and nonrenewable. Only after indigenous autonomies had been constituted 
                                                
26 See Garcés (2010). 
 
27 For more on plurinational states, see Tockman & Cameron (2014). 
 
28 For more on traditional norms and customs, see Eisenstadt (2013). 
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would the territorial administrative map be redesigned, with the central state having a 
mediating role and no power to overturn the decisions made by autonomies (Garcés, 
2010). In the new administrative map, departments would lose importance and would 
have no autonomy of their own, as autonomy would be reserved for indigenous nations 
living in their ancestral territories. Indigenous autonomies would therefore be the 
foundation of the state, with the central apparatus only coming after the decentralized, 
indigenous-controlled entities, and with very little power over them. These goals were 
clearly expressed in the Pacto’s proposal, particularly in the following points that were 
presented to the Constituent Assembly: 
 
1. As originary indigenous nations and peoples we propose a Unitary 
Plurinational State, Pluricultural and Multilingual. The constitution of 
this Plurinational State implies redefining our country, which historically 
has been organized in a colonial fashion and has privileged the 
oligarchic elites of the country. The Plurinational State has to be based 
on the participation of the originary indigenous nations and peoples in 
all the tiers of the state structure and in the government of our country. 
2. Constitution of Autonomías Territoriales Indígenas Originarias y 
Campesinas [autonomies] through which the country will be territorially 
reorganized. We recognize the existence of Intercultural Urban 
Autonomies. On the basis of these territorial tiers regions will be 
reconstituted. 
3. Recuperation and full exercise of the Property of our Natural Resources 
[sic], both renewable and nonrenewable, in our self-determined 
territories as originary indigenous nations and peoples. The management 
and distribution of the benefits of Natural Resources will be based on the 
principles of solidarity and reciprocity that characterize the life of our 
communities.  
4. Recognition of the originary judicial systems within the principle of 
judicial pluralism that will characterize the Plurinational State.   
5. Recuperation of indigenous and originary Authority over the land and 
the territories ancestrally occupied by indigenous, peasant, and originary 
peoples, to redistribute them fairly, considering gender equality and 
equity principles. Administration and use of our land and resources 
through the traditional norms of our communities.29 (Garcés, 2010, pg. 
49).    
 
 
 
 
                                                
29 Translated by the author. 
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(3) No Constituent Assembly: Santa Cruz’s Departmental Autonomy 
 
By the early 2000s Bolivia’s social movements had grown and transformed. A 
strong coalition of identity based indigenous organizations, cocalero trade unions, 
neighborhood associations, miners’ unions, peasant organizations, etc. had built a 
powerful alliance that would shift the center of Bolivia’s politics. 
During that time, however, the economic center of Bolivia had also shifted from 
the mining centers at the west of the country to the growing agro-businesses and large 
haciendas in the Eastern lowlands. These lowland departments –Pando, Tarija, Beni and 
Santa Cruz– came to be known as the Media Luna (because of their geography), with the 
Santa Cruz department becoming the richest, and its capital, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the 
main economic hub of Bolivia (Webber, 2008a).  
 The Media Luna provinces, and Santa Cruz in particular, had a unique economic 
history. The Agrarian Reform Law passed after the 1953 Revolution had led to land 
distribution and the growth of small land-holdings in the highlands. However, it had had 
the opposite result in the lowlands. As explained by the Monkoxt indigenous writers 
Peña, Tubari, Chuvé, Choré, & Ipi (2016), the Agrarian reform law didn’t recognize 
communal property, which led to indigenous lands being expropriated and redistributed 
in an individual basis, “therefore contributing to the expansion of cattle ranching and the 
subjugation of indigenous families under patrones and landowners.”30 (Peña, Tubari, 
Chuvé, Choré, & Ipi 2016, pg. 23). 
 In the 1970s, the land concentration process continued, while the Media Luna 
departments’ were economically growing with the application of the Bohan Plan. The 
plan proposed economic diversification, monetary stabilization and import substitution 
policies of basic agricultural commodities, particularly in the Santa Cruz region31. The 
central government also implemented highway projects that connected the Chapare 
region and Santa Cruz de la Sierra to the highlands, and “awarded large land concessions 
to individuals and agribusinesses –almost 10 million hectares in Santa Cruz alone [...] 
Agricultural programs supervised by the U.S. Agency for International Development 
                                                
30 Translated by author. 
 
31 For more on the Bohan plan, see Crabtree (2005). 
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(USAID), made credit, fertilizer, seed, and machinery available to Santa Cruz oligarchy” 
(Postero, 2007, pg. 47). 
In the 1980s the region saw an even more dramatic economic growth. As stated 
by Benjamin Kohl (2010) “Santa Cruz thrived under neoliberalism’s privileging of 
private capital, quickly becoming the fastest growing part of one of South America’s 
poorest countries” (Kohl, 2010, pg. 109). By the early 2000s, Santa Cruz generated 40% 
of Bolivia’s export revenues and 42% of its tax revenues. As a department, Santa Cruz 
attracted –and still does– more foreign direct investments that any other region in the 
country, and when it comes to Gross National Product, Santa Cruz still leads the country 
in electricity and gas production, industrial manufacturing, commerce, finance and 
agricultural profits (Webber, 2008b).   
However, the growth of left-wing social movement organizations and Evo 
Morales’ MAS party in the early 2000s represented a challenge for the Santa Cruz and 
Media Luna elites. If ever elected to office, Morales and his allies had promised to 
reverse the neoliberal policies that had proved so beneficial for the Santa Cruz 
bourgeoisie. Moreover, the Media Luna elites also felt threatened by the growing strength 
of identity based indigenous organizations.  
In their case, their fears centered on lowland organizations such as CIDOB, the 
Confederación de los Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of the Indigenous 
Peoples of Bolivia), and their Monkoxt affiliate, CICOL, the Central Indígena de 
Comunidades Originaras de Lomerío (Indigenous Central of the Originary Communities 
of Lomerío). Both organizations were building alliances in the lowlands and the 
highlands to push for the implementation of indigenous autonomies, which could have 
directly threatened the large haciendas and land holdings that Santa Cruz’s elite 
depended on. 
Under these circumstances, the Santa Cruz elites, traditionally divided, came 
together under two main organizations, the FEPB-SC and the CPSC (Eaton, 2007). The 
FEPB-SC, the Federación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia – Santa Cruz (Federation 
of Private Entrepreneurs of Bolivia, Santa Cruz), represented a wide array of business 
organizations in Santa Cruz, including the CAO (Eastern Agricultural and Cattle 
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Chamber), the Federación de Ganaderos (Cattle Ranchers’ Federation) or the Cámara de 
Hidrocarburos (Hydrocarbons Chamber).  
The CPSC, the Comité Pro-Santa Cruz (Pro Santa Cruz Committee) became the 
political tool of the Santa Cruz elites, and the organization through which they first 
promoted, in the early 2000s, their proposal for departmental autonomy. As explained by 
Eaton: 
 
The various fractions of the cruceño capitalist class have been able to close 
 ranks under the banner of autonomy, where autonomy is generally understood 
 to mean (1) regional control over natural resources (e.g. land, timber, gas, and 
 oil), (2) the right to retain control over two-thirds of all tax revenues generated 
 in the department, and (3) authority to set all policies other than defense, 
 currency, tariffs, and foreign relations. (Eaton, as cited in Webber 2008b, pg. 
 90). 
 
 The departmental autonomy model proposed by the Santa Cruz elites would 
surpass by far any autonomy model in Latin America. It would dramatically limit the 
central government’s capacity to redistribute wealth, therefore having a negative effect on 
non-elite actors in Santa Cruz (Eaton, 2007). Moreover, their autonomy proposal 
challenged the autonomy demands made by indigenous groups. Departmental autonomy, 
as envisioned by Media Luna elites, would make the application of indigenous autonomy 
impossible. 
 The departmental autonomy project, however, has successfully co-opted certain 
non-elite civil society organizations and trade unions, and promoted the growth of 
sympathizer organizations, including the proto fascist youth league UJC, the Unión 
Juvenil Cruceñista (Cruceño Youth Union)32. The alliance with far-right actors can be 
understood when considering that “current autonomy demands deploy an explicitly racist 
discourse: highland valley indigenous peoples are identified as backward and the source 
of Bolivia’s poverty, while the ‘whiter’ eastern lowlands are symbols of modernity, 
economic dynamism, and promises of a brighter future” (Kohl, 2010, pg. 109-110).  
 The racism underpinning the departmental autonomy project is based on a 
mythology about the particularism of lowland history. According to this mythology, the 
                                                
32 For more on the Unión Juvenil Cruceñista (Cruceño Youth Union), see Eaton (2007). 
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inhabitants of the lowlands, the cambas, have a whiter heritage than the collas, the 
indigenous inhabitants of the highlands:  
 
 Militant cambas describe ‘camba-ness’ as if it were a goal-directed zeitgeist 
 unfolding in Bolivian history, born of the original synthesis of two noble razas 
 [races]. One side of the lineage is emblematized by the white Spanish 
 conquistador, the other by the dusky tropical (not Andean) indigenous 
 maiden. (Lowrey, as cited in Webber, 2008b, pg. 89).  
 
The racist camba discourse is reproduced even by members of lowland 
indigenous nations that defend indigenous autonomy and oppose the Santa Cruz elites. 
That is the case of Julio. Julio is a member of the Monkoxt community. He has worked 
with CICOL, the Monkoxt’s main indigenous organization, since the early 1980s. He is a 
passionate defender of indigenous autonomy. Although he criticizes Santa Cruz’s elites, 
he shares their racism against highland indigenous immigrants. When asked about the 
Monkoxt’s relationship with highland indigenous people, collas, he explains that they 
don’t have a good relationship, since:  
 
In the last years the highlanders are trying to invade our territory, they are  leaving 
 the highlands to come occupy our lands here in the Orient. And they come with a 
 very different mindset from our own. They want to divide up the land and sell it. 
 While we are trying to preserve it, they only want to sell it,  buy cars, Volvos... 
 And the colla women... they are bad.33  
  
 In 2003, the alliance between social movement organizations and identity based 
indigenous organizations was able to overthrow neoliberal president Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada. His Vice-President, Carlos Mesa, assumed the presidency, but his administration 
would only last 2 years. In 2003 the electoral strength of Evo Morales’ party, MAS, was 
undeniable, and his election to the Bolivian presidency seemed only a matter of time. The 
Santa Cruz elites, through CPSC, the Comité Pro-Santa Cruz (Pro Santa Cruz 
Committee), organized two massive demonstrations in support of departmental 
autonomy. The first one took place in June of 2004, and the second one in January of 
2005. The second demonstration was particularly relevant, since the organizers claimed 
that over 350,000 people demonstrated in Santa Cruz, in the biggest demonstration of 
Bolivia’s history (Eaton, 2007). 
                                                
33 Interview with the author, translated. San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.11.2018 
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During the months between the two demonstrations, the CPSC also collected over 
500,000 signatures in favor of departmental autonomy, holding additional strikes and 
protests to try to force the government to hold a referendum on departmental autonomy. 
They wanted their autonomy proposal to be made into law before Evo Morales could be 
elected and could transform the country’s political system, possibly also implementing 
the indigenous autonomy model organizations like the Pacto de Unidad were 
campaigning for.  
The massive mobilizations and protests organized by CSPC successfully 
pressured interim President Carlos Mesa, who agreed to two sets of elections. First, he 
accepted to jointly hold, with presidential and legislative elections, the first direct election 
of regional prefects in Bolivia’s history. As explained by Benjamin Kohl (2010):  
 
This shifted political power –at least discursively– from the central state to the 
 regions and fed conflict because the new position’s competencies, powers and 
 procedures have not been clearly defined. When right-wing prefects won five 
 of the country’s nine departments, [...] they wasted no time in agitating for 
 the collapse of what they perceived as a hostile, even communist government. 
 (pg. 110).  
 
The government Kohl is referring to is Evo Morales’ government, who was 
elected President at the same time as the right-wing prefects.  
The prefects successfully pressured Morales to keep Mesa’s second promised 
vote: a nationwide referendum on departmental autonomy. Morales not only agreed to 
fulfill Mesa’s promise but he added another vote to the same date, July 2nd of 2006: the 
election of representatives for the Constituent Assembly (Eaton, 2007). 
The departmental autonomy referendum became a victory for Morales and MAS: 
even though 71% of voters in Santa Cruz supported departmental autonomy, a majority 
of Bolivians, 56%, rejected the departmental model, giving Morales a chance to initiate –
and control– a debate on autonomy during the Constituent Assembly (Eaton, 2007). 
 
The Constituent Assembly– Conflicts, Violence, and Concessions 
 
The Assembly met between August 6, 2006, and December 15, 2007. MAS 
delegates were elected to a large number of seats, 137 of 255, while Media Luna parties 
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that supported departmental autonomy occupied a majority of the leftover seats. 
(Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011). The Assembly was contentious from the beginning. Violent 
protests erupted in the streets several times during the negotiations, and the commissions 
in charge of writing articles related to land reform, autonomy and indigenous rights faced 
stark divisions and conflicts (Postero, 2017). 
It was clear from the outset that the right-wing Media Luna parties that supported 
departmental autonomy would not hesitate to use their veto power in the assembly and to 
protest in the streets to achieve their goals. The first major confrontation came shortly 
after the start of the Assembly. MAS declared that “the ‘two-thirds’ rule of the 
Constituent Assembly would only apply to the final text of the draft constitution at the 
end of the process, whereas the decisions leading up to the final text would be determined 
by simple majority” (Webber, 2008b, pg. 85).  
The CPSC, outraged with the decision, declared itself in state of emergency and 
Tuto Quiroga, the leader of the right-wing PODEMOS party, presented one of many 
appeals to the Bolivian Supreme Court claiming that Morales and MAS were using the 
Constituent Assembly to stage a power grab. With the support of CPSC, PODEMOS 
joined other Media Luna parties to hold massive demonstrations against the assembly in 
Media Luna provinces. These demonstrations erupted to violence in several occasions, 
with the burning of the seats of non-profit and indigenous organizations (Postero, 2017). 
By December of 2006, “the civic committees of Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Santa 
Cruz issued an ultimatum to the government, threatening to declare de facto autonomy if 
the government refused to bend to their demands” (Webber, 2008b, pg. 85). Although 
Vice-President García Linera was able to reach an agreement on procedures with Media 
Luna parties, the conflicts continued: in May 2008 the Media Luna departments 
organized an illegal referendum on departmental autonomy, parallel to the Constituent 
Assembly negotiations. Their goal was to force the Assembly to recognize their 
autonomy demands and reject the indigenous autonomy project. The voting day 
generated tensions and conflicts between supporters of departmental autonomy and 
indigenous organizations that supported the indigenous autonomy model, particularly in 
Santa Cruz. 
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Meanwhile, MAS supporters and lowland indigenous organizations also held 
massive demonstrations in the streets and staged hunger strikes against the departmental 
autonomy project of the Media Luna elites. Tensions reached a high point when in the 
Media Luna department of Pando, eleven MAS supporters were assassinated while 
protesting in favor of their party’s position in the Constituent Assembly. The national 
trauma this event generated forced all parties back to the negotiation table, and 
procedural agreements were finally reached.  
MAS, however, made important concessions on land reform, the scope of 
indigenous autonomy, and they also granted Media Luna departments limited autonomy. 
(Postero, 2017). The Constitution would also include protections for private property 
(Article 56) and latifundios (Article 315, 399) (Regalsky, 2010). The concessions made 
by MAS mostly related to the goals that had been defended by identity based indigenous 
organizations, which didn’t have much strength in the Assembly.  
Firstly, the electoral law passed by MAS and right-wing parties, as explained in 
former sections, had debilitated their representation. Secondly, most MAS delegates 
belonged to social movement organizations such as cocalero unions. Identity based 
indigenous organizations had far fewer representatives within MAS, which gave them 
less strength in pushing their demands forward during the drafting of the Constitution 
(Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011).  
MAS chose to prioritize the interests of social movement organizations, their 
main supporters and founders, and sacrificed some of the key demands of their allies, the 
identity based indigenous organizations. The tensions between social movement 
organizations and identity based indigenous organizations were obvious during the 
Constituent Assembly. As stated by Almut Schilling-Vacaflor:  
 
While the priority of the indigenous lowland and Ayllu organizations34 
 [highland identity based indigenous organizations] was to achieve the creation 
 of strong self-governed entities (with respect to land rights and to natural 
 resources) and secure direct representation in state institutions, the MAS party 
                                                
34 Ayllus are pre-Inca, social, political and administrative units in the Andes, common among the Aymara 
and Quechua communities, particularly in Bolivia and Peru. Ayllus became the basis of municipalities after 
Sánchez de Lozada’s multicultural reforms in the 1990s, and they are the basis of many municipal 
autonomies. For more on the ayllu, see Vigiani (2008).  
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 and the peasant organizations aspired to the construction of a new state 
 hegemony and the strengthening of the national level. (Schilling-Vacaflor, 
 2011 pg. 8). 
 
The 2009 Constitution – Between Classical Liberalism and Plurinationalism 
 
Despite the conflicts and disappointments, the Constituent Assembly was able to 
agree on a constitutional text that would be passed in a referendum in January 25th of 
2009 by a 60% margin (Postero, 2017). The 2009 Constitution certainly represented a 
break from traditional Bolivian republicanism. It is the first Magna Carta in Bolivia’s 
history to recognize the rights of indigenous Bolivians, defining the State, in article 1, as 
a “unitary social state under the rule of law, plurinational and communitarian, free, 
independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized, and with autonomies”35 
(“Constitución Política del Estado,” 2009, pg. 5). Article 2 is particularly relevant, as it 
recognizes that the rights of Bolivia’s indigenous nations do not emanate from the state, 
but precede its existence:  
 
Given the precolonial existence of the nations and indigenous originary peasant 
peoples and their ancestral control over their territories, their self-determination is 
guaranteed within the framework of unity of the State, which consists in their 
right to autonomy, self-government, their culture, and the recognition of their 
institutions and the consolidation of their territorial entities, following this 
Constitution and the law.36 (“Constitución Política del Estado,” 2009, pg. 5). 
 
According to Morales, the goal of this Constitution was to “vernacularize” the 
Western liberal state enabling the transformation of the Bolivian Republic into a 
decolonized, plurinational nation (Postero, 2017). According to Jason Tockman and John 
Cameron (2014), who have extensively researched indigenous rights and the autonomy 
system in Bolivia:  
 
Plurinationalism has emerged as a way of reconceiving the nation-state, 
 positing a departure from a liberal multicultural framework for constructing 
 state-society relations to a conceptualization of the state as the composite of 
 multiple nations to which greater rights are extended. At plurinationalism’s 
                                                
35 Translated by the author. 
36 Translated by the author. 
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 core, proponents advocate for the broadening of collective rights to peoples 
 whose existence precedes the advent of the colonial and republican state.  
(pg. 46).  
 
The 2009 Constitution certainly embraces the language of plurinationalism. It 
tries to reach a balance between the form and principles of a traditional liberal state, 
while expanding the rights of traditionally marginalized groups, particularly indigenous 
nations. It breaks with liberal tradition by claiming that the Bolivian nation is not only 
constituted by individual subjects –citizens– but also by colectivos, such as indigenous 
peoples, intercultural groups and afro-Bolivian communities, who hold rights not only as 
individual citizens but as members of these groups (article 3, “Constitución Política del 
Estado,” 2009).  
However, this equilibrium isn’t always easy to find. Juan Carlos Urenda Díaz, 
lawyer and scholar tied to the land-owning lowland elite in Santa Cruz, claimed that the 
Constitution, by enshrining the rights of indigenous Bolivians, was discriminating against 
non-indigenous citizens. According to him, granting privileges to citizens based on their 
ethnicity contradicted the principles of equality that are the basis of a liberal democratic 
system, claiming that “‘indigenous peoples’ right to participate in the benefits of natural 
resource exploitation (Article 30) is a racial privilege.” (Hindery, 2013, pg.166). For 
conservative parties and the lowland elite, the 2009 Constitution, and its declaration of a 
plurinational state, represents an attack to their rights as citizens. 
Also illuminating is the tension between article 4 and article 8 of the Constitution, 
as pointed out by Nancy Postero in her article The Struggle to Create a Radical 
Democracy in Bolivia (2010). In a traditionally liberal fashion, “article 4 guarantees 
‘liberty of religion and spiritual beliefs, in accordance with cosmovisiones [literally 
worldviews] and declares the state independent of all religion” (pg. 72). However, article 
8 establishes that the state will promote ethical and moral principles that are in 
accordance with particular indigenous values such as ama qhilla, ama llulla, ama suwa 
(don’t be lazy, don’t be a liar, don’t be a thief) or suma qamaña (vivir bien or live well). 
The inclusion of these ethical principles in the Constitution, first of all, can be 
essentializing, since it ignores the diverse views and beliefs of indigenous nations and 
ignores culture’s capacity to change and evolve.  
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Secondly, and more importantly for this discussion, are the contradictions 
between article 4 and article 8, and the deviation it represents from Western liberalism. 
Nancy Postero (2017) expresses the contradictions between the desire to adhere to liberal 
democracy while radically transforming the state when she asks “how can this be a 
legitimate liberal constitution if it privileges one cultural framework over all others?” (pg. 
73) and, “can the liberal nation-state form accommodate the forms of self-government 
that are at the heart of indigenous communities’ demands for decolonization?” (pg. 43). 
  When it comes to autonomy, the 2009 Constitution accepted some tenets of the 
Pacto de Unidad’s proposal and embraced its plurinational language. However, it 
substantially modified and reduced the scope of indigenous autonomy that identity based 
indigenous organizations had envisioned. As a result, the 2009 Constitution is a 
fundamentally liberal constitution in which indigenous forms of democracy are forced to 
co-exist, in a subaltern status, with representative liberal democracy, particularly when 
pertaining to autonomies.  
  In the final Constitutional text indigenous autonomies are far from the constitutive 
entities of a decolonized, decentralized, plurinational state: although recognized, the 
central state retains the power of determining which territories can become indigenous 
autonomies, imposing liberal election systems rather than respecting traditional norms 
and procedures for electing representatives, always under state supervision. The 
Constitution: 
 
  Clearly conditions such recognition on the preservation of the unitary state.  
  Articles 2 and 290 specify that, although the design of indigenous self-  
  governments can be based on indigenous norms and procedures, it must also  
  comply with the Constitution and secondary laws. In this context, AIOCs   
  [autonomies] should be understood as administrative units that comply with  
  and reproduce the unitary state. [...] the Constitution incorporates indigenous  
  modes of governance more deeply into the state structure. (Tockman,   
  Cameron & Plata, 2015, pg. 39).  
 
  Moreover, indigenous autonomies will not control the non-renewable resources of 
their territories. Although the central government will have to consult them before 
developing an extractive project in their territories, the consultation will be non-binding 
and can easily be ignored by the central state. In the words of Tockman & Cameron 
(2015), “Bolivia’s new model for indigenous autonomy is similar to other more 
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established autonomy regimes in Latin America, which provide strong rhethorical [sic] 
and, in some cases, constitutional recognition of indigenous rights but undermine them in 
practice” (pg. 48). 
 
Decolonization and Development – A Divided Government 
 
The issues regarding autonomy and its implementation did not end with the 
drafting of the 2009 Constitution: the Morales government’s attitude towards the issue 
shifted during their first administration, adding yet more complications to indigenous 
nations pursuing autonomy. The main causes of the shift were the divisions within the 
Morales government, the extractive policies prioritized by the Morales administration, 
and the role municipal governments played in consolidating MAS’ regional power. 
Despite public performances of unity and unconditional embrace of 
plurinationalism, the Morales administration was never cohesive, and three main 
ideological trends contended for power and to have their goals set as executive priorities: 
(1) the indigenista sector represented by David Choquehuanca, the Minister of the 
Exterior; (2) the populista group led by Evo Morales; and (3) the estatista sector of the 
classical left represented by Vice President –of the first Morales administration– and 
social movements’ scholar Álvaro García Linera. As stated by Roberto Laserna (2010): 
 
The discursive analysis of speeches, proposals and decisions made by MAS 
 allow us to characterize it as a caudillista movement in which at least three 
 tendencies converge with projects that are not necessarily compatible nor 
 harmonious, united by the personal leadership of Evo Morales.37 (pg. 39).  
 
(1) The indigenista sector 
 
The indigenista sector considered that the main goal of the administration was to 
stage a cultural and democratic revolution. Most Aymara ministers and cabinet officials 
belonged to this tendency. This group took charge of the country’s foreign policy and 
representation, focusing at home on passing multilingual education laws and constructing 
                                                
37 Translated by the author. 
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a carefully curated discourse in the media, based on indigenous symbology. As stated by 
Nancy Postero (2017),  
 
Choquehuanca and the first MAS minister of education, the Aymara 
 sociologist Félix Patzi, utilized idealized versions of Andean culture to project 
 an indigenous image onto the government’s economic projects, arguing that 
 Bolivia’s indigenous peoples have solutions to the ills caused by Western 
 capitalism. (pg. 34)  
 
This sector gave Evo Morales the symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1989) he needed to 
present himself as an indigenous President that fully represented the rights and interests 
of the indigenous majority of the country.  
The root of the indigenista sector’s indigenous “credentials” came from its 
members’ involvement with the Katarista movement. The origins of this movement can 
be traced back to the mid-1960s, when Aymara students and intellectuals, many of them 
studying in La Paz, developed a movement that “linked rural and urban Aymaras, calling 
for cultural recognition of Indian rights within a ‘multicultural’ Bolivia” (Postero, 2007, 
pg.42).  
 The state that grew out of the 1952 Revolution was a corporatist, liberal state. It 
incorporated indigenous Bolivians to the political system as individual citizens, as right-
holders vis à vis the state. Their inclusion in the system was based on assimilation and an 
elimination of difference, rather than the recognition of indigenous cultures and 
identities: 
 
 For Indians, this corporatist political system took the form of state sponsored 
 peasant unions, which integrated Indians into the state as producers and not as 
 Indians per se. This meant the official codification of a new social and 
 political category for them: campesinos. (Postero, 2007, pg. 38).  
 
 The Katarista movement rejected this categorization, and was an ideological 
inspiration for many identity based indigenous organizations in the highlands: it based its 
mobilization strategies and frames on re-claiming indigeneity as the most salient identity 
of Aymara Bolivians. By “mobilizing memory” (Farthing & Kohl, 2013, pg. 362), 
Kataristas were able to draw from Bolivia’s indigenous, historical heroes such as Túpac 
Katari. They also referenced past experiences of struggle and liberation, linking them to 
present issues of lack of representation and economic exploitation. Katarismo enacted an 
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“ethnic ideology not only expressed in its name and heroes [...] [but also] in the 
revaluation of traditional authorities, in its Aymara-speaking radio shows, and in many 
other details that remained but were suppressed in peoples collective imaginary.”38 (Albó, 
2008a, pg. 38).  
 The Katarista movement became a key actor in peasant struggles against Hugo 
Bánzer’s dictatorship. They formed their own union, the Sindical Única de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB the Unified Federation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) 
which would be extremely influential in pushing for recognition of indigenous rights in 
the 1990s. The union’s leader, Felipe Quispe, would play an essential role in the early 
2000s uprisings that would bring down the neoliberal government of Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada. 
 However, Katarismo’s main contribution to Bolivia’s politics was bringing to the 
foreground the ‘Indian question.’ Katarismo provided “a powerful tradition that is 
counterhegemonic to both liberal (ethnocidal) nation-building projects, and Eurocentric 
ideals of cultural homogenization and citizenship under a reified form of cultural 
mestizaje” (Sanjinés, as cited in Postero, 2007, pg. 43). The ministers and cabinet 
members that belonged to this tradition were, therefore, deeply committed to the 
implementation of a plurinational state and supported the indigenous autonomy project 
unconditionally. 
 
(2) The Populista Sector 
 
 Evo Morales was the main representative of what Laserna (2010) calls the 
populista group. Activists who had played key roles in peasant unions and neighborhood 
associations –social movement organizations– composed this sector. Whether it was at 
the forefront or in the second line, they had all been involved in mobilizations such as the 
Water War in Cochabamba that had brought down Sánchez de Lozada’s government in 
the early 2000s. As stated, the members of this sector were mostly concerned with 
reversing the economic policies that they considered had harmed their constituencies, 
rather than pursuing indigenous rights. 
                                                
38 Translated by author. 
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Many of them, however, identified as indigenous. Neighborhood associations, for 
example, were mostly formed by indigenous Bolivians who had emigrated from the 
countryside to places like El Alto. There, they were faced with having to work in the 
informal economy to earn a living, with an almost complete lack of basic services. As 
explained by Xavier Albó (2008a): 
 
The importance of immigrants from rural origin, many of whom maintain ties 
 with the countryside, has facilitated a stronger relationship and even solidarity 
 between both areas. This [tendency] is mostly visible in El Alto, the poor but 
 also more creative appendix of La Paz, in which 74% [of inhabitants] self-
 identified as Aymara in the 2001 Census.39 (pg. 45). 
 
This connection facilitated building an alliance with identity based indigenous 
organizations. In many cases, members of the populista sector supported the goals of 
identity based indigenous organizations, but they weren’t their core demands and did not 
consider them nonnegotiable, as the Constituent process had already shown. 
 
(3) The Estatista Sector 
 
 Finally, there was the group Laserna (2010) calls the estatista sector, with Álvaro 
García Linera in the lead. Those who had been linked to the classical Marxist left before 
joining MAS composed this sector. The main goal of this group was to transform the 
relationship between the state and the market to move towards socialism (pg. 39).  
To do so, they believed the state had to expand its reach and push for a nationalist 
industrialization, in which the economic surplus would be equally distributed among the 
masses. According to their view, the first step was to nationalize the exploitation of 
natural resources and use the revenues to expand the state and implement a wide range of 
social programs. Particularly in the first Morales administration, the estatista sector was 
in an enviable position to achieve their goals:  
 
In fact, we could say that practically all the economy-related ministries are 
 held by members of this tendency, and they are the ones promoting the 
 ‘recuperation’ of the state companies. [...] This tendency has, therefore, a 
 privileged position in the Morales cabinet, but they also occupy relevant spaces 
 in Congress and especially in the Senate. (Laserna, 2010, pg. 41). 
                                                
39 Translated by author. 
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Autonomy versus Extractivism – The IDH 
 
Morales’ charismatic leadership and the ideological flexibility of the populista 
tendency allowed for a balancing of the interests of the estatista and indigenista sectors 
during the first Morales administration. However, the application of the economic 
policies designed by the estatista sector collided with a full implementation of the 
autonomy system. These policies consisted on extractive projects based on the 
exploitation of Bolivia’s natural resources. They multiplied the State’s revenues, allowing 
the government to implement the social programs it had promised to its constituency.  
In May 2006, the Morales administration ‘nationalized’ the oil and gas sectors, 
even sending the army –in a highly publicized strategy– to the gas installations owned by 
foreign companies (Postero, 2017). It also “sharply raised taxes and royalties on gas 
producers, and taxed natural gas profits, imposing what are called impuestos directos a 
los hidrocarburos (IDH) [direct taxes on hydrocarbons]” (Postero, 2017). According to 
data from the Andean Information Network cited by Nancy Postero, the gas and oil 
companies had kept around 82% of the revenues from their operations in Bolivia. After 
being forced to renegotiate with the Morales administration, the state retained 54% of 
these profits (Postero, 2017).  
The effects of this law were transformative: governmental income from oil and 
gas increased from $173 million in 2002 to about $1.57 billion in 2007 (Bolivian 
Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy, as cited in Postero, 2017, pg. 98), which allowed 
the Bolivian government to eliminate its deficit and even to start running a surplus. The 
impact on the Bolivian economy was massive: 
 
Urban unemployment levels fell from 8.1% in 2005 to only 4% in 2013. On 
 the other hand, and referring to the impact of social programs, the National 
 Minimum Salary was raised from 500 Bolivian [pesos] in 2005 to 1,656 
 Bolivian [pesos] in 2015.40 (Arze Vargas, 2016, pg. 6).  
 
 An important percentage of the new revenues received by the Bolivian 
government came from the impuestos directos a los hidrocarburos (IDH). The revenues 
of the IDH were used to implement incredibly popular –and publicized– programs, such 
                                                
40 Translated by author. 
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as a universal retirement account for senior citizens, cash transfer programs such as the 
Juancito Pino program –1.7 million primary school students receive $28 a year–, and the 
Juana Azurduy program –for expectant and new mothers (Postero, 2017).  
These programs became essential for the Morales’ administration image, and 
therefore the government became dependent on the source of their funding: extractivist 
policies and the exploitation of natural resources. To implement these extractivist 
policies, the government needed to access and exploit the natural resources present in 
indigenous territories. A full embrace of a plurinational state model and of the indigenous 
autonomy system –in which indigenous communities would decide how to manage all 
natural resources in their territories– would have threatened the government’s economic 
policies, as it would have limited its capacity to implement the extractivist projects it saw 
fit. When faced with this conflict, the Morales administration chose to protect its 
extractivist interest, defended by the populista and estatista sector, and sacrificed its 
commitment to indigenous autonomy, supported by the indigenista sector: 
 
Facing growing tensions between plurinationalism and the dependence on  
nonrenewable natural resource exports, the state appears to be leaving behind 
 its support for indigenous autonomy in favor of a model of development 
 focused on the redistribution of state rents from resource extraction (often  labeled 
 as neoextractivist; (Veltmeyer 2013) and highly partisan political strategies to 
 control state power. (Tockman & Cameron, 2014, pg. 59).  
 
The TIPNIS case is paradigmatic of this tension, and the government’s choice. In 
2011, the Morales administration announced its intention to build a highway from Villa 
Tunari (Cochabamba) to San Ignacio de Mojos in the Beni region, crossing through the 
protected territory of the TIPNIS, “one of the largest and most diverse tropical reserves 
and home to sixty-three Moxeño, Yuracaré, and Chimane communities.” (Postero, 2017, 
pg. 122).  
The first two sections of the road (on either side, outside of TIPNIS lands) were 
already under construction although no environmental review had been done, and no 
consultation process had been organized with the indigenous communities. Although 
consultations are not binding, they are mandated by the 2009 Constitution. After the 
scandal broke, the Morales government refused to compromise and said that the road 
would certainly be built, with Morales himself stating: “I want to tell you, like it or not, 
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we are going to build this road and this administration is going to deliver the Villa Tunari 
San Ignacio de Mojos highway.” (La Jornada, 2011, as cited in Postero, 2017, pg. 123).  
Faced with an intransigent government, the indigenous organizations CIDOB, the 
Confederación de los Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of the Indigenous 
Peoples of Bolivia) and CONAMAQ, Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Marcas del 
Qullasuyu (National Council of the Ayllus and Marcas of the Qullasuyu) organized a 
march to La Paz: Morales refused to negotiate with the protesters and in September 25th, 
2011, the national police attacked the marchers. According to Bolivia’s Defensor del 
Pueblo (ombudsman), the police used disproportionate violence in an action that 
amounted to human rights violations. 
National outrage and international pressure forced the Morales administration to 
hold the constitutionally mandated referendum. Although most voters supported the 
construction of the road, Rolando Vilena, the Defensor del Pueblo: 
 
Issued a harsh critique of the consultation process, which he characterized as  
‘authoritarian, colonialist, and unilateral’. In addition to failing to comply with 
 international requirements for a prior consultation (before financing and 
 construction commitments), to be carried out in good faith and in accordance 
 with indigenous customs and governing structures, [...] the process did not 
 achieve the agreement of all parties, as required by the Plurinational 
 Constitutional Court (TCP), as a condition of its constitutionality. (Postero, 
 2017, pg. 127). 
 
The TIPNIS case is paradigmatic of the success of the estatista sector in setting 
the priorities of the state, and the sacrifice of indigenous autonomy as a governmental 
priority. When a confrontation between indigenous rights and the interests of the state 
took place as it did in the TIPNIS case, the Morales administration opted to protect state 
power and its interests rather than the rights of indigenous peoples to their land and 
territory. Members of what Laserna (2010) called the indigenista sector resigned after the 
TIPNIS controversy, and indigenous organizations expressed a sense of betrayal from an 
administration they had helped get elected.  
Vice President García Linera, in his book Geopolitics of the Amazon: Landed-
Patrimonial Power and Capitalist Accumulation (2012), disassociated the TIPNIS 
conflict from indigenous rights and demands, and blamed the protests on the foreign 
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influence of well-meaning environmentalists, who according to him, and however 
indirectly, served the interests of big capital:  
 
The most dramatic thing of all is that this planetary farce of a capitalism that is 
strategically destructive of nature but tactically preserves environmental niches 
has as the executioners of its plans for capitalist gains an army of well-meaning 
environmental activists –with salaries paid by multinational companies– that 
‘preserve’ the forests of poor countries and at the end of their work day, deliver to 
the mega-company an extraterritorial environmental surplus that will increase 
even more the prices of its stock. [...] a tiny portion [of the surplus] goes to the 
hands of the environmentalists, who long for the continued marginalization of the 
inhabitants of the forest of some country in the South, such as those in the 
TIPNIS, and they chase away the State so that it doesn’t disturb their ‘harmonic’ 
poverty, completing a sinister planetary mechanism of ‘environmental capitalist 
accumulation.’41 (García Linera, 2012, pg. 88-89). 
  
Morales’ argument to defend the TIPNIS road, however, was different from 
García Linera’s and more congruent with his populista ideology. The TIPNIS conflict 
represented a challenge to the power of the state and the capacity the central government 
had to implement the policies it saw fit in the whole national territory, particularly in 
areas controlled by indigenous communities. For Morales, the construction of a strong 
state –and his hold of it–, surpassed any other consideration, as he insinuated in 2011 
when he stated that:  
 
In the Constitution, it says that natural resources belong to the Bolivian people 
 under the administration of the Plurinational State. In some regions, they are 
 trying to generate confusion [...] some of our brothers say that because they 
 have indigenous first peoples’ autonomy they are entitled to natural resources. 
 [These], especially hydrocarbons, metal and nonmetal resources, belong to the 
 national government. (Los Tiempos, 2011, as cited in Tockman & Cameron, 
 2014, pg. 54). 
 
Autonomy versus State Control – The Case of the Municipalities 
   
 The people I interviewed in my time in Lomerío identified one main opposing 
force to the autonomy process: the political parties elected to the municipality. According 
to Julio, historical CICOL leader, “those who are used to clinging to political parties are 
                                                
41 Translated by author. 
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the ones that don’t like it [autonomy].”42 Like Julio, the other interviewees identified 
personal and political interests behind their opposition. Antonio, who works in the 
municipality himself but is also involved in CICOL and supports autonomy, agrees with 
the others: “I see it related to the issue of power. Fear of losing power, their salary, their 
job. They don’t fight for our society as a whole, they fight for themselves and create 
trouble.”43 
 Even MAS supporters and representatives have opposed autonomy and favored 
the continuity of municipalities. Cameron & Tockman (2014), who have studied the 
autonomy conversion processes of many indigenous communities both in the highlands 
and in the lowlands, believe that:  
 
 The reticence of the state towards indigenous autonomy also needs to be 
 understood in the context of the priority the MAS party has put in winning 
 municipal elections as a strategy for building a base of popular support and 
 controlling political power (pg. 61).  
 
 As early as 2009, during the elections, MAS supporters falsely stated that 
converting the municipality into an indigenous autonomy would lead to an increase of 
local taxes. In the several municipalities where Tockman & Cameron (2014) conducted 
their research, such as Jesús de Machaca, MAS ran candidates that openly opposed 
autonomy, and after they got elected, they blocked the autonomy process to effectively 
extend their terms as mayors and councilors from two to five years. Even Morales 
himself warned that his government would not work with municipalities where MAS 
officials weren’t elected (La Prensa 2010, as cited in Tockman & Cameron, 2014, pg. 
57).  
 The crux of MAS’ opposition to autonomy was that in many cases, the statutes 
that were being drafted rejected liberal democratic elections and favored elections 
through traditional norms and procedures, which normally involved assemblies: in these 
systems, political parties would not be allowed to run. That is the case of the Monkoxt of 
Lomerío, as Luis, a young CICOL representative, explains:  
 
                                                
42 Interview with the author, translated. San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.11.2018 
 
43 Interview with the author, translated. San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.18.2018 
 
 47 
With autonomy all public functionaries are also going to serve 5-year terms [as 
they do in the municipal system]. Those who will run to become the mayor are 
not going to be elected through a vote; they are going to be subject to [someter] an 
assembly. Secret [vote], acclamation, that’s what we are still discussing. When 
there are issues with the administration of the autonomous government, an 
assembly will be called and the man [the mayor] leaves, that’s it. That is going to 
be the change. We are not going to vow [someter] to political parties. There is 
going to be an assembly of the twenty-nine communities, there he is revoked, 
supported, or he runs again, but it’s going to be according to the work that the 
autonomous government does. 44 
 
According to Julio, the transformation of the electoral system was one of the 
reasons behind the autonomy process:  
A component of autonomy has a lot to do with the transformation of the system 
 of government in our territory. Because when we titled it [and obtained TCO 
 recognition] we also thought about it, how we should govern ourselves. 
 Although it is true that we have a municipality, they still have the same 
 traditional mentality of the political parties.45 
  
For Pedro, an elder in the community, the origin of such transformation doesn’t 
only come from an embrace of traditional decision-making procedures, or even from the 
TCO process. Sánchez de Lozada, in the mid-90s, passed the Ley de Participación 
Popular (Popular Participation Law) that came to be known as LPP. Its goal was to 
achieve a:  
 
Decentralizing of a significant percentage of government expenditure to local 
 government budgets, the creation of new opportunities for rural communities 
 to partake in the planning and regulation of local government, and formal 
 recognition of indigenous and popular organizations as political entities with 
 rights. (McNeish, 2002, pg. 229).  
 
The LPP had some positive effects by increasing the representation of indigenous 
peoples in municipal governments. In the municipal elections of 1995, the first after the 
law was passed, “more than 500 peasants and indígenas were elected as municipal 
councilors (concejales) or, in some cases, mayors. In the 2000 municipal elections, that 
number rose to over 1,000, or 65 percent of the total number of seats” (Albó and Quispe, 
2004, as cited in Albó, 2008a, pg. 27). For Pedro, once they were been able to elect 
                                                
44 Interview with the author, translated. San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.20.2018. 
 
45 Interview with the author, translated. San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.11.2018. 
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indigenous representatives from Lomerío, they realized that political parties only brought 
conflict: 
 
What is always harming us here, inside the TCO, are political colors. That is what 
divides people, nothing else. Before this there was politics of course, but no one 
thought it could be different. There weren’t any candidates from Lomerío. We 
could only support candidates that came from political parties in Concepción or 
Santa Cruz. Nothing else. But nowadays there can be candidates from Lomerío. 
And you have to look into the specific person, you see? If they are responsible, if 
they like solidarity, caring for all the communities, because there are a lot of 
people who want to come in, do their campaign, but it’s all for personal interests. 
Nothing else. They don’t work for the communities, they only have personal 
interests, and that’s bad: once they get elected, they forget about the 
communities.46 
 
 Antonio defends a similar thesis to Pedro’s. Although the LPP allowed for more 
indigenous representation, it still forced the Monkoxt who wanted to get involved in local 
politics to run in a political party. For him, in the current system, participating in party 
politics was inevitable as it was the only way to gain representation in political 
institutions that have a critical impact on the lives of the Monkoxt. That will change once 
autonomy is implemented: 
 
Political parties used to be like ladders. Because if we didn’t get in, we didn’t 
have representation. We had to get involved, want it or not. [...] For example now, 
if autonomy were consolidated, we wouldn’t have political parties anymore. And 
then we shouldn’t fight, because we are all indigenous, wouldn’t that be better? 
It’s not like in other places, in which there are divisions [...] Here we are all 
indigenous and most of us are family. Here what we need is not more 
socialization [of the statute], what we need to do is make everything more 
participative. Include community members in everything, in everything. So that if 
some of us get arrested, the fight doesn’t have to stop, it can continue.47 
 
The fact that these perceptions are enshrined in the Monkoxt statute –and the six 
studied by Tockman and Cameron (2014)– is a clear challenge to MAS’ political power 
throughout Bolivia. This challenge, together with the need to continue expanding the 
extractivist policies that have funded the Morales administration’s social programs, has 
effectively led the government to restrict the exercise of autonomy and to impede the full 
implementation of a true Plurinational State. 
                                                
46 Interview with the author, translated. San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.19.2018 
 
47 Interview with the author, translated. San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.18.2018. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE IMPACT OF THE STATE’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE MONKOXI AUTONOMY 
 
In this chapter, I will analyze how the different views of autonomy that contended 
at the state level, as described in the prior chapter, impacted the Monkoxt’s autonomy 
process and their autonomy statute, the Estatuto Autonómico de la Nación Monkoxt de 
Lomerío (2015). 
After the passing of the 2009 Constitution, Evo Morales’ administration designed 
and passed the LMAD, the Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización (Framework 
Law of Autonomies and Decentralization). The LMAD is the law that regulates the 
implementation of the autonomy system. I will show that the tensions and contradictions 
that became apparent in the constituent process resurfaced in the drafting of the LMAD. 
The law establishes an extremely complex bureaucratic process to access autonomy, and 
its design shows that the Morales government wanted to avoid a deep reconfiguration of 
the state.  
 In the second section of this chapter, Autonomy and the Monkoxt –A Process vis a 
vis State Bureaucracy, I will show that in the case of the Monkoxt, the implementation of 
the LMAD has been particularly problematic: the CICOL, the organization representing 
the Monkoxt vis a vis the state in the autonomy process, started their process to pursue 
autonomy before the law was passed. Because of that, they have had to jump even further 
bureaucratic hurdles to adapt their process to the requirements of the law. 
Finally, in the section The Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío, I will analyze how 
the LMAD impacted the final version of the Monkoxt’s statute, showing the sacrifices it 
demanded from the original draft written by the CICOL in 2015. 
  
The LMAD – Contradictions of a Centralizing State 
 
 The contradictions that surfaced and were written into the 2009 Bolivian 
Constitution are reproduced in the Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización 
(Framework Law of Autonomies and Descentralization) the LMAD, the law set to 
regulate the decentralization of the Bolivian state and the constitution of indigenous 
autonomies.  
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As explained, and according to the 2009 Constitution, indigenous nations have the 
right to constitute autonomies in their territories and govern themselves through their own 
traditional norms, customs, and institutions. Not only that, but their capacity to achieve 
autonomy and govern themselves is an expression of their inalienable right to self-
determination, recognized in article 1 of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution (“Constitución 
Política del Estado”, 2009). 
However, many indigenous groups and organizations such as CEJIS –a Santa 
Cruz based NGO that has closely collaborated with the Monkoxt in the autonomy 
process–, consider that “the Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization 
[LMAD] is an obvious violation of the Constitution, and its contents are even considered 
as a betrayal of the constitutional process by indigenous groups”48 (Jiménez Pimentel, 
2010, pg. 106).  
The LMAD establishes several paths and types of autonomy. Departmental 
autonomy is relatively easy to achieve, and although it grants more administrative 
capacities to the department, it does not suppose the creation of a new political entity 
within the state. This is the type of autonomy that Media Luna elites had defended and 
that Evo Morales had agreed to include in the 2009 Constitution. 
However, indigenous autonomies, as defended by identity based indigenous 
groups, lead to a deeper transformation of the state’s structures, and can be constituted in 
–and then separate from– an autonomous department.  
When it comes to indigenous autonomy, the LMAD has prioritized the municipal 
path, which has come to be known as the “quick” path. The process to achieve this type 
of autonomy is much shorter and less demanding, probably because once an autonomy is 
formed, it does not modify the current administrative organization of the state. The 
municipality is governed by indigenous nations through their norms and customs, but it 
remains under the same regional government, under the same administrative system.  
The other main path established in the LMAD, the territorial path, allows 
indigenous nations to become an autonomy based on their ancestral territories. Once 
autonomy is constituted, the administrative lines established by the state have to be 
redefined. This path has come to be known as the “long” path. It demands that indigenous 
                                                
48 Translated by the author. 
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nations follow an eleven-step process filled with bureaucratic hurdles and challenges. The 
Monkoxi of Lomerío, one of the first indigenous nations to start the bureaucratic 
procedures to have their autonomy recognized by the state, have still not complied with 
all the requirements, over ten years after they started the process.  
According to the territorial path, first of all, indigenous nations have to obtain a 
state certification that declares them indigenous and recognizes their right to self-
determination over their ancestral lands, a right that is already recognized in the Bolivian 
Constitution49. 
Secondly, the law determines that there must be a minimum population in the 
indigenous territory, and that they must prove the economic viability of the future 
autonomic entity. However, as explained by CEJIS scholars, “the law contradictorily 
imposes population and viability requirements to the indigenous peoples that wish to 
constitute an autonomy in their territory that, however, can be waived if they choose the 
municipal path” (Jiménez Pimentel, 2010, pg. 110).  
Thirdly, indigenous nations are required to collectively confirm their will to 
constitute an autonomy in front of the Bolivian state. They can’t, however, make that 
decision through their traditional norms and procedures without governmental approval. 
First, their norms and procedures have to be approved and certified by a state official. 
Only then will indigenous groups be allowed to use these procedures to decide on 
whether or not they want to become an autonomous territory, and always under state 
supervision.  
Moreover, “the law imposes specific elements of institutional design that appear 
to have no connection to any indigenous norm, instead reinforcing liberal principles and 
municipal institutions” (Tockman, Cameron & Plata, 2015, pg. 42). For example, even 
when properly certified, monitored and approved, before the autonomy process can 
continue, the central government forces indigenous peoples to confirm their decision to 
become an autonomy by holding a Western-style liberal referendum, based on an 
electoral census determined by government officials. This is not the only case in which 
liberal modes are given primacy over indigenous traditional norms and procedures. 
Article 62 of the LMAD also imposes a particular form of government to be adopted by 
                                                
49 See “Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional” (2009) 
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indigenous autonomies, requiring a division between executive, legislative and 
administrative branches, also including specific directions on how the branches must be 
designed (Tockman, Cameron & Plata, 2015).  
 Finally, indigenous autonomies cannot, even after following all the turns and 
intricacies of the law, go over departmental borders. It does not matter that the 
Constitution recognizes indigenous nations’ right to territorial restitution, or their claims 
to their ancestral lands: the structure of the liberal state supersedes their rights.  As 
clearly explained by researcher Georgina Jiménez Pimentel, from CEJIS, the 
impossibility of modifying departmental borders to form autonomous territories forces 
indigenous nations to “resign their inalienable right to self-determination, their right to 
self-government, their right to territory and autonomy, to secure the continuity of the 
territorial organization of the liberal, colonial state”50 (Jiménez Pimentel, 2017, pg. 109). 
 Table II presents a simplified account of the steps indigenous nations need to 
follow to pursue territorial autonomy. According to CEJIS scholars: 
 Behind these requirements there is the desire to curve –through laws, rules and 
 prerequisites– the aspiration of self-government and the deepening of the 
 pluralist and communitarian character that establishes the CPE [Constitution] 
 to return to the liberal institutionalism inherited from colonial times.51 (Flores 
 Gonzales, 2018, pg. 189). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
50 Translated by the author. 
51 Translated by the author. 
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Table II: LMAD, Steps and Requirements. Designed by the author, following the 
information in Flores Gonzales, 2018, pg. 183-189. 
 
  
 
Steps Procedures according to the LMAD 
 
 
 
Step 1 – Ancestrality, Population and Governmental 
Viability Certificate 
 
Given by the Ministry of Autonomies, this certificate 
verifies the “indigeneity” of those pursuing 
autonomy. It also certifies that they fulfill the 
minimum population requirement set by law, and 
their capacity to govern themselves based on their 
indigenous institutions.  
 
 
 
Step 2 – Referendum to Access Autonomy 
 
The indigenous group must confirm their desire to 
pursue autonomy in a referendum supervised by the 
Electoral Plurinational Organ and the Intercultural 
Service of Democratic Strengthening (SIFDE). 
 
 
 
Step 3 – Constitution of the Deliberative Organ 
 
Election of the community representatives that will 
write the future autonomy’s statute. In the case of the 
Monkoxt, the deliberative organ was called the CCA, 
the Consejo Consultivo Autonómico (Autonomic 
Advisory Council). 
 
Step 4 – Participative Drafting of the Statute 
 
Once the Deliberative Organ is constituted, it must 
determine the rules and procedures according to 
which it will function. It also has to establish the 
participative methodology through which it will draft 
the contents of the statute. As stated, the design of 
the new autonomy has to follow the minimum 
conditions specified in article 62 of the LMAD. 
 
 
 
Step 5 – Approval of the Autonomy Statute 
 
The Statute must be approved by two thirds of the 
Deliberative Organ, and then through the indigenous 
nation’s traditional norms and procedures. 
 
 
 
Step 6 – Constitutional Control 
 
The approved statute must be sent to the Bolivian 
Plurinational Constitutional Court for control and 
approval. Once it has been approved, the indigenous 
group must petition the Electoral Plurinational Organ 
to call for a referendum in the territory. 
 
 
 
Step 7 – Creation of the Territorial Unity Law 
 
 
 
 
The Bolivian Congress, known as the Plurinational 
Legislative Assembly, must pass a law approving the 
constitution of a new territorial autonomous entity 
within the State, and determine its borders with other 
regions. 
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Table II continued: 
Steps Procedures according to the LMAD 
 
 
 
Step 8 – Calling the Referendum 
 
Once the Plurinational Constitutional Court has 
approved the statute, and the law of Creation of 
Territorial Unity has been passed, the Plurinational 
Electoral Organ will call for a referendum, which 
will be administered by the Departmental Electoral 
Court, following a census defined by the Electoral 
Supreme Court. 
 
 
 
 
Step 9 – Constitution of the Government 
 
If the statute is approved in referendum, the new 
indigenous autonomy will be allowed to form its 
government, according to the rules and procedures 
determined in the approved Statute, under the 
supervision of the Plurinational Electoral Organ. 
 
 
Autonomy and the Monkoxt –A Process vis a vis State Bureaucracy 
 
 The Monkoxt of Lomerío were one of the first indigenous nations to pursue 
autonomy and to deal with the complicated intricacies of the LMAD, the Ley Marco de 
Autonomías y Descentralización (Framework Law of Autonomies and Descentralization). 
Their case is particularly interesting, as they started to pursue autonomy for their territory 
before the law was drafted and passed. 
Before the current autonomy process, the Monkoxt reference as their main 
achievement towards self-determination the communal titling of their land to become a 
TCO, a Tierra Comunitaria de Origen (Communal Land of Origin)52 on May 30th, 2006 
(Flores Gonzales, 2018). As stated by Carmen, a young professional that collaborates in 
the communications’ department of CICOL: 
 
Lomerío is a TCO where we live, constituted by twenty-nine communities and 
 [the organization] that represents the twenty-nine communities is the CICOL, 
 which means Central Indígena de Comunidades Originaras de Lomerío 
 [Indigenous Central of the Originary Communities of Lomerío].  
CICOL, thirty-six years after it was created, has been fighting for the rights of 
 the indigenous communities. The great achievement until now has been the 
 titling of the TCO where we live.53  
                                                
52 See Postero (2007) chapter 1, section State-Sponsored Multiculturalism, for more on TCOs, Tierras 
Comunitaria de Origen (Communal Lands of Origin). 
 
53 Translated by the author. 
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CICOL, the Central Indígena de Comunidades Originaras de Lomerío 
(Indigenous Central of the Originary Communities of Lomerío), is the indigenous 
organization that has represented the Monkoxt since the 1980s. CICOL, with the help of 
Santa Cruz NGOs, negotiated and processed the documents necessary to have their 
territory, Lomerío, recognized with communal titles as the ancestral territory of the 
Monkoxt.   
However, the TCO status wasn’t enough to fulfill the desire of self-government 
and self-determination that CICOL was pursuing:  
 
Actually, conquering our territory hasn’t been easy, we have marched to force 
 them to listen to our demands until after ten years the state gave us our [TCO] 
 title. The titled territory is bigger than the territory under the municipal 
 government, [...] that is why the [Monkoxt] Assembly analyzed this situation 
 and in 2008 decided to pursue an indigenous autonomy based on the titled 
 territory54 (María Choré, President of the CCA, as cited in Flores Gonzales, 
 2018, pg. 155-156).  
 
Since the Constitution and the LMAD hadn’t yet passed, to legally support their 
autonomy demands, they cited the 169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention passed 
by the ILO in 1989, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that had 
been ratified by the Constitution passed by the Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 
administration in the 1990s (Flores Gonzales, 2018). 
Because there was no legal frame of reference, the Monkoxt pursued autonomy 
following their traditional usos y costumbres: CICOL called for a general assembly of the 
Lomerío communities in March of 2008. The assembly took place in the community of 
Puquio Cristo Rey. In the meeting, CICOL declared Lomerío the “first autonomous 
indigenous territory of Bolivia” and stated their intention to write and pass an autonomy 
statute following their traditional norms and procedures. 
Following the resolution, the CICOL called for a meeting of the representatives of 
the 29 communities the 13th and 14th of July of 2009, in San Lorenzo de Lomerío. The 
meeting was titled Primer Encuentro Autonómico Territorial de Lomerío (First 
Autonomous Meeting of the Territory of Lomerío). Each community elected its 
                                                                                                                                            
 
54 Translated by the author. 
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representatives following traditional norms and procedures. The first Morales 
administration showed its full support to the process, so that “the 56 assembly 
representatives were recognized by the then Minister of Autonomies Dr. Carlos Romero, 
in a big event that took place in Puquio in July 20th 2009” (Flores Gonzales, 2018, pg. 
163). 
These representatives met in San Lorenzo and elected the Consejo Autonómico 
Monkoxi del Territorio de Lomerío, CCA (the Autonomy Council of the Lomerío 
Territory). The Council had the mandate of writing a first draft of the Autonomy Statute 
and establishing a participative process to share it with the communities.  
The final draft of the Estatuto was finished by August 2009, and it was presented 
to President Evo Morales in Camiri, a small city in the Santa Cruz province, together 
with other indigenous communities that also wanted to pursue autonomy: the 
municipalities of Jesús de Machaca and Charazani from La Paz, Tarabuco and Mojocoya 
from Chuquisaca, Chayanta from Potosí and Rajaypama from Cochabamba (“El 
Gobierno junta 5.000 campesinos”, 2008). 
 Therefore, the Monkoxt had written and approved their Estatuto Autonómico 
(Autonomy Statute) in 2009, a year before the LMAD was signed into law in 2010. By 
then, and once the law was passed, the Ministry of Autonomies under Carlos Romero 
identified the municipalities of Jesús de Machaca in the highlands, and Lomerío in the 
lowlands, as exemplary cases to prove the viability of the municipal conversion path. 
However, CICOL, as the grass-roots organization representing Lomerío, opposed the 
government’s push and decided to follow the territorial path:  
 
We didn’t want to pursue indigenous autonomy through the municipal path, 
 despite the insistence of the Minister of Autonomies Carlos Romero, who told 
 us it would be the shortest route and it would make our access [to autonomy] 
 quicker, saying that we had chosen the longest path. Why? There are a lot of 
 advantages for us in the territorial path, and talking geographically it is better 
 for us to follow the territorial path because the TCO title we have goes beyond 
 the limits of the municipality, so if we chose the municipal path some 
 communities would be left out and that would be a disadvantage [...]55 (Elmar 
 Masay, General Cacique of CICOL, as cited in Flores Gonzales, 2018,  
pg. 170-171). 
 
                                                
55 Translated by author. 
 57 
 However, CICOL had to face the problems the mismatch between the steps set 
out in the LMAD and their own autonomy process generated. Between 2008 and 2009, 
CICOL had held a consultation according the their traditional norms and procedures, 
appointed a Deliberative Council –the CCA, the Consejo Consultivo Autonómico 
(Autonomic Advisory Council)– and written and approved an autonomy statute: 
following the steps set in the LMAD, it had completed steps two, three and four. 
However, state representatives hadn’t monitored these procedures, and CICOL had yet to 
present the certificates of Ancestrality and Governmental Viability, which were the first 
step in the autonomy process according to the law. Because of that, the autonomy process 
of the Monkoxt was in a stalemate, and they were forced to present documents that would 
prove that the statute and the procedures through which it had been written complied with 
legal requirements.  
Moreover, and with the help of CEJIS técnicos, CICOL had to present the 
following documents to the Ministry of Autonomies to obtain the Certificate of 
Ancestrality: organic statute of CICOL, internal rules, reports presented to the INRA 
when titling their territory to prove their claim to their lands, and photocopies of the 
certificates INRA had given them when they had titled the TCO.  
To obtain the certificates of Governmental Viability and Population minimum 
(base poblacional), they had to present a photocopy of the Ancestrality Certificate (once 
it was obtained), an integral development plan for the territory, data on the last census, an 
administrative resolution from the Ministry of Autonomies certifying their governmental 
viability, and further documents that although not required according to the law, 
individual workers in the Ministry of Autonomies demanded to process CICOL’s 
demands (Flores Gonzales, 2018). 
 CICOL also had to present the resolutions and minutes of the assemblies in which 
they had voted to pursue territorial autonomy, elected the CCA and approved the statute. 
The process was so taxing and they faced so many bureaucratic delays, that CICOL 
didn’t obtain all the documents necessary to continue the autonomy process where they 
had left off until six years later, in 2016. Then, they were finally able to send their 
proposed statute to the Plurinational Constitutional Court (TCP) of Bolivia for revision 
and approval. 
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 The Plurinational Constitutional Court (TCP) mandated the modification of 
nineteen articles of the statute presented by CICOL. Two of the modifications demanded 
are particularly interesting for the discussion of this chapter. Article 3, entitled 
Jurisdicción Territorial –Territorial Jurisdiction– established the territorial limits of the 
future autonomous territory. However, the TCP demanded that the whole article be 
eliminated: only the central state, through the Bolivian Congress, had the legal right to 
determine the territorial limits of Lomerío’s autonomous territory, by passing the law of 
Creation of Territorial Unity (step six according to the LMAD).  
The Constitutional Court also demanded the modification of article 5, entitled 
Jerarquía Normativa del Estatuto Autonómico –Normative Hierarchy of the Autonomy 
Statute– that started by stating that “the following Statute is the constitutive Magna Carta 
of the Territorial Autonomy of the Monkoxt Nation of Lomerío;” (Flores Gonzales, 2018, 
pg. 221). There can only be one constitutive Magna Carta in Bolivia, and that is the 
Plurinational Constitution passed by the central state in 2009. 
In the following section, I will analyze the most salient modifications according to 
the CICOL’s understanding of indigenous autonomy, as outlined in the first version of 
the Estatuto Autonómico de la Nación Monkoxt de Lomerío, published in 2015. 
 
The Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío 
 
While in Bolivia, I conducted eleven interviews with members of the Monkoxi 
nation of Lomerío56. While some had been actively involved with the autonomy process, 
and were active members of CICOL, others felt disconnected from the autonomy process 
and did not regularly participate in CICOL meetings. I discussed autonomy with them, 
and the meaning they gave to the concept. Despite their differences, they all understood 
autonomy as a practical tool related to four main categories: (1) resource management; 
(2) rejection of traditional political parties, and more broadly, political conflict; (3) a 
quest for freedom, related to a historical arc of overcoming exploitation; and (4) cultural 
                                                
56 See Methods section, in the first chapter of this thesis. 
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conservation, particularly tied to their language, farming lifestyle, and traditional tales 
and practices57.  
In this section, I will show how each category appears in the legal document that 
would govern the Monkoxi autonomy, the Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío (Autonomy 
Statute of Lomerío) (2015). I will reference the first version of the Estatuto, published in 
2015, before the Constitutional Court of Bolivia mandated the modification of several 
articles. A comparison between the final version of the Estatuto and the 2015 draft, 
illuminates the clashes between the view of autonomy set in the 2009 Constitution and 
the LMAD at the state level, and the understanding of the concept of autonomy of 
CICOL, at the local level.  
 
(1) Resource Management 
 
 The management of natural resources was a particularly sensitive issue for 
CICOL and the central government. As explained in prior chapters, identity based 
indigenous organizations wanted the 2009 Constitution to recognize the right of 
indigenous nations to fully manage their natural resources without interference from the 
central government. However, their proposal wasn’t fully included in the final 
Constitutional text. According to the 2009 Carta Magna, indigenous nations have the 
legal right to manage the renewable resources present in their territories, but the central 
government retains the right to exploit the nonrenewable resources present in their lands. 
The government has the obligation to consult the affected communities, but the result of 
the consultation is non-binding and the state can proceed to develop an extractive project 
in indigenous lands even if the communities oppose it.58 
 This distinction strongly affected the Estatuto Autonómico written by the 
Monkoxt. To achieve autonomy, the Plurinational Constitutional Court of Bolivia (TCP) 
had to approve the Estatuto drafted by the indigenous nation. The CICOL presented their 
Estatuto for revision an approval to the Court in 2016, and the TCP mandated the 
modification of nineteen articles, most of them related to resource management.  
                                                
57 See the fourth chapter, Autonomy as Identity, of this thesis for an indepth analysis of the meanings 
attached to autonomy by individual interviewees of the Monkoxi nation. 
 
58 See Autonomy from the State’s Perspective Chapter. 
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An analysis of the Estatuto published by CICOL in 2015 –before the Court’s 
corrections– is relevant as it allows us to understand how the CICOL planned to manage 
the natural resources in their territory. However, the 2015 version of the Estatuto 
remained vague even before the TCP’s corrections. There were references to 
sustainability and making sure future generations could enjoy Lomerío’s natural 
resources, but there was no specificity on the application of these principles.  
For example, part 5 of the Estatuto is devoted to the Estructura Económica y 
Social, Recursos Naturales, Tierra, Territorio y Medioambiente (Social and Economic 
Structure, Natural Resources, Land, Territory and Environment). In chapter I of this 
section, right after detailing what they mean by natural resources (articles 61 and 62), the 
Monkoxt included article 63, entitled Cosmovisión y Protección (Cosmovision and 
Protection). This article stated that all policies relating to the use of natural resources 
must respect “‘Jichi’ owner of the hill,” a Monkoxt deity that lives in and protects nature. 
Moreover, section I of article 63 established that: 
 
I. The Autonomous Monkoxi Government of Lomerío will promote the 
 protection, use, access, and sustainable management of natural resources and 
 biodiversity, in the framework of the cosmovision and needs of its families. It 
 will consider the related practices they undertake such as hunting, fishing, [...] 
 for family consumption.59 (“Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío,” 2015, pg. 40). 
 
However, the TCP mandated the elimination of this section as it considered that it 
infringed on the competencies of the central government. 
There are further references to the connections between resource management and 
cultural values throughout the Estatuto. In the second chapter of the document, article 12 
Valores Ancestrales y Principios (Ancestral values and principles) section II, states that: 
 
II. Ancestral values and principles are the basis, the cement on which we build our 
“Casa Grande” [Big Home] as we call our territory. On them we build our future, 
recovering the historical past of our nation, valuing our present, which allows us 
to protect, use, manage and adequately make use of the natural resources we 
possess.  (pg. 15). 
 
                                                
59 Translated by the author. All excerpts from the Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío, unless otherwise 
indicated, have been translated by the author. 
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However, the TCP also mandated the elimination of this section. In the same 
article, section III, the Monkoxt outlined their values and principles. These included 
freedom, collaboration and solidarity, among others. There is also one ancestral value 
outlined that relates to resource management: 
 
9. Sustainability, is making use and utilizing natural resources considering 
 the future of our children and grandchildren, taking care of the forest, the  pampa, 
 the water and all the living beings that live in the “Casa Grande,”  making sure 
 they don’t run out (pg. 16). 
 
The Constitutional Court also demanded the modification of this section, 
mandating that it had to specify that: “sustainability is making use and utilizing the 
renewable natural resources, arid and aggregated” (Flores Gonzales, 2018, pg. 226). 
Article 14 was similarly affected. This article outlined the rights and duties of the 
inhabitants of Lomerío. Several rights related to the management of natural resources: 
 
4. Receiving timely and truthful information about the activities undertaken 
 in the territory. 
 
9. Using, managing and utilizing natural resources respecting sustainability 
 rules and thinking about future generations. 
 
13. Being consulted if natural resources are exploited, and enjoying its 
 benefits fairly and equitably. (pg. 18). 
 
The rules are vague and do not clarify what it would entail to exploit natural 
resources “thinking about future generations,” or “enjoying its benefits [of natural 
resource exploitation] fairly and equitably.” However, the TCP mandated, as it had for 
article 12, that section I, number 9 was modified to read: “9. Using, managing and 
utilizing the renewable natural resources, arid and aggregated, respecting sustainability 
rules and thinking about future generations” (Flores Gonzales, 2018, pg. 226). 
The Constitutional Court mandated similar modifications throughout the Estatuto, 
demanding the elimination of full sections or the addition of the “renewable natural 
resources, arid and aggregated” epithet to several articles. 
Another interesting modification related to the management of natural resources 
affected article 15. As it has been explained earlier in this thesis, the Monkoxt have 
fought for the recognition of their nation, and their rights over their territory, for decades. 
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They have opposed slavery, marched through the Andes to La Paz, and even confronted 
violent opposition from local landowners. These experiences explain the wording in 
article 15, in which they established the defense of their territory as a duty of all 
inhabitants of Lomerío: 
 
4. Protecting, using and defending [emphasis added] the territory and 
 environment. 
 
14. Defending the unity and harmony within the community and the territory. 
 
16. Defending the territorial unity of the government of the Monkoxt nation.  
(pg. 18).  
 
However, the TCP did not accept the use of the term defending in the final 
document: it mandated the suppression of the word in number 4, and demanded its 
substitution for the term maintaining in 14 and 16.  
The original draft of the Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío shows that the CICOL 
closely ties resource management to cultural and ancestral values. They state in their 
Estatuto that natural resources should be managed sustainably and protecting the interests 
of future generations. They also consider that protecting their territory and resources is a 
duty of Lomerío’s inhabitants. Even though the text is not specific about the shape the 
protection and sustainable exploitation should take, it has already generated conflicts with 
the central state. The CICOL’s interpretation of the relationship between resource 
management and autonomy does not correspond to the state’s interpretation of the same 
rights.  
Currently, however, the interviewees do not consider resource management as 
their main understanding of autonomy, which explains CICOL’s embrace of the Estatuto, 
even after the aforementioned mandated modifications. However, as I will explain in the 
Autonomy as Resource Management section in the following chapter, the lack of control 
over natural resources may be contested and challenged by the Monkoxt and CICOL if it 
threatens their capacity to pursue other salient goals the interviewees associate with 
indigenous autonomy. 
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(2) Rejection of Political Parties 
 
 The Estatuto drafted by CICOL insisted on their right to remain autonomous and 
independent from foreign influences. Most interviewees understood political parties as 
foreign structures that created conflict in their territory. Interestingly, the existence of 
political parties is completely ignored in the Estatuto. There aren’t any direct references 
to political parties in the whole text. However, there is a clear intention of expelling them 
from the future autonomous government, as the system and structure outlined leave no 
space for party representation. As early as in article 6 of the document it is established 
that the Monkoxi autonomy will be governed through direct democracy: 
 
 Article 6.  Model of Government  
 
I. The model of government of the indigenous autonomy of the Monkoxi 
nation of Lomerío will be based on community, direct and participative 
democracy. 
II. The elected authorities will assume their duties in application of our norms 
and procedures in the framework of the current State. (pg. 12). 
  
 The second part of the Estatuto is titled Estructura de Gobierno (Structure of 
Government). The first articles of section one outline the structure of the future 
autonomous government, and the method to elect representatives: 
 
Article 24. General Assembly  
The general assembly is the main authority, with power to make decisions, of the 
Autonomous Government of the Monkoxi Nation of Lomerío. 
 
Article 25. Design of the General Assembly and Election System  
I. The General Assembly will be formed by representatives from the 29 
communities affiliated with CICOL, which form the Lomerío TCO. 
II. The delegates designated by the assembly of each community will 
participate in the General Assembly, with proper accreditation. 
(pg. 25).  
 
This model blends the traditional decision-making procedures implemented by 
CICOL with elements of municipal governance as introduced in the mid-1990s. This 
model is similar to the systems outlined in other statutes passed by several Bolivian 
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indigenous communities. Tockman, Cameron and Plata (2015) studied five other 
autonomy statutes and found that they:  
 
Introduce important innovations that signify some departure from municipal 
 governance, [however] they also reproduce much of the municipal system 
 established by the LPP in 1994. Most significantly, despite changes in the  names 
 of specific institutions, the five statutes all propose systems of governance that 
 include legislative and executive organs that are remarkably similar to municipal 
 councils and mayors’ offices in municipal systems. [...] The emerging model of 
 indigenous autonomy in Bolivia focuses primarily on innovations in the design of 
 political institutions of local governance, selection procedures, and judicial 
 decision-making – the latter of which remain largely undefined– but not in 
 bureaucratic management. (pg. 49). 
 
Traditional political parties play no role in this election system: although an 
elected representative may sympathize or be affiliated with a certain party, their election 
is based on their involvement with their community and the personal merits their 
neighbors consider they have.  
Political parties are also left out from the election of the Yarusirixi Yiriabuxi, the 
equivalent of a mayor, who leads the executive branch of the government: 
 
Article 30. Nityanu Niriakaxi 
Is the administrative and executive organ of the Monkoxi Autonomous 
Government of Lomerío, and is formed by the Yarusirixi Niriabuxi (woman) or 
the Yarusirixi Yiriabuxi (man). 
 
 Article 31. Election System 
 
I. Each community will have the right to present their candidates properly 
accredited and confirmed by the General Assembly for their designation. 
Then, the Assembly will elect the Yarusirixi Niriabuxi (woman) or the 
Yarusirixi Yiriabuxi (man) following our own norms and procedures. 
(“Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío,” 2015, pg. 26-27). 
 
There is no mention of political parties in the following articles, including article 
32, which details the requirements to become an elected representative. There is also no 
mention of political parties to be elected to the legislative organ or other administrative 
commissions (“Estatuto Autonómico de la Nación Monkoxt de Lomerío,” 2015).  
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(3) Freedom 
  
 A connection between history, autonomy, and freedom is apparent in the 2015 
version of the Estatuto. I will discuss this issue further in the Autonomy as Freedom 
section in the following chapter. In the 2015 Estatuto draft, chapter two dealt with the 
Principios y Finalidad de la Autonomía Monkoxi de Lomerío (Principles and Objective of 
the Monkoxi Autonomy of Lomerío). The second section of article 12, cited earlier in this 
chapter, made a direct reference to the recovery of the history of the Monkoxt: 
 
II. Ancestral values and principles are the basis, the cement on which we build our 
“Casa Grande” [Big Home] as we call our territory. On them we build our future, 
recovering the historical past of our nation [emphasis added], valuing our 
present, which allows us to protect, use, manage and adequately make use of the 
natural resources we possess. (pg. 15). 
 
 Right under this section, the Estatuto outlined the principles and values that 
would guide the Monkoxi autonomous government. The first two principles cited directly 
relate to what the Monkoxt understand as their quest towards freedom: 
 
1. Freedom, which expresses our bravery and struggle to live without 
 masters or patrones, without being subjugated to or subjugate other peoples, 
 not allowing the exploitation of any individual. 
 
2. Self-Determination, is the highest expression of our historical and political  
will of making our own decisions in our territory and defining it within the 
 framework of our identity as the Monkoxi Nation. (pg. 15).  
 
 As these excerpts reflect, the Estatuto ties self-determination to the Monkoxi 
nation’s will of freedom. Freedom is understood as the capacity to live without patrones 
who subjugate and exploit them, being able to make their own decisions in their territory. 
Interestingly, the capacity to make their own decisions, as it’s phrased in the document, is 
connected to their “framework of identity”: in this context, freedom is understood as a 
communal right to decision making based on a particular set of principles and cultural 
values, not a right of the individual. 
 There is another relevant value mentioned in article 12, value “15. Independence, 
freedom of action, in the political, social, cultural, ideological and religious realms, free 
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from external pressures and interests foreign to the Monkoxi nation, to protect and 
respect our self-determination.” (pg. 16).  
The Estatuto therefore claims independence from anyone that does not belong to 
the Monkoxi nation. What constitutes an external pressure, or a foreign interest, is 
understood in various ways by different members of the community. The TCP mandated 
the elimination of principle 15 from the Estatuto, but as I will explain further in this 
chapter, the desire to remain autonomous from outside influences and powers –such as 
political parties–, remains strong among community members. 
 
(4) Cultural Conservation 
 
The Estatuto is extremely concerned with the culture, symbols, and cultural 
identity of the Monkoxi nation of Lomerío. After the articles defining the geographic 
limits of the future autonomy and establishing its legal hierarchy vis a vis the State, 
articles 7 and 9 discuss Monkoxi identity and their language, the Bésiro: 
  
Article 7. Identity of the Monkoxi Nation of Lomerío 
I. The women and men, as the originary inhabitants of the indigenous territory of 
Lomerío, re-value our origin identifying as ‘Monkoxi nation’ maintaining at the 
same time our identity as Bolivian citizens. 
 
 Article 9. 
I. The inhabitants of the indigenous territory of Lomerío, women and men, 
share a common language called Bésiro that is considered the official 
language in the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Government of the 
Monkoxi Nation of Lomerío. 
II. Spanish is recognized as the second official language. 
III. The official documents of the Autonomous Government of the Monkoxi 
Nation of Lomerío will be in Bésiro, Spanish, and others. (“Estatuto 
Autonómico de Lomerío,” 2015, pg. 12-13). 
 
Moreover, article 10 establishes the symbols and the religious and spiritual beliefs 
that represent the Monkoxi nation: 
  
Article 10. Symbols 
I. The symbols representing the Monkoxi nation are: 
a. The Monkoxi, with his tari, next to his bow, arrow, ax, machete and 
shovel, symbolize the work in the hill and the chaco [small plot of 
land]. 
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b. The hill, with which we coexist and from which we eat. 
c. Dress, the tipoi, the palm hat (sumpreruxi), the sandal (nariyeruxi) for 
the man. 
d. The Xarityúxi mask, made out of leather or wood, used for the 
Carnival celebrations. 
e. The dances, from which we derive joy and we celebrate, are: tokokoxi 
sukiununúxi (dance in a wheel or circle), Xarityúxi (danced during 
Carnival), the carnavalito and the sarao. 
f. Musical Instruments, the flute, the fífano, churiqui, secu-secu for 
Easter (yoresoka) and the secu-secu for the Purísima, yoresomanka, 
tyopíxi (long flute), caja, cola de tatú, the bombo. 
g. The full moon, with a colorful crown, like the rainbow, announces an 
epidemic, with a white crown announces rain, bad weather, a moon 
tilted to the North announces rain, a moon tilted to the South means 
wind, a sitting moon means drought. 
h. The new moon, towards the North is a sign of rains. It’s no good to 
plant or harvest corn, cutting wood or cleaning clothes. 
i. The sun, depending on its color, announces rains, drought or sickness. 
A white sun in the morning announces rain, when there’s an eclipse 
water is contaminated, it gets sick. 
j. The Southern Cross, used for orientation. 
k. The rainbow, to the West announces rains and to the East, God 
remembers the man. 
l. Marked stones, are signs or codes that signal places where there are 
precious minerals such as gold, and in other cases are a sign of slavery, 
where thousands of sisters and brothers died or were taken to do forced 
labor in the rubber exploitations, they represent the fight and resistance 
of the Monkoxi people. 
m. Nasaikíxhi (Jasaye). 
 
II. The symbols of all the indigenous originary and peasant peoples and 
nationalities of the Plurinational State of Bolivia are respected, in the 
framework of a meeting between cultures, in respect of diversity and an 
intra and intercultural dialogue. 
 
Article 11. Religion and Spirituality 
I. The Monkoxi Autonomous Government of Lomerío respects and 
guarantees the spiritual and ritual practices of the cosmovision of the 
Monkoxi nation, and also the freedom of religion and worship of all its 
population. 
II. Everything in nature has an owner or master called ‘Jichi,’ who 
intervenes in the relationship between humans and nature. To the 
Monkoxt there are magical places where the master of each element of 
nature resides, his role is to take care of every species on Earth so that it 
doesn’t disappear, and to protect and establish norms regarding its use. 
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III. There are protector owners of all natural resources in the territory: flora 
(hill), fauna (hunting and fishing), water, mineral rocks and the land 
(chacos): 
1. Nixhí Tuki, master of the water in the puquios [wells] and springs. 
2. Nixhí Yirityuxi, master of the mountain. 
3. Nixhí Niunxi, master of the hill. 
4. Nixhí Taxi, master of rain. 
5. Nixhí Xhoense, master of the pampa. 
6. Nixhí Tobíchi, master of the night. 
7. Choborese, devil. 
 
IV. To the Monkoxi nation of Lomerío good and evil coexist, and each person 
is free to choose the path of good or evil. (pg. 13-14). 
 
 These symbols, ancestral values, and principles are referenced throughout the 
Estatuto. Several principles have already been discussed in this chapter, including 
freedom, self-determination, and sustainability. Principle 8 is also relevant for the present 
discussion: 
 
 8. Cultural Identity 
It is our pride to be indigenous [peoples] from the Monkoxi nation. 
(pg. 13-14). 
 
The recurrence of references to symbols, principles and values of the Monkoxi 
nation show that the CICOL, in drafting the Estatuto, considered their culture and 
traditions the basis of their future autonomous government. The high number of articles 
and the importance given in the document to cultural values and beliefs shows the 
relevance their culture and its conservation have for the CICOL, and the Monkoxt as a 
whole. The great value given to cultural protection is confirmed by the interviewees: 
continuing their path towards freedom and protecting and revitalizing Monkoxi culture 
were the two most cited understandings of autonomy. 
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CHAPTER IV   WHOSE ESTATUTO?  
 
 In this chapter I will analyze the drafting of the Monkoxi Estatuto from a local 
perspective. In the first section, CICOL and CEJIS’ Estatuto?, I will examine the impact 
on the autonomy process of two key actors: CICOL and CEJIS.  
 CICOL, the Central Indígena de Comunidades Originarias de Lomerío 
(Indigenous Central of the Originary Communities of Lomerío) is the organization that 
has represented the Monkoxt since the early 1980s and that led the autonomy process in 
Lomerío. CEJIS, Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social (Center of Judicial 
Studies and Social Investigation), has worked with the Monkoxt for decades, and its 
técnicos have provided essential technical and logistical support to CICOL during the 
autonomy process. The inner dynamics of CICOL, together with the influence of CEJIS 
técnicos, had a deep impact on the drafting of the Monkoxi statute.  
In the second section, Women’s Estatuto?, I will discuss how Monkoxt women 
were left out from the autonomy process and the drafting of the Estatuto. I will also 
discuss their low participation in political processes in Lomerío, and the causes both men 
and women identify for their lack of involvement in politics, and their reduced access to 
elected positions. 
 
CICOL and CEJIS’ Estatuto? 
  
The Monkoxt faced a long and complicated process to draft and get their autonomy 
statute recognized by the Bolivian state. As early as March of 2008, over ten years ago, 
CICOL called for its XXVI Ordinary General Assembly, which met in the community of 
Puquio Cristo Rey. In this meeting, CICOL declared Lomerío the “first autonomous 
indigenous territory of Bolivia” and stated their intention to write and pass an autonomy 
statute following their traditional norms and procedures (from the General Assembly’s 
resolution, cited in Flores Gonzales, 2018, pg. 160-161). 
Following the resolution, the CICOL called for a meeting of the representatives of 
the twenty-nine communities the 13th and 14th of July of 2009, in San Lorenzo de 
Lomerío. The meeting was titled Primer Encuentro Autonómico Territorial de Lomerío 
(First Autonomous Meeting of the Territory of Lomerío).  
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Each community elected 2 representatives following traditional norms and 
procedures. The representatives elected were people who had a track record of 
community participation and involvement with CICOL, and therefore supported 
indigenous autonomy. CICOL is an organization with wide support in Lomerío, but those 
that don’t support autonomy or are not interested in political participation do not tend to 
attend CICOL local assemblies. Therefore, those elected, although certainly representing 
their communities, had a specific profile: they had been involved with CICOL, or had 
shown a keen interest in the organization, and supported indigenous autonomy.  
The representatives to the titled Primer Encuentro Autonómico Territorial de 
Lomerío (First Autonomous Meeting of the Territory of Lomerío) elected the Consejo 
Autonómico Monkoxi del Territorio de Lomerío, CCA (the Autonomy Council of the 
Lomerío Territory). The Council had the mandate of writing a first draft of the Autonomy 
Statute, share it with the communities, and incorporate their notes and suggestions (Flores 
Gonzales, 2018, pg. 162-163). 
Those elected to the CCA also had a very specific profile: in their case, they had 
all been involved with CICOL for a long time and were recognized as community 
leaders. Three men and two women were elected, although the women’s positions carried 
less responsibility than the men’s:  
− Juan Soqueré O.: was in charge of calling and directing the Autonomous 
Assembly. 
− María Choré: was to substitute Juan Soqueré in case of absence. 
− Antonia Cuasace Ch.: was in charge of taking minutes of the meetings. 
− Pedro Sesarí: was in charge of systematizing the data from future 
workshops throughout Lomerío’s territory. 
− Miguel García Chuvé: was in charge of offering support in designated 
tasks. 
 The CCA, once elected in mid-July, found itself in a bind: President Evo Morales 
had called a meeting in August 2nd of that same year titled Día de la Autonomía Indígena 
(Day of Indigenous Autonomy) in Camiri, a small city in the Santa Cruz province. In this 
public meeting, Morales would receive the autonomy proposals of different indigenous 
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groups, and the CICOL leadership considered extremely important to present their own 
Estatuto to the President in Camiri. 
 The CCA counted with an extremely valuable ally to meet the deadline: the Santa 
Cruz nonprofit CEJIS, Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social (Center of 
Judicial Studies and Social Investigation)60. Experts from CEJIS, known as técnicos, have 
provided essential technical and logistical support to CICOL. They have helped the 
Monkoxt transform their demands into legally adequate documents, and they were also 
key in the process to title Lomerío’s territory and obtain the TCO status.  
 The support of CEJIS técnicos was vital to write the first draft of Lomerío’s 
statute in time to present it to Evo Morales in Camiri (“El Gobierno junta 5.000 
campesinos”, 2008). They also played an essential role in helping the Monkoxt put 
together the documents required by the LMAD, and in facing the legal challenges put 
forward by the opposition and the Plurinational Constitutional Court of Bolivia.  
 During my time in Lomerío, I was able to observe the deep influence CEJIS 
técnicos still have with CICOL. I was invited to attend a meeting of the CICOL directory 
in which autonomy and land use were to be discussed. The meeting was run by the 
CICOL leadership, and the elected representatives of the twenty-nine communities were 
called to attend. However, any community member could join to present complaints or 
demands to the CICOL leadership.  
 The meeting was held a sunny Monday morning, on July 23rd of 2018. About 
forty people attended, only three of which were women. Land use and autonomy were 
last on the topics to discuss. When the time came to talk about territorial rights, the 
CICOL leadership, without further comment, introduced a CEJIS técnica who had 
actively supported and helped draft and collect the legal documents necessary to obtain 
the TCO status. 
 The técnica started her speech in a scolding tone: she stated how unhappy she was 
with how land was being managed, and reminded the CICOL leadership how tough it had 
been to obtain the TCO status and the titles for the lands it included. She explained that 
she had received reports that the elected leaders of certain communities –known as 
caciques– were giving lands to people who did not belong to the Monkoxi nation.  
                                                
60 See “CEJIS” (n.d.) 
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 A young man in the audience raised his hand and tried to tell her there was 
nothing they could do, as each cacique had the right to manage their community’s lands 
as they saw fit. She quickly corrected him, explaining that according to the TCO status 
they, the Monkoxt, had obtained, the land belonged to every single member of the 
community. She prompted CICOL to control what individual caciques were doing with 
the land: no piece of the territory could be given away without the consent of the 
Monkoxt as a whole. After the técnica’s explanations, members of the CICOL directory 
supported her statements, and reminded everyone in attendance that she had been key in 
obtaining the TCO status.  
 Similarly, when the time to talk about autonomy came, the CICOL leadership 
introduced Miguel González, the CEJIS técnico that had most closely worked with the 
Monkoxt in drafting the Estatuto. He had also supported them in collecting all the 
necessary documents to meet the bureaucratic demands of the LMAD, the Ley Marco de 
Autonomías y Descentralización (Framework Law of Autonomies and Descentralization).  
 Miguel explained the autonomy process to the CICOL leadership, answering 
questions about the stages they had gone through. Using a big piece of paper taped to the 
wall, as shown in Figure I, he drew a running track, and presented autonomy as a hurdle 
race, explaining the different stages the Monkoxt had had to go through, and how the 
LMAD and the 2009 Constitution had delayed the approval of the Estatuto. 
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 Figure I. The Monkoxi Autonomy Process as a Hurdle Race. Outline drawn by Miguel 
González, CEJIS técnico. Picture taken by the author, July 23rd, 2018.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Miguel’s command of the issue was unparalleled in the room, and after his 
speech, the CICOL leadership decided to follow his advice and start a political campaign 
in favor of autonomy, as the Monkoxt still have to vote on a referendum before being 
able to finally implement their autonomous government. 
The Monkoxt aren’t the only indigenous group to have received important support 
from nonprofit organizations. Jason Tockman, John Cameron and Wilfredo Plata (2015) 
analyzed the autonomy process –and the Estatutos they led to– in five different 
indigenous territories: Charagua, Mojocoya, Pampa Aullagas, Totora and Uru Chipa.  
They found that these groups had followed a similar process to the Monkoxt. To 
draft their statues, they had called several assemblies with representatives from the 
different communities involved. The researchers also found that personnel from the 
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Ministry of Autonomies, nonprofits and private consulting firms had also attended the 
meetings, reaching 30% of attendees in some cases (Tockman, Cameron & Plata 2015).  
According to Tockman, Cameron & Plata’s (2015) research: 
The behavior of government technocrats and consultants had a significant  impact 
 on the autonomy deliberations and on the content of the statutes themselves. 
 Indeed, we believe that the interventions of these outside actors seriously limited 
 the development and articulation of the ideals of indigenous self-government, as 
 articulated in Bolivia before 2009 and in the UNDRIP [the United Nations’ 
 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples]. In some cases, this influence 
 was perhaps unintended, while in others, it was clearly deliberate and patronizing. 
 (pg. 43).  
 
The researchers found that the five statutes were impacted by outside actors in 
five main spheres: (1) the consultants had provided a common format for the statutes, 
therefore standardizing the final documents produced by the different communities; (2) 
technical staff pushed the indigenous communities to frame their estatutos within the 
limits set by the Constitution and national laws; (3) their recommendations suggested a 
bias in favor of municipal governance systems; (4) they had privileged the use of Spanish 
in the documents; (5) the experts actually wrote and edited much of the text of the 
autonomy statutes (pg. 43-44).  
Some of Tockman, Cameron & Plata’s (2015) conclusions certainly apply to the 
Monkoxt. They did not hire outside consultants, but they counted with the support of 
CEJIS técnicos such as Miguel González, who had worked with CICOL for many years. 
CEJIS técnicos privileged Spanish, as they did not speak Bésiro, and they certainly 
followed a set format to write the Estatuto, for which they did an important share of the 
writing.  
 However, the Monkoxt’s case departed from Tockman, Cameron and Plata’s 
conclusions in relevant aspects. Because the LMAD hadn’t yet been passed when the first 
draft of the Estatuto was written, and the Constitution had just been approved in 
referendum, they departed from these laws in the writing of several articles. Actually, the 
Plurinational Constitutional Court of Bolivia demanded important modifications to the 
first draft of the Estatuto to declare it Constitutional, as discussed in Chapter III, The 
Impact of the State’s Perspective on the Monkoxi autonomy.  
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 Moreover, and although CEJIS técnicos had a very important role in the writing 
of the first draft, the Estatuto was edited to incorporate comments and suggestions from 
different community members. This point was particularly important to Miguel González, 
who considered that it distinguished the work of CEJIS from hired consulting firms. He 
considered that the time used to incorporate community members’ opinions explained 
why the articulation of the final draft of the Estatuto Autonómico de la Nación Monkoxt 
de Lomerío had taken much longer than in other indigenous communities. In a 
conversation I had with him in his office in Santa Cruz, Miguel showed me that the 2015 
version of the Estatuto included a page outlining over 30 workshops held in different 
communities of Lomerío to share the Estatuto with community members and incorporate 
their comments and notes.61 (“Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío,” 2015, pg. 50). 
However, similarly to the election of CICOL representatives, those that attended 
autonomy related workshops were generally in favor of autonomy, and not critical of the 
process. Most attendees had very little knowledge of the legal demands to pass the 
Estatuto. Moreover, an important share of people over forty years old in Lomerío have 
difficulties reading and writing.  
The drafting to the statute took place almost ten years ago, in a very particular 
historical moment: the younger generations and those that didn’t participate in the 
workshops are not familiar with the contents of the text. Moreover, and in my experience 
attending workshops organized by CICOL, 80% of attendees are men, with very few 
women attending, and even less actively participating. Therefore, and despite the efforts 
to make the Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío as representative of all views as possible, 
the final result was deeply influenced by the participation of CEJIS técnicos and the 
views and hopes of the CICOL leadership that was most involved in the autonomy 
process.  
 Furthermore, the final version of the Estatuto, declared constitutional in February 
20th, 2009, had to be edited to conform to the limits to indigenous autonomy set by the 
new Constitution of Bolivia, as shown in earlier chapters. Therefore, the final statute was 
deeply shaped by the influence of CEJIS técnicos, the views of the CICOL leadership, 
and the limitations set by the LMAD and the 2009 Constitution. 
                                                
61 Interview with author, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 28.07.2018. 
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Women’s Estatuto? 
 
I met with Mercedes, Juana and Lourdes in San Lorenzo’s sewing cooperative. 
Mercedes and Juana were closer in age: Mercedes was sixty years old and Juana had just 
turned fifty. Lourdes was much younger, as she was only twenty-seven years old at the 
time of the interview. The three women met almost every afternoon in the cooperative, 
where they fixed their families’ clothes and also made purses and other accessories to sell 
in the San Antonio artisanry shop. They got the 15 sewing machines they had in the 
cooperative from an international nonprofit. However, they only used 5 of them, as they 
were not sure how the others worked and they were afraid to break them. A nonprofit 
worker had given them a two-hour tutorial on how to use them when they first got the 
machines. That, however, was many years ago, and no one from the nonprofit had ever 
come back to answer their questions. 
When I first asked Mercedes, Juana and Lourdes about indigenous autonomy, the 
three sat in silence and looked at me with an empty stare. As I let the silence go on, they 
started to uncomfortably move in their chairs. Lourdes, the youngest, looked at the other 
women, back at me, and leaning in, she stated: “What’s going on is that we don’t really 
know about that. Read, they tell me. Nothing, I don’t have time for that with two kids. 
We would like more information, because we don’t actually know what autonomy is.”62  
 
The other two women nodded vehemently. Juana, more confident after Lourdes 
had spoken, added:  
 
We want them to explain to us what’s going to happen with autonomy. I 
 understand we are the owners and want to be autonomous with our things. Our 
 territory, that’s why it’s called autonomy, that’s what I understand. [...] 
 Because I know autonomy is long [she refers to the Estatuto], it has many 
 chapters... But they should explain it to us in the simplest words so we can 
 understand. That’s it. Because we don’t understand technical words.63 
 
Mercedes, the oldest, concluded: “Sometimes, they call, the leadership, they call 
for us to go and listen. But us talking... They never include us.”64 
                                                
62 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07/18/2018. 
 
63 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07/18/2018. 
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The five women interviewed agreed that women’s participation in the autonomy 
process –and in political discussions in general–, was still very lacking.  
As these statements show, women feel so disconnected from the autonomy 
process that they want it explained to them, they don’t expect to be included in the 
deliberations or the design of the new autonomic system in any other way. Only one of 
the five women interviewed, Carmen, was actively involved with CICOL. When asked 
about her participation, however, Carmen didn’t refer to a personal desire to participate, 
but to her father’s involvement with the organization: 
 
I [have participated] since I was a kid because my dad was a CICOL leader. 
 He told me to participate so I would know why CICOL existed. As a little girl 
 I always participated, since I was in school. When I was older I went to 
 university, I finished university, and I came back to support them.65 
 
Women believe that there are two main reasons for their lack of participation. 
Firstly, they have to work longer hours than men. They have to work in agriculture, just 
as men do, and they also have to take care of their children, the elderly of the family, and 
their home. Secondly, it has only been recently that women have been able to participate 
in community meetings, and their word isn’t taken as seriously as a man’s, as Dolores 
explains:  
 
Now when there’s a meeting, and one asks to speak, at least they have to listen 
 and they don’t make so much fun of you, when you give your opinion. 
 Because sometimes we give our opinion and they make fun of us. But one is 
 trying to speak, I don’t know if what we say is correct, but we’re just trying to 
 give our opinion. But sometimes we make mistakes... No one is perfect not to 
 make mistakes when speaking! Now there’s been a change for us because at 
 least they listen to us, when there’s a meeting. They correct us, but to help.66 
 
Most men interviewed agreed that women’s participation in political discussions 
is still much lower than men’s: four out of the six men interviewed considered that 
women have a smaller presence in public Monkoxt life than men.  
                                                                                                                                            
64 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07/18/2018. 
 
65 Interview with author, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 08/02/2018. 
 
66 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07/16/2018. 
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However, the causes men identify to explain this mismatch are different from the 
ones cited by women. Antonio, who works in the municipality, considers that autonomy 
has engaged more women in politics than prior political processes. But he recognizes that 
women still participated in much lower numbers than men. He believes the mismatch is 
an issue that stems from the education of children from a very early age: 
 
It’s from birth. I see it like that. Because for example when we go to work, we 
 have always seen that women are pushed aside to do certain things. For 
 example when I was a boy, if she was a woman, [she belonged] in the kitchen. 
 And the man... Well, it started from birth, we were educated like that. But now 
 with participation in politics, some women are getting in, but still very few.67 
 
Juan agrees with Antonio that the role of education is what has prevented women 
from having a more active participation in politics. However, he also believes that 
women are still not as prepared as men, and that some of them have simply been elected 
because they are charming:  
 
Now we are trying to balance it a little, because before only men could talk. 
 [...] For the Monkoxt, [the men] after reading and writing went to do their 
 military service and there they learnt to speak Spanish and all that through 
 beatings. They came back with a different mentality, they were superior, they 
 could have a public position in society. Now it’s very different. It’s balanced. 
 Not long ago we had a representative from here [San Lorenzo de Lomerío] 
 Nélida, and she was the leader of CICOL. We have a councilor that is a 
 woman. Some women have also participated [in autonomy] and things are  getting 
 balanced but it’s very difficult because there is no academic education [for 
 women] to become authorities. Sometimes she is elected because she is 
 charming [simpática], because she talks more, but when it comes to managing an 
 organization, like a mayor’s office... no. It’s not a lot [women know], it’s not 
 enough. More education is needed, more knowledge.68 
 
Juan’s explanation has several layers. On the one hand, he clearly values Spanish 
over Bésiro, and considers those who have received an education outside of Lomerío 
“superior” to those that haven’t left the territory. Moreover, he also clearly considers that 
women lack the knowledge necessary to hold positions of responsibility and to represent 
                                                
67 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07/18/2018. 
 
68 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07/18/2018. 
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the community. His explanations align with the conclusions of studies conducted in 
Lomerío and the Chiquitanía region.  
In 2009, Mercedes Nostas Adaya and Carmen Elena Sanabria Salmón published 
an investigation on the role of women in several indigenous communities of the 
Chiquitanía, titled Detrás del cristal con que se mira: Mujeres chiquitanas, órdenes 
normativos e interlegalidad (2009) (Behind the glass you look through: Chiquitano 
women, normative systems and inter-legality).  
They collaborated with women from each community to do the fieldwork and 
help them in the interviews. Women reported that comments similar to Juan’s were 
widespread. They described feeling excluded, undervalued and discriminated against 
when they participated in political processes. They explained that in many cases “the 
attitudes of leaders symbolically reproduced the relationship of the Chiquitano couple, 
characterized by masculine authority [over women]”69 (Nostas Adaya & Sanabria 
Salmón, 2009, pg. 215). Moreover, they also reported that when participating in politics, 
they received personal attacks, and their motives for political participation were 
questioned. Their sexuality also became a topic men commented on, and they were either 
labeled as lesbians or divorcees (pg. 216). 
Luis’ comments, for example, fell into the first category. He stated that women 
have participated in the autonomy process as much as men – considering that 3 women 
having important positions to 6 men constituted a good example of equality. He also 
questioned women’s reasons for joining CICOL. He suggested that women were 
interested in earning money, and that they quit political participation when they saw there 
was no money to be made with CICOL: 
 
No one has been pushed aside. It has been fought a lot [for women and men to 
 have the same rights]. This leadership is implementing the participation of 
 women. Right  now in CICOL, we are nine elected representatives: three women 
 and six men. And women had some of the strongest positions. But  only one is 
 left. The other two have abandoned [their positions]. What  happens is that 
 CICOL is a nonprofit organization. We function with the support of some 
 institutions, some cooperatives, we don’t make any money.70 
 
                                                
69 Translated by the author. 
 
70 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07/20/2018 
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Julio’s comments fell into the second category: he stated that married women 
simply couldn’t serve in CICOL for long, as their husbands would demand them to 
abandon their political positions to focus on the care of the family and the home: 
 
Equality? Not at a 100%. Here women are in a position of disadvantage when 
 it comes to [political] responsibilities, because sometimes when a woman has 
 occupied a position here in CICOL, all of a sudden, after a short time, the 
 husband tells her to leave the position to take care of the children, the family, 
 or the home. Most of the time it’s men that leave to work constantly and 
 sometimes they go outside [of Lomerío] too. That’s why many [women] feel 
 obligated to leave their position. Because here women are normally never  alone. 
 They have a husband, and because they have a husband, they have  children and 
 therefore they have responsibilities in the home. [...] It’s one of the things limiting 
 gender equality. It’s still rare to see a husband that allows a  woman the freedom 
 to exercise the position. Normally here the women that stay in the position are the 
 women that... well... To put it one way, they don’t have a husband, or they are 
 single mothers, normally the ones that have  a husband don’t carry out [the 
 term].71 
 
Julio’s explanation also shows that taking care of children, elderly family 
members, and the home, are considered gendered tasks that are to be carried out by 
women. He also clearly considers that men have the authority to allow –or not– their 
wives to pursue political representation and participation.  
His opinion is also particularly relevant as he currently has an important position 
in Lomerío related to gender: he is in charge of promoting gender equality and women’s 
rights. He complained that he didn’t have enough funding to pursue his goals, an issue 
voiced by other gender representatives in Nostas Adaya and Sanabria Salmón’s study 
(Nostas Adaya & Sanabria Salmón 2009:216). However, when asked about his work 
regarding gender, he explained that his goal was to get indigenous autonomy 
implemented for everyone, and he didn’t mention any goal directly related to gender 
equality or women’s rights: 
 
Right now my priority is to work on indigenous autonomy, I’m supporting 
 [campaigns] with men, women, the youth, I’m going to give conferences in 
 schools mostly [...] I’m going to explain all the autonomy process since the 
 creation of CICOL and its achievements, because autonomy is an achievement 
 fought for by CICOL.72 
                                                
71 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07/11/2018 
 
72 Interview with author, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 09/08/2018 
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Although he was asked several times, his answer remained the same: his goal as a 
gender representative was to promote indigenous autonomy. When asked about the effect 
of autonomy on women, he also refused to discuss women as a separate category: 
 
[Autonomy] is not just for women, but for everyone, we fought for freedom to 
thrive in our territory. Our ancestors, our grandparents were slaves and we don’t 
want slavery to ever happen again. And that’s not for men or for women, that’s 
for everyone, not only women. That’s the framework we always discuss, for 
everyone.73 
 
 
Julio’s only references to work done regarding machismo and gender equality 
were due to a partnership with a nonprofit organization from Santa Cruz: 
 
When I had just been elected there was an activity I did in June [a year before], 
and we coordinated with the NGO Proceso that also works on gender, then we 
shared our responsibility to give talks about leadership and women’s rights [...] 
What we are trying to do is to make more flexible, to reflect on women and men’s 
attitudes towards women. What we lately have been referring to as masculinity. 
Trying to change both [genders’] attitude, but mostly men’s, to try to change a 
little the attitude of machismo towards women. Then... well... And also about 
some laws in favor of women that we now have in Bolivia under this government 
[...] There are laws against violence... Although I don’t remember their name. But 
there are some laws.74 
 
 Women have therefore felt excluded from the autonomy process and from 
political participation in general. Both men and women believe their lack of inclusion is 
caused by the gendered division of tasks prevalent in Lomerío, as childrearing, taking 
care of the elderly, and the home, are considered female responsibilities.  
 Women also report feeling underestimated by men, while their male peers believe 
women are unprepared to take on political positions and label the few that do participate 
in politics as divorcees, single mothers or lesbians. Moreover, they consider it is a 
husband’s prerogative to decide if his wife should or should not participate in political 
organizations. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
73 Interview with author, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 09/08/2018. 
 
74 Interview with author, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 09/08/2018. 
 82 
 Julio’s reflections, as the man in charge of promoting gender equality in Lomerío, 
are also relevant. His statements show that women’s rights are considered subordinate to 
the autonomy process, and the promotion of gender equality is easily sacrificed in favor 
of what CICOL considers the goals of the “majority.”  
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 CHAPTER V   AUTONOMY AS IDENTITY 
 
The concept of indigenous autonomy has become popular throughout Latin 
America and different indigenous groups from Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, among 
other countries, have gained control over their territories under different autonomy 
regimes75.  
The term ‘indigenous autonomy’ has been understood and applied in different 
ways. It has been molded by different groups with different histories and in varied 
circumstances, reflecting complex trajectories, disjunctures, and power relations both 
within indigenous groups and vis a vis the state. Although the UN may have defined the 
right to self-determination and autonomy, the meaning of these concepts has mutated in 
different contexts. They are a paradigmatic example of Ann-Belinda Preis’ (1996) 
argument that human rights have become ‘culture’:  
 
Human rights increasingly form part of a wider network of perspectives which 
 are shared and exchanged between the North and South, centers and 
 peripheries, in multiple, creative, and sometimes conflict-ridden ways. Human 
 Rights have become ‘universalized’ as values subject to interpretation, 
 negotiation, and accommodation. They have become ‘culture.’ (pg. 133).   
 
Catalan anthropologist Pere Torra i Morell (2017) has studied the autonomy 
process of the Guaraní of Charagua. He argues similarly, borrowing the term significante 
vacío from Argentine philosopher Ernesto Laclau, translated to English as empty 
universal: “images, words or nouns used for political struggles that are able to express 
and constitute ‘links’ or ‘equivalence chains’ between multiple social demands, 
heterogeneous and particular, but that are all unsatisfied by the constituted political 
system.”76 (pg. 66). According to Torra i Morell, autonomy in Bolivia, and more 
generally in Latin America, has become a significante vacío, an all-encompassing 
concept with different meanings and hopes attached to it by different groups and 
individuals. 
                                                
75 See González (2015) on different autonomy regimes in Latin America.  
76 Translated by the author. 
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Torra i Morell’s analysis applies to the Monkoxt. In this chapter, I will present 
how individual interviewees from the Monkoxi nation understand autonomy. I 
interviewed eleven members of the Monkoxi nation, six men and five women. Most of 
them lived in the community of San Lorenzo de Lomerío, although three of them lived or 
had been born in other communities, such as Puquio Cristo Rey. The oldest interviewee 
was eighty-two years old, while the youngest was twenty-seven years old at the time of 
the interview. Out of eleven interviewees, six were over forty years old.  
The interviewees understood autonomy as a practical tool, not an abstract 
concept. To explain their understanding of autonomy, they referred to the goals they 
hoped an autonomous government would help them achieve as an indigenous nation. The 
interviewees referred to four main goals:  (1) resource management; (2) rejection of 
political parties, since interviewees believed that autonomy would lead to the 
disappearance of political parties in Lomerío, and with them, the disappearance of 
political conflict; (3) freedom, related to a historical arc of overcoming exploitation; (4) 
cultural conservation, particularly of their language, farming lifestyle, and traditional 
tales and practices. 
 Although several referred to resource management, only two considered that a 
higher influence in the management of Lomerío’s natural resources was the most relevant 
goal of autonomy. Seven interviewees referred to political parties, but only one 
considered their elimination from Lomerío’s government an essential goal of autonomy. 
However, eight interviewees referred to their ancestor’s quest to free themselves from 
slavery and exploitation as vital to their identity and their support of autonomy. Out of 
eleven interviewees, ten mentioned the conservation of their culture as one of the main 
goals of autonomy. Interestingly, the interviewees that discussed resource management 
and the disappearance of political parties to define autonomy also considered that these 
goals were tied to the protection and revitalization of their language, their ancestors 
farming techniques, and their traditional tales and practices.  
 Over half the women interviewed, from different age groups, felt excluded from 
the political process behind indigenous autonomy, and from political participation in 
general: they believed that their responsibilities in the home, raising their children, and 
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taking care of the elderly in the family made it impossible for them to engage in political 
participation in the same terms as men.  
 Like their male counterparts, the women interviewed were deeply concerned 
about the disappearance of their language and Monkoxi traditional practices. However, 
the women went further in their analysis of the issue. They also reflected on the 
disjunctures the transformations of farming practices, education access, and traditional 
celebrations create between different generations and genders, and the conflicts they 
generate. 
 The female interviewees over fifty years old rejected these transformations and 
blamed the younger women for the loss of Bésiro and traditional outfits, for example. 
They were also weary of how the younger generations engage with tradition, and how 
they have transformed some practices, for example, with young girls playing instruments 
that used to only be played by men.  
 The interviewees under fifty, while still valuing traditional Monkoxi culture, 
Bésiro, and certain practices, were critical of their lack of opportunities in comparison to 
men, and wanted to negotiate the meaning and understanding of certain practices, trying 
to adapt them to their present needs and expectations.  
However, the expectations of both genders go beyond the scope of an autonomous 
government. Particularly the interviewees over forty years old hope that autonomy will 
allow them to compel the younger generations to work the land, to use Bésiro in their 
daily lives, and to reject the charm of the big city. Although autonomy will allow them to 
have more control over their resources and to implement programs to promote their 
culture, it is unlikely that it will allow them to convince the younger generations to live as 
their parents and grandparents did. If autonomy is implemented in Lomerío, the 
implausible expectations of its supporters may lead to a bitter disappointment with the 
autonomous government, or with autonomy as a whole. 
 
Autonomy as Resource Management 
 
 There is a general understanding among interviewees that the meaning of 
autonomy relates to controlling their territory and the resources within it. Lourdes, a 
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young mother of two, expressed this general understanding clearly when she stated that: 
“We are the owners [of our territory] and we want to be autonomous in all our things in 
our territory, that is why it’s called autonomy, that is what I understand”77 
The sense of ownership of their territory has been passed on generation from 
generation. The Monkoxt understand having control over their titled territory as a 
historical right – from which resource management emanates. This excerpt from an 
interview with Julio, a respected CICOL member, illustrates this perspective: 
 
I didn’t meet my grandparents. But my father told me, when he came back from 
the Chaco War, he was a veteran. He always told us, told me, that he fought so we 
would have our territory to dispose of. That land came before everything else, it is 
for us, and it has to be ours. 
 
Interviewer: What does it mean for the land to be yours? 
That someone else doesn’t come in and appropriates it. That someone from 
outside wouldn’t come to take it from us. That land remains our source of life, 
and we have to take care of it, we have to sustain it from here on.78 
 
Interviewees have a similar understanding of the relationship between autonomy 
and resource management as outlined in the Estatuto. The ownership and management of 
natural resources is perceived as an inherited right, and there is a common understanding 
that resources should be protected and exploited in a sustainable manner.  
 However, there was no further specificity in the interviews. Most interviewees 
didn’t consider resource management as the core meaning of autonomy. Out of eleven 
interviewees, only five referenced resource management when explaining what autonomy 
meant for them. Only two of them considered it the defining goal of autonomy: Juan and 
Luis. They are both men who, in different capacities, have jobs that are affected by the 
use of Lomerío’s land.  
 Juan defines autonomy as gaining further rights over their territory. He doesn’t 
have a specific view of how resources should be managed, but he is deeply displeased by 
the lack of control his community has over Lomerío’s natural resources vis a vis the 
State. He believes that autonomy should protect the economic interests of those working 
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the land from state intervention and outside companies that take advantage of their 
territory: 
Autonomy would be managing our own resources, and that we have the rights 
 [over them]. For example now the general wealth [of the territory] isn’t ours. 
 It is purely the State’s, we don’t have power to say how it is managed. Then 
 automatically the State comes, militarizes everything, and we are left with 
 nothing. Since we aren’t autonomous yet, they come and do whatever they 
 want. This is a clear example. They can take advantage [of the resources]. For 
 example, in a man’s chaco79 it could happen that they go in and don’t 
 compensate him. They take it from him and that’s it. That’s it.80 
 
Antonio does not consider resource management the main meaning of autonomy. 
However, when asked about the issue, he voices a similar perspective to Juan’s: 
I have always believed that one should be able to manage their own natural  
resources. That would be important. Because if we don’t manage them, how 
 do we continue? For example if we want to talk about the issue of wood, we 
 have to go to the corresponding [state] institutions. If we talk about mining, 
 we can’t manage it either, we have to go there [the corresponding state 
 institution]. In other words, we can’t [manage our natural resources]. It should 
 be everything, the whole territory, I should be able to dispose of all of that, in 
 consensus with everyone.81 
 
Juan and Antonio’s understanding of resource management directly clashes with 
the 2009 Constitution, just as the Estatuto did when it was reviewed by the Plurinational 
Constitutional Court of Bolivia. Lomerío becoming an indigenous autonomy would 
certainly give the Monkoxt more capacity to determine how the natural resources present 
in their territory are managed. However, according to the 2009 Constitution, the central 
state retains the right to exploit nonrenewable resources in indigenous autonomies. Juan 
and Antonio would be able to vote in a consultation, but the results wouldn’t be binding: 
they would not prevent the government from developing an extractive project in 
Lomerío, or to give a private company the concession to do so. 
Luis was the only other interviewee, aside from Juan, to directly tie the meaning 
of autonomy to resource management. He understands autonomy as increasing the 
Monkoxt’s capacity to administer Lomerío’s natural resources, managing them as they 
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see fit. Although he believes that’s what the Monkoxt have traditionally done, he also 
thinks that they need to regain control over Lomerío’s natural resources and obtain 
constitutional backing to protect their rights. However, he is not specific over which 
policies should be applied. Moreover, he ties resource management to the recuperation 
and protection of traditional agricultural practices and the revitalization of the Monkoxt’s 
language, Bésiro: 
 
Well, there is a demand of ours, autonomy, we already are autonomous. We’ve 
 been exercising autonomy for a long time. It’s only that we now want to make it 
 constitutional. To exercise it, in accordance with the Constitution. Why is it that 
 we are asking for autonomy? Because we have a territory and within that titled 
 territory that we have, we want to administer the natural resources. The different 
 types of wood, if there’s mineral resources too. To do it within our possibilities 
 without introducing machinery, none of that. Cultivate our language, Bésiro, 
 further, and to go back to simply doing what we did before, planting corn, rice, 
 which is disappearing, we’re even losing our native seeds.82 
 
As this quote shows, resource management is essential for Luis, but directly tied 
to the protection and promotion of the Monkoxt’s language and traditional agricultural 
practices. Particularly relevant is his rejection of using machinery in farming. The 
interviewees tied the use of machines to agribusiness and foreign companies that exploit 
the mineral resources of their territory. Similarly to Luis, interviewees didn’t consider 
that type of farming Monkoxt farming.  
The desire to “go back to simply doing what we did before” is also prevalent in 
the interviews. Interviewees voiced this desire when talking about farming, but also when 
discussing their culture and their ancestral beliefs. Most interviewees –particularly men– 
are suspicious of technological and cultural transformations. They regard a return to past 
practices as desirable, and tightly related to their pursuit of autonomy. This issue is 
explored further in the Autonomy as Cultural Conservation section.  
 At the state level, the management of natural resources in indigenous lands was a 
key issue that polarized the Constituent Assembly and the drafting of the 2009 
Constitution. It was one of the main goals outlined by identity based indigenous 
organizations. In their narrative, autonomy was an expression of indigenous nations’ right 
to self-determination in their territories, tied to managing the natural resources present in 
                                                
82 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.18.2018. 
 89 
their lands. Although resource management was mentioned by several interviewees, it did 
not appear as the defining meaning they assigned to autonomy. Out of eleven 
interviewees, five mentioned resource management when discussing autonomy. Only two 
of the five considered it the core principle behind the Monkoxt’s pursuit of autonomy. 
Moreover, interviewees expressed the idea that resource management was only the 
beginning, a tool for the recovery of traditional practices and their language, rather than 
the only goal of autonomy.  
 However, resource management may become salient for the interviewees if the 
state promotes an unpopular extractive project in Lomerío. As it will be explained in the 
following sections, the Monkoxt have a negative opinion of political parties and greatly 
value exercising freedom from foreign influences in their territory. If the central 
government –and the political party in power– threatens the Monkoxt’s sense of freedom 
and control over Lomerío’s natural resources by implementing an extractive project, the 
administration of Lomerío’s resources may become a highly contested topic. This desire 
may also become salient if they feel that they lack the funds necessary to pursue their key 
understandings of autonomy, such as cultural conservation. 
 
Autonomy as Rejection of Political Parties 
 
 The Estatuto written by the Monkoxt and approved by the Plurinational 
Constitutional Court of Bolivia envisioned a new system of government for the Monkoxi 
nation. The new system would be based on a combination of municipal governance and 
the deliberative assemblies that many indigenous nations have traditionally used for 
community decision-making. In the case of the Monkoxt, deliberative assemblies have 
been the main tool for decision-making and conflict resolution in the twenty-nine 
communities, and are also the basis of CICOL’s election system. 
 Luis is a member of CICOL who has been actively involved in the autonomy 
process. For him, the main meaning of autonomy relates to resource management. When 
asked about the future autonomous government, he outlines some similarities and 
differences between the new system and the municipal government they currently have. 
He also states –in an excerpt also analyzed in the Autonomy versus State Control – The 
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Case for the Municipalities section–, that the main goal behind transforming Lomerío’s 
political system is eliminating the control exercised by political parties: 
 
 With autonomy all public functionaries are also going to serve 5-year terms 
 [as they do in the municipal system]. Those who will run to become the mayor 
 are not going to be elected through a vote; they are going to be subject to 
 [someter] an assembly. Secret [vote], acclamation, that’s what we are still 
 discussing. When there are issues with the administration of the autonomous 
 government, an assembly will be called and the man [the mayor] leaves, that’s 
 it. That is going to be the change. We are not going to vow [someter] to 
 political parties. There is going to be an assembly of the twenty-nine 
 communities,  there he is revoked, supported, or he runs again, but it’s going 
 to be according to the work that the autonomous government does.83 
 
 Luis therefore believes that the new system of government would allow for a 
better control of public representatives, and a higher capacity to hold them accountable 
for their actions. Julio agrees with Luis. Like him, Julio has also been actively involved in 
the autonomy process, and has collaborated with CICOL since the 1980s. He is the only 
interviewee that discussed self-government to explain his understanding of autonomy. 
Like Luis, he believes that getting rid of the influence of political parties will be the main 
benefit of establishing an autonomous government. However, he ties self-government to 
other cultural goals that he considers essential for the strength of the Monkoxi nation:  
 
 The autonomy we want here is to liberate ourselves, we want the election of 
 our authorities to be through our own usos y costumbres, not through political 
 colors.  Because political colors have divided us and brained washed us, they 
 have debilitated our organizing and that is why we prefer our elections to be 
 through our own usos y costumbres. And also to strengthen our culture and 
 our language. It is also a means for our culture to remain strong and not 
 disappear. We also want our language to be taught in schools, high schools 
 and universities, and other public institutions. Because we know that it is 
 through its culture and language that an indigenous nation grows strong.84 
 
 Out of eleven interviewees, seven referred to political parties, all in negative 
terms. The main argument behind their distrust is that parties are foreign structures, used 
by those seeking to advance their personal interests. They do not really represent the 
Monkoxt. Because of that, interviewees also referred to political parties when discussing 
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opposition to autonomy. They believe that those involved with parties feel threatened by 
autonomy, as Carmen, a young woman who actively participates in CICOL, explains. If 
autonomy were implemented, political parties would lose influence, and with them, those 
who have been elected to public office as party members. That is why the main 
opposition to autonomy comes from the mayor’s office in San Antonio:  
 
 They believe [in the municipality], that it’s not going to be a municipality,  it’s 
 going to be an autonomous government, something bigger, that’s what they 
 don’t understand. It’s not going to work as a municipality, but like an 
 autonomous government that’s going to be able to manage its own resources, 
 we’ll see how, there are not going to be political campaigns, politicians are not 
 going to be able to intervene here anymore. Now politicians intervene a lot. 
 For each election the parties come, the MAS, the EMR, the Democrats... [...] 
 For an indigenous person to be the mayor he has to join one of the parties. But 
 now with indigenous autonomy, that is not going to be needed anymore, parties 
 are going to stop getting in between the indigenous people of Lomerío. That is the 
 idea. They also don’t let you explain it to them, they’re closed to it. 
 Because they have an appointment [in the municipality] and they don’t want 
 to lose it.85 
 
 There is also a sense among interviewees that political parties are the main cause 
for conflict in Lomerío, and the expectation that political strife will disappear with them. 
Don Pedro, an elder in the community, expresses that view: “What is always causing 
harm here, in the TCO, is political color, nothing else. That is what divides people, it’s 
politics, nothing else.”86 Antonio, a middle aged professional, expresses a similar view –
in an excerpt that was also analyzed in the Autonomy versus State Control – The Case for 
the Municipalities section–. He works in the municipality, and thinks that under the 
current election system, they had no option but to join political parties to work for their 
communities. However, he believes indigenous autonomy will be better than the 
municipal system, and conveys the expectation that conflict will disappear with the 
implementation of autonomy: 
 
 Parties, they used to be like a ladder. Because if we didn’t join, we didn’t get 
 any representatives either. We had no option but to join. [...] For example  now, if 
 autonomy were implemented, we wouldn’t have political parties anymore. And 
                                                
85 Interview with author, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 08.02.2018. 
 
86 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.19.2018. 
 
 92 
 then we shouldn’t fight, because we are all indigenous, wouldn’t that be better? 
 It’s not like in other places, in which there are divisions [...] Here we are all 
 indigenous and most of us are family.87  
 
 There is a general distrust of political parties among interviewees. Moreover, they 
believe that parties are the main cause of conflict between individuals and communities 
in Lomerío. Several interviewees, like Don Pedro and Antonio, are convinced that 
conflict will disappear if autonomy is implemented and political parties vanish from 
Lomerío.  
 This expectation can be problematic. Deliberative assemblies will certainly take 
away most of the power and influence political parties currently hold. It isn’t clear, 
however, that political parties will completely disappear. Even if they did, it would still 
be unlikely that conflict would vanish from Lomerío altogether. The autonomous 
government would still have to distribute funding and resources, and prioritize certain 
projects over others. Some communities would most likely receive more funding than 
others. Political decisions inextricably generate disagreements and, in many cases, 
conflict. The expectation that political conflict would fade with the implementation of 
autonomy –and the supposed disappearance of political parties–may lead to 
disappointment with the autonomous government or autonomy as a whole. 
 
Autonomy as Freedom 
 
 In the last few years, the Monkoxt of Lomerío have participated in several 
publications about their history, partnering with nonprofit organizations from Santa Cruz 
and from the Global North. They published a short history book titled Camino hacia la 
libertad (2015) (Path towards freedom), and a book about their autonomy process, titled 
Sueños de libertad: Proceso autonómico de la nación Monkoxi de Lomerío (2018) 
(Dreaming about freedom: The autonomy process of the Monkoxi nation of Lomerío). A 
main theme in these publications is the reconstruction of the Monkoxt’s history as a 
nation. The retelling of their history focuses on distinguishing them from other lowland 
nations, and on tying their past grievances to their current demand of autonomy, 
establishing an overarching quest for freedom. 
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Julio, a CICOL leader passionate about the recovery of the Monkoxt’s language 
and history, traces the origins of their history to pre-colonial times: 
 
Well, the Monkoxt are one of the forty-five tribes [etnias] that existed before 
 the colonization of America, dispersed among the five provinces of what is 
 now known as the Gran Chiquitanía. Then, the Jesuit reducciones came, in 
 the past, and they were distributed among the provinces too, they created ten 
 reducciones. The first one was in San Javier, then Concepción, San Ignacio, 
 San Miguel, San Rafael, Santa Ana, San Juan, San José, Santo Corazón and 
 one more that I don’t remember. But in these ten reducciones they distributed 
 the forty-five tribes and they were subjected to evangelization.88 
 
Julio’s account only partly aligns with Birgit Krekeler’s Historia de los 
Chiquitanos (1995) edited by Jürgen Riester, and the most cited history of the 
Chiquitanía’s indigenous nations. 
During colonial times, many lowland indigenous groups were forced to live in 
reducciones, settlements created and ran by Jesuit priests closely aligned with the 
Spanish crown. Indigenous peoples were captured and forced to live and work in these 
settlements, also known as misiones. The Jesuits, as part of their evangelizing mission, 
also forced them to abandon many cultural and spiritual practices, and violently forced 
them to adopt Catholicism (Krekeler, 1995, pg. 80).  
The history of these indigenous nations was radically shaped by this traumatic 
experience. In the reducciones, the different groups mixed, and their forced cohabitation 
led to a cultural amalgam, with only a few languages surviving (pg. 26). Historians 
believe that the indigenous nations that currently exist in the Chiquitanía region are a mix 
of different pre-colonial groups, and it is nowadays almost impossible to trace back the 
origins of each group.  
Therefore, the Monkoxt can’t be considered direct descendants of a particular pre-
colonial indigenous group, as Julio claimed. However, his explanation aligns with a 
general desire of the interviewees to present the Monkoxt as a separate nation from other 
Chiquitano groups. Since the pursuit of autonomy, the Monkoxt have reclaimed and 
redefined their history, focusing on the historical events and processes that distinguish 
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them from other nations in the Chiquitanía. For example, some in the CICOL leadership, 
like Julio himself, have started to reject the term Chiquitanos:  
 
We are now identifying as the Monkoxt nation, within our autonomous land, 
 in our demand of indigenous autonomy. [...] Many of the writers and 
 historians that came from outside didn’t identify us as such, they always called 
 us Chiquitanos, which for us, the current inhabitants, Chiquitano is the 
 nickname that colonizers gave us during that time. So now we have decided to 
 reclaim our own name.89  
 
Most interviewees still used the term Chiquitano and Monkoxt interchangeably, 
but only referred to events pertaining to Lomerío’s history when talking about their past 
as an indigenous group. When discussing their identity and history, eight out of eleven 
interviewees referred to their ancestors’ experiences of exploitation and slavery. Luis, for 
example, explained: 
 
 I am proud to be indigenous, proud to be Monkoxt [...] the Monkoxt identity, 
 the name itself says it, we are born here. Monkoxt [in Bésiro] means that we 
 were always here inhabiting this land. Then, in the times of slavery, this was a 
 place of refuge for our ancestors, our grandparents, our parents’ parents. There 
 was a lot of slavery and that’s why they came to this place, this place was a 
 refuge for the indigenous people of the time.90 
 
 Don Pedro’s account is quite similar to Luis’: 
 
 From the beginning, our parents, our grandparents lived here. But before, they 
 came from different provinces. Because of slavery, because of the patrones, 
 there was a lot of discrimination. They were even beaten. That was the 
 patrones’ way. They [grandparents and parents] came together here in 
 Lomerío. They came from San Javier, from San Ignacio, from Velasco [...] 
 they came from different provinces and came together here in Lomerío. [...] 
 That is why they’re called Chiquitano, Monkoxt. The word Monkoxt means 
 from the beginning, have never separated, they have only lived here.91 
 
 The interviewees retelling of their ancestors’ history continues by explaining how 
others arrived to Lomerío escaping from rubber exploitations, to which they had been 
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dragged to as slaves. Eventually, however, they were also enslaved in Lomerío, forced to 
work for patrones, beaten and mistreated.  
 Interviewees didn’t see these events as tales from the past, disconnected from the 
present. Like Julio, they tightly connect their ancestors’ experiences with CICOL’s 
current demand of autonomy:  
 
 The historical part of the Monkoxt is that they love freedom [...] The 
 foundation of this territory of Lomerío, of the communities, was done by 
 families that ran away from slavery [...] They sought refuge in the Lomerío 
 territory in the search for freedom and a peaceful life [...] they stayed in the 
 land we have now, which we claimed as a Territorio Comunitario de Origen 
 [TCO] and it was titled, and now we have the demand to continue to be free 
 through autonomy.92 
 
Carmen is almost thirty years younger than Julio, but puts forward the same 
argument, tying her ancestors’ desire of freedom with CICOL’s current pursuit of 
autonomy: 
 
For them [her parents and grandparents] it is a great achievement because they 
 have always dreamt about being autonomous. As I was telling you they were 
 enslaved, but now they decide how to live, in freedom, without a patrón. For 
 them, if autonomy passes [in a referendum] it will be a dream come true, what 
 they always wanted, desired, what their parents dreamt about.93 
 
Carmen’s account, however, does not correspond with the elders’ recollections of 
their parents and grandparents’ political opinions and goals. There is a disjuncture 
between the narratives of younger generations and older members of the community, 
such as Don Pedro. Don Pedro is a highly respected elder in the San Lorenzo community. 
Many afternoons, he meets with San Lorenzo’s school children, who ask him about 
Monkoxi history and traditions to include them in their homework. Don Pedro explains 
that his parents never thought or considered autonomy:  
 
Before, they didn’t talk about that. They didn’t. They didn’t know. They were 
 under exploitation, under discrimination. And they were fewer; they also didn’t 
 unite to have an organization [to represent them]. Being Monkoxt was preserved 
 only because they maintained their culture, which nowadays is very much 
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 disappearing. They, they lived according to what they had learnt. They played 
 their cajas [traditional drums], [they drank] their chicha, [they held] their 
 celebrations... [...] But they maintained their autonomy. They never said this is 
 ours, our autonomy, only because they didn’t understand.94 
 
The contrast between Don Pedro’s explanation and Carmen’s account isn’t simply 
anecdotic: it shows how the meaning of autonomy, and even the understanding of 
Monkoxi identity, is being redefined according to current understandings of what being 
from Lomerío, what being Monkoxt, entails. As stated by Margaret Jolly (1996), “[...] 
tradition is not a static burden of the past but something created for the present” (pg. 
151). 
There is certainly a historical basis for the reconstruction of the Monkoxi nation’s 
history. However, framing and retelling of history is never neutral, and it always reflects 
the interests and goals of those shaping it in the present. In their pursuit of autonomy, the 
Monkoxt are mobilizing “different understandings of history and seek to construct and 
project historically based identities in efforts to generate legitimacy [...].” (Cameron, 
2013, pg. 180).  
This process is not unique to the Monkoxt. John McNeish (2010), after 
conducting research in the Santuario de Quillacas, an Aymara-speaking municipality in 
the Bolivian highlands, reached a similar conclusion. He stated that “although 
globalization is responsible for an increase in the spread and economic diversification of 
rural Andean communities, local people continue to ground their different identities in a 
sense of tradition and past” (pg. 228).  
Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl (2013) have dubbed this process mobilizing 
memory:  
 
Each generation and movement has built highly instrumental, site and time-
 specific memory bridges between present needs and interpretations of history. 
 Social movement leaders actively deploy these constructed memories to bind 
 movements together through tapping into political participants’ deeper 
 emotions and aspirations (pg. 362). 
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By interpreting their history through the eyes of the present, the Monkoxt give 
legitimacy to their claim of autonomy, connecting it with their ancestors’ struggle against 
slavery, establishing an overarching quest towards freedom.  
There are, however, further disjunctures beyond the differences in the narratives 
of older and younger generations. The understandings of slavery and freedom also 
change between women and men.  
Mercedes and Dolores, when discussing slavery, both referred to Doña Elisa, the 
wife of the patrón: 
 
My mother used to plant cotton, harvest it, and at night spin it. And during 
 the day she would work in the chaco, she would make clay pots, and hammocks. 
 But at night, she spun the cotton. And with the threat she would sew, and that’s 
 God’s power,  God’s help to us, because she had the intelligence to work like that. 
 She sews, makes almost 5 meters of cotton fabric, makes trousers [...] She would 
 go to the old patrón’s place, in Piedra Marcada, his name was Don Benjamín, her 
 name [the patrón’s wife] was Doña Elisa. She would bring fabric with colors 
 from the city. She [her mother] would exchange her fabric and bring colors for us, 
 green... [...].95 
 
Although the men had widely talked about slavery, and many had mentioned Don 
Benjamín, the patrón, and Piedra Marcada, his hacienda, none had referred to Doña 
Elisa. This omission shows that during slavery gendered relationships and tasks were 
clearly reinforced.  
Moreover, Dolores also used the concept of slavery to refer to her mother, 
explaining that she was a slave to her father. She also pointed to disjunctures between 
different generations of women, and their understanding of their role vis a vis their 
husbands: 
 
Yes, my mother was a slave to my father, she suffered a lot, my mother. Bad, 
 she said my father was. Bad, he made her work, she would arrive from the  chaco 
 and he would make her spin [to make wool], take care of his hammock, and at 
 three am again, she wouldn’t rest well. He beat her often. It was bad. I don’t know 
 why. Maybe they [women] couldn’t state their opinions, tell their husbands, I 
 don’t know. ‘No way!’ I told my mother. ‘You let my father boss you around a 
 lot.’ When my father died, with the new husband she had, she didn’t work like 
 that. It was good. She says not only men have rights, women do too, but we 
 shouldn’t take it too far. That’s what  my mother says. Sometimes when I get 
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 angry with my husband, she tells me: ‘don’t  treat your husband like that!’ ‘No, he 
 better get used to it’ I tell her. We all have a  right to give our opinions, I tell her.96 
 
Carmen was only five years younger than Dolores but she had had a very different 
life. Dolores didn’t have the means to finish primary school, she could only write her 
name and read very slowly if she needed to. She couldn’t read quickly like her children 
could, she explained. Carmen, on the other hand, was able to go to university in Santa 
Cruz, and she never got married, although she was a single mother. Despite their 
differences, she made a similar point to Dolores: 
 
“I have seen my grandfathers and my father, I have seen them beating up their 
 women. Nowadays you don’t see it as much, women, we stand stronger so that 
 doesn’t happen. Maybe not 100% but an important share...”97 
  
The women interviewed did share men’s understanding that autonomy is tied to 
freedom. However, women’s perceptions of “freedom” referred to embodied experiences, 
to personal choice, rather than an overarching Monkoxi project. Their understanding of 
freedom was also linked to not being “beaten up”, as Dolores’ comments show: 
 
Elmar [the current leader of CICOL] came and explained [autonomy] to us. 
 Before I used to think that autonomy was the gringos coming and bossing us 
 around. But no, it’s not like that. Elmar explained it to us, he knows, you see? 
 ‘Do not think that autonomy means someone is going to come to boss us 
 around, no.’ He said. We are autonomous. We can decide what we work on 
 without being bossed around. We are free to go wherever we want. We are 
 free, free, no one can beat you up anymore.98 
 
There is certainly an understanding among women that earning the right to not be 
beaten, and the laws against gender violence that enforce it, have come from outside of 
Lomerío. Lourdes, for example, stated that it has been the last government, referring to 
Evo Morales’ administration, which has pushed men to: “leave discrimination behind. 
Before here only men had the right to study, women were only to have children and [to 
work] in the kitchen.99 Dolores, in her early forties, agreed with Lourdes: 
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There’s been plenty of changes, plenty of changes. Now I hear it on TV at  night, 
 there have been changes. They say that now it is not ok anymore that a woman is 
 beaten by her husband. She has to sue him if her husband goes too  far. There is a 
 law by Evo. That’s what I’ve heard on TV. Now you can tell your husband, if he 
 beats me, if you beat me, you have some place to go to defend yourself. That is 
 the change now, through Evo. It was thanks to him,  that we have rights. 
 Autonomy too, that too.100 
 
Violence against women was a recurring topic mentioned in the interviews with 
women, usually appearing as the issue women identified with machismo, and through 
which they measured the evolution of women’s status in Monkoxi society. 
Dolores, for example, was quite adamant in explaining that women had many 
more responsibilities than men, since they had to work in the chaco just like the men did, 
and also had to take care of cooking, raising their children, and taking care of the home. 
She was quite proud that her husband cooked too, although she explained that many 
considered that inappropriate, as they believed a man should not spend time in the 
kitchen. However, she considered machismo had disappeared in Lomerío because her 
husband had never beaten her:  
 
There was [machismo] before but not anymore. There isn’t anymore. That’s 
 why I’m telling you things have changed, they have changed a lot. I’m from 
 San Antonio, not from San Lorenzo. But when I first came [to San Lorenzo] I 
 saw [violence against  women]. My husband has never beaten me, since we 
 got married until now. We fight, but not like that. We fight, but the next day 
 we talk and solve it. But him beating me, no. I’ve never had to live with that.101  
 
When discussing her identity as a Monkoxi person, however, Dolores showed her 
unhappiness with the current distribution of tasks according to gender: 
 
Mmm... You want to know what being Monkoxt is? Well we work on making 
 hammocks, pots, those are jobs exclusively of women, of housewives. And we 
 also have our chores, cooking, cleaning, she also goes to the chaco. [...] The 
 man only has one job, only one job. But women... Pucha! We have a lot more 
 work than men [...] cleaning the children, washing clothes... All of that. The 
 day is too short for a mother. However, men only have one job. He comes  back 
 [from the chaco], he rests... He doesn’t say ‘oh, I’m going to wash my 
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 clothes.’ It’s always the woman that cleans. There is no rest, always working. 
 Only at night do we get to rest.102 
 
Carmen was also displeased with the distribution of tasks between men and 
women. She questioned the gendered nature of the traditional division of labor in 
Monkoxt families, and would have liked to see men “helping” more: 
 
When she [her mother] gets home, she still has a lot to do, she has to feed the 
 children, maybe clean, she makes a double sacrifice. Because the man arrives 
 and waits for the food. That’s what I see in my father, he is like that. My parents 
 both work in agriculture, they have their cows, their pigs, and their  chaco [...] 
 They have to toil every day, and if it’s only them, she has to cook and he waits. 
 Instead of helping her! That’s what I complain about, because if they both have 
 responsibilities, why don’t they help each other? But that isn’t going to happen 
 because my father is pretty old and it’s difficult for him to change103 
 
Women therefore considered that they enjoyed further freedoms than their 
mothers, including having to endure much less violence in the hands of their husbands. 
They, however, were starting to question the gendered division of labor that forced them 
to do “double sacrifices,” and questioned, like Lourdes, their lack of opportunities in 
comparison to men: 
 
Why aren’t women as educated? Because we are in the kitchen, doing things 
 [...] If I leave [to the city to study] my husband, and not just my husband, but 
 other people will tell him why did you let her go? She is going to leave you, 
 they don’t think well of women. But  what happens if the husband leaves? 
 Nothing, but if the woman goes uuuh, they will criticize you. [...]104  
 
Juana, older than Lourdes, nods and adds: 
 
“the majority of women here that want to study, and are young, are told to  wait, 
 not to have a partner. Not to have a family [...] Like she was saying now... Men 
 and women are equal, but women better be careful not to have a family [if they 
 want to study].”105 
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 Women, therefore, are a lot more critical with the Monkoxt’s narrative of 
presenting their history as a quest towards freedom, with constant improvements over 
time. They contrasted their current situation to their mothers and grandmothers’. While 
certainly appreciative of being able to enjoy further freedoms than prior generations of 
women, they were still critical of their situation. They did not concur with male 
definitions of “freedom” and “slavery,” challenging the narrative male leaders of CICOL 
such as Antonio have put forward: 
 
 I’m proud to be Monkoxt, because we live in freedom in this territory, in 
 Lomerío. We almost have everything, this is a paradise. As an indigenous [man] 
 I’m proud to be Monkoxt.106 
 
Autonomy as Cultural Conservation 
 
There will be a soccer game. My neighbors have been excitedly telling me all 
week: you have to come, you will see what being Monkoxt is like there, Don Pedro 
insists. The game is the talk of the town, as Lomerío’s soccer season is about to start 
again and the local team of San Lorenzo is playing at home.  
The soccer field is only a few minutes’ away in the forest, and easy walk from the 
house I’m staying in, on the edge of San Lorenzo de Lomerío. The path isn’t paved, so a 
small cloud of dust follows me and the dog that has adopted me as we walk down the 
street. At our right, some spotted cows graze peacefully. At our left, about fifteen pigs 
bathe in the mud and soak in the winter sun. 
The field is easy to find, we only have to follow the music and laughter. After a 
couple minutes walking under tall trees and avoiding treacherous bushes, the green veil 
opens up and we see the field. Twenty-two young men dressed in colorful jerseys chase 
each other and the ball on an uneven field of natural grass. Most of the field is surrounded 
by forest, but the path leads me to a cleared area, where about thirty people sit in small 
groups. Most of them sit under little roofs made with wooden poles and covered with 
palm leaves, to avoid the direct sun. They are eating snacks and drinking chicha they 
carry in re-used plastic water bottles. A group of four elderly men are playing local 
instruments, different types of flutes and little drums. When they take a break, however, a 
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group of young men blasts some cumbia from a big set of speakers, but they turn it down 
as soon as the musicians are ready to play again. 
I sit on a tall wooden bench with the dog, close to the field. Shortly after, Don 
Pedro comes over with his nephew, who is about my age. They both smile broadly and 
seem happy to see me there. They offer me their chicha, and proudly explain that it is 
homemade, following a Lomerian recipe, and I won’t find better chicha anywhere else. 
They insist on refilling my glass before it’s empty, and tease each other about who made 
the best chicha – although I find later on that it was actually their wives that made it.   
Don Pedro explains that this game is part of a league where only teams from 
Lomerío can compete: all the players were born and raised there, and each team comes 
from one of the 29 towns of the territory. I ask him if his team does well, but he doesn’t 
really know. According to him, what matters the most is the atmosphere: the chance to 
catch up with friends and family, to listen to and play their traditional instruments, and to 
drink and share chicha. This, he tells me, is their autonomy. This is what being Monkoxt 
means, and what they are trying to preserve: this is who they are. 
Don Pedro is very clear on what he understands as autonomy:  
 
Autonomy means our way of life, our culture, our customs. Our culture is  what 
 we do. Our work, like that and... Our plot of land, we work it with our own two 
 hands, we don’t use machines. We grow corn, rice, yucca, bananas... A bit of
 everything. That is our culture, our autonomy. When there’s a festivity, we make 
 chicha, we celebrate and we play our instruments, which are original from here. 
 [...] Culture surviving, our language surviving, that’s what it means to be 
 autonomous, indigenous autonomy as we call it.107 
 
 Out of eleven interviewees, ten referenced cultural conservation as essential to 
their understanding of autonomy. Like Don Pedro, they explained that autonomy would 
allow them to revitalize their culture. “Culture,” however, is an extremely broad concept 
that can be defined and understood in a myriad of ways. In the case of the interviewees, 
when they talked about their “culture,” they referred to three main categories: (1) Bésiro, 
their language; (2) farming and the lifestyle they associate with it; (3) traditional tales and 
practices, also intimately related to farming. 
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(1) Language – Bésiro 
 
 On the first chapter of the Statute, right after the territorial delimitations of 
Lomerío and the role of the Statute vis a vis the Bolivian Constitution, there is the first 
mention of Bésiro, the Monkoxi language. Article 9 of the Estatuto defines Bésiro as the 
common language of the inhabitants of Lomerío, and establishes that it will be considered 
the official language in the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Government of the Monkoxi 
Nation of Lomerío (Estatuto Autonómico de Lomerío 2015:13). 
According to the Education Ministry of Bolivia, Lomerío is the only region where 
Bésiro is still commonly spoken. But even in Lomerío, Spanish is quickly displacing 
Bésiro, as the children and youth of the area have “a passive knowledge of it, since the 
primary language of socialization is Spanish” (“Ministerio de Educación” 2014, pg. 45). 
Carmen, in her mid-thirties, agrees with the Ministerio’s account. She is actively 
involved with CICOL and speaks some Bésiro in certain meetings, but not with her 
friends or her younger siblings, who can’t speak the language at all: 
 
We also have a language that nowadays, sadly, I can say, is disappearing [se 
 nos está yendo]. Very few of us speak it. I for example can still speak it, I 
 understand it, but we don’t speak it when we get together with friends for 
 example, it’s only Spanish, the language [we use]. It is not used day to day. 
 Even worse my younger siblings don’t speak it at all, don’t speak it at all.108	
 
The same report by the Ministry of Education explains that Bésiro is still known 
by adults over forty, even those that use Spanish as their primary language. Bésiro has 
become essential to be recognized as an appropriate representative in community 
assemblies:  
 
[Bésiro] possesses a very important symbolic value among these groups as it 
 allows them to regulate the representational capacity of their leaders. [...] The 
 virtual loss of Bésiro contrasts with the value given to it by the Chiquitanos as 
 their original language, whether they speak it or not, and the leaders and 
 intellectuals of this nation want to reactivate it and revitalize it. (“Ministerio 
 de Educación,” 2014, pg. 45) 
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This affirmation is consistent with my interviews: ten out of eleven interviewees 
discussed Bésiro and expressed a desire to revitalize it. Of these, the four men and two 
women who were over forty years old reported speaking fluent Bésiro, while the two men 
and the woman who were younger reported not being able to speak it fluently and 
varying levels of understanding. Only Carmen, among the interviewees under forty, 
reported being able to fluently speak it.  
However, they all expressed a desire to recover the language and promote its use 
among younger generations, considering Bésiro key to Monkoxt identity, as expressed by 
Juana: 
The young ones, there aren’t many speaking Bésiro. Their moms specially, 
 when talking to them, don’t speak in Bésiro. Almost none, the Monkoxt, their 
 culture, their language... Very little [is used]. We have to revitalize  [recuperar] 
 our native language. We have to revitalize [recuperar] our  culture. But who is 
 going to revitalize it [recuperar] if no one practices it? Now there is help if one 
 writes, if one makes books [in Bésiro]... Comparing  with the collas, though... 
 They have their own language. On the streets, on TV, you see them, talking, 
 singing, in their own language. And we seem ashamed of speaking our own 
 language.109 
 
Many remember why Bésiro became a residual language among the young. Julio 
explains it emphatically: 
 
When I was a boy, they forbade us from speaking Bésiro in school, and when 
 we did, the teacher beat us. Then, it was forbidden to speak in our native 
 language because they despised us, they discriminated against us, they insulted us. 
 They said that speaking our native language in school was a savage thing 
 [salvajismo], barbaric, and other demeaning terms, I remember that clearly. 
 Because of that, as years went by, the younger generations lost the  value [of 
 Bésiro], their self-esteem, and their identity too [...] Even some of our elders, I’ve 
 heard them say: ‘I’m going to send my son to Santa  Cruz so he gets civilized.’ 
 You can imagine the distorted mentality that we have suffered.110 
 
 The ten interviewees that mentioned Bésiro believe that autonomy will be an 
essential tool to revitalize it. They believe that it should be an individual initiative, of 
parents and grandparents talking to their children and grandchildren in Bésiro, but think 
that autonomy will provide the tools for Bésiro to thrive again.  
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 However, considering the recuperation of Bésiro a family issue puts a heavy 
weight on those in the community that raise children: women.  
The Monkoxt women interviewed believed that they themselves were to blame 
for the disappearance of Bésiro, as they didn’t use the language with their children. Even 
Lourdes, who doesn’t speak Bésiro herself, blamed mothers for not passing on the 
language to their children: “If the mother doesn’t speak [in Bésiro], they don’t learn. 
They are trying now with indigenous autonomy, but we have to talk too.”111 
The women interviewed agreed with male interviewees that language 
revitalization would be one of the main goals autonomy would allow them to achieve. 
Carmen, for example, stated that: 
 
I think so [Bésiro can be revitalized]. But [at the moment] there isn’t a 
 strategy to speak it normally, like we speak in Spanish, I think we need one, it 
 [Bésiro] has to be in everything, starting at school, the family... We have to 
 incentivize speaking the language that is what we are going to do with autonomy. 
 I think we can do it [revitalize Bésiro] if we all work together. But  if some are 
 ashamed of speaking it... [...] but I think if we all work together, if  we incentivize 
 it, if we start campaigns, we can do it.112 
 
Interestingly, while men had discussed the disappearance and recuperation of 
their language in the abstract, women discussed the practical consequences of the 
disappearance of Bésiro, particularly in the relationships between different generations. 
Lourdes is the youngest of the three women interviewed in the sewing cooperative. She 
explains feeling guilt and isolation from older generations for not speaking Bésiro:  
 
And about speaking [Bésiro], I didn’t learn to speak it. They tried to teach me 
 when I was leaving [school]. I learnt the names of a few animals, but not enough  
 to have a conversation [para charlar]. For example they [points to two older 
 women] talk, it seems important, they look scared, or they laugh, and I don’t 
 know what they are saying, I don’t know anything.113 
 
Dolores also worried about the practical effects of the loss of Bésiro, reflecting on 
the disjunctures it creates between generations. She explained her family’s case, in which 
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there is a disconnect between her children, that don’t speak Bésiro, herself, and her 
mother, who barely speaks Spanish:  
 
My children barely speak [Bésiro]. When I ask them to do something [in 
 Bésiro], they say ‘what are you saying mom?’ When I tell them [speaks in  Bésiro] 
 I’m telling them to go and bring me some water. They don’t like it. [...] ‘Tell me 
 in Spanish!’ They don’t like it [...] On the other hand, my mom can’t speak like 
 you and I [in  Spanish]. It’s difficult for her. She speaks in  Bésiro. She can’t talk 
 like we are talking right now. She can barely talk [in Spanish]. She can’t talk like 
 that to her grandchildren.114  
	
 The loss of Bésiro, the Monkoxt’s language, is therefore analyzed differenlty by 
male and female interviewees. Men discussed the loss of the language as it relates to their 
indigenous identity, particularly as they derive communal power from being able to speak 
Bésiro. 
 Women, as explained in former sections, do not derive political power from their 
capacity to speak the language, as they are still excluded from wide political 
representation. Their concerns related to the embodied effects of the loss, and the 
disjunctures it creates among generations. 
		
(2) Farming Lifestyle 
  
As stated by Don Pedro at the beginning of this section, the Monkoxt equate their 
culture to their daily practices, and therefore, to agriculture. Most interviewees share this 
understanding. Ten out of eleven interviewees mentioned farming when explaining their 
identity as Monkoxt, and also when discussing their culture. Interviewees define 
Monkoxt farming as working by hand, without machines. They also refer to the chaco, a 
small plot of land cultivated for the families’ own consumption, complemented by fishing 
and hunting. As explained by Antonio: 
 
 Lomerío is composed of twenty-nine communities, the Monkoxt nation speaks 
 Bésiro, and well... Until now we have our culture, our identity, our own 
 language, clothing... Our housing, we work, mainly we work in agriculture but 
 in small quantities, only for our consumption, not for sale. We have also hunted 
 and fished, and collected fruits from the forest. Now we have some basic services 
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 in some communities, although until about twenty years ago we drank water from 
 a paúro, from the river I mean, because we didn’t have machinery then. There 
 also wasn’t any electricity, we used candles. No communications... And it would 
 take two weeks to arrive to Santa Cruz by cart.115 
  
There is a sense among interviewees over forty –six out of the ten– that the 
Monkoxt were better off when they remained faithful to their traditions, that they were 
healthier and happier. Their animals grew bigger, and they were healthier to eat.  
They are also worried that the younger generations have lost interest in farming. 
They believe that they aren’t ready to put in the work necessary to maintain a chaco. 
Luis, for example, thinks that their young are simply not ready to commit to working year 
round. He believes that since the road to Santa Cruz was built, buses to travel made 
available, and phones became ubiquitous, the attraction of the city became irresistible for 
the younger generations116.  
Women also pointed to the role of education to understand why the youth aren’t 
interested in maintaining a chaco. Women over forty expressed a contradictory feeling. 
On the one hand, they understood that the chance to pursue higher education in Santa 
Cruz represents a great opportunity for the young. But as explained by Juana, it may 
come at too high a price: 
 
The chaco is only to eat, for the family. But it’s disappearing. Now the young 
 want to study, get ahead, well. But it’s not so good. They wait to see if there’s 
 a truck  coming full of bananas to buy them. Because we don’t plant, we don’t 
 harvest anymore. Young people don’t have one, they don’t have a chaco. They 
 just wait for the truck to arrive with the corn, the bananas, the rice, whatever it 
 is, they buy everything [...] Now we want autonomy. We want our land. But 
 what are we doing with it? We aren’t planting. And they come and they take 
 the wood anyway. The young sell the wood and that’s where they get their 
 money from [...] Things are changing, but not for the better. We are despising 
 ourselves, our own lands.117 
 
However, Lourdes and Carmen, the younger women –twenty-seven and thirty-
five respectively–, did not agree with Juana over the role education has played in the 
disappearance of traditional practices, including farming in the chaco. They greatly 
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valued the possibility of getting an education. As explained in earlier sections, Lourdes’ 
main complaint regarding women’s status in Monkoxt society was that they didn’t have 
the same possibilities to get an education as men did. Interestingly, whether women 
should or shouldn’t get a formal education appeared as another disjuncture between 
different generations of women, as Carmen’s explanation shows: 
 
Before, my mother tells me, when it comes to education, women didn’t have 
 the possibility of going to school. My mother is illiterate, she doesn’t know 
 how to read, because my grandmother didn’t allow her to, she said only men 
 go to school [...], women belong in the home to take care [atender] of their 
 husbands, to have children. It has evolved, women now have professions, more 
 or less almost 50% of the women [in Lomerío] decide to go to university. Another 
 story is that they may not get there due to a lack of means, because coming from 
 the countryside to the city is difficult, it’s very expensive. But I was able to go 
 with a grant, and I’m very, very proud of it.118 
 
In Dolores case –she was forty years old– her desire to learn new things had even 
led to direct confrontations with her mother, and what Dolores described as painful, 
although gratifying, conversations: 
 
I like [learning] about everything. My mother never wanted me to learn. I told 
 her ‘you want me to be as stupid as you!’ I told her [she covers her mouth with 
 her hand, in a sign of disbelief]. But now, my mother is impressed by all the 
 things I know how to make. I gave her a hammock, she couldn’t believe it [..]. 
 ‘We have to learn about everything, mamita’ I told her.119 
 
 The men over forty shared the older women’s diagnosis: going to the city 
transforms the young, who come back with different values and interests. Julio went as 
far as saying that they lose some of their indigeneity, and their minds become corrupted: 
 
 For example a young man, no matter how lomeriano he may be, how 
 indigenous he  may be, how Monkoxt he may be, arrives at the University of 
 Santa Cruz and comes back with a different mentality. He is still indigenous 
 but he has a different mentality, he has been brain washed. Then they come 
 back, they get an appointment [with CICOL or the municipality] and they do 
 whatever, anything but good work. That is one of the main distortions, the 
 corruption of the mentality, the way of thinking [modelo mental] that our youth 
 has compared to what we live here [in Lomerío], those of us who love culture.120 
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 The four interviewees under forty years old, however, also defined their identity 
in relation to traditional farming, and referenced fishing and hunting as essential to their 
identity as Monkoxt. However, they expressed a desire to see more development projects 
implemented in their territory and more opportunities to pursue higher education in Santa 
Cruz. One of them, Juan, was quite critical of the reproaches expressed by older 
generations and directly critiqued traditional agricultural practices:  
 
 How we live now, with dogs and pigs running around, that shouldn’t exist. 
 The chickens too, cows... Each animal should have its own space, the owner 
 should have the capacity to give it specific food. They [the animals] live off 
 whatever they can find and that is not right. Everything should be much more 
 organized, we are very behind, we need to teach people about how to take care 
 of animals, themselves, proper, modern farming, because animals can transmit 
 diseases to men, and men to animals.121  
 
 The contrast between the perceptions of younger and older generations, 
particularly relating to traditional culture and education, show how some Monkoxt resent 
the changes they see in the lives, desires, and expectations of their young. Particularly 
older generations fear that these changes will erase Monkoxi culture, and, with it, 
Monkoxi identity. 
 These disjunctures, however, also point towards internal power dynamics at work 
between different sectors within Monkoxt society. Bésiro and certain aspects of what is 
defined as “traditional culture” have become markers of true indigeneity, of truly being 
Monkoxt. The older men, who also hold positions of power in CICOL, particularly worry 
about these issues as they constitute the source of their political and communal power, 
and worry that the transformations they see in younger generations will deprive them of 
the influence that particular cultural capital confers them. 
 Women, however, do not derive communal or political power from their 
engagement with “traditional culture” and Bésiro. Even the older generations of women, 
although also worried about the transformations they see in younger generations, focus 
on the concrete, the embodied experience generated by the loss of tradition and Bésiro. 
They worry about the generational barriers such loss creates, both between women and 
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within families. Moreover, they internalize the guilt for not being able to pass on these 
markers of “Monkoxtiness,” as their gender is tasked with raising the future generations 
appropriately.  
 
(3) Traditional Tales and Practices 
 
 The Estatuto outlined the symbols, and the spiritual and religious beliefs, that are 
traditional to the Monkoxi nation according to their cosmovisión (“Estatuto Autonómico 
de Lomerío,” 2015, pg. 13-14). They are intimately tied to farming practices and 
traditional celebrations, which many times align with harvest or planting seasons. The 
interviewees considered some of these practices essential to their understanding of their 
culture and Monkoxi identity, and expressed the fear that they are disappearing.  
 Although the Estatuto mentions several deities, the interviewees only referred to 
one: Jichi, protector of nature. As explained by Don Facundo: 
 
 My grandfather told me that there are Jichis. And people older than him 
 thought so too. Supposedly, we still believe in jichis. They preserve water and 
 forests. In our Estatuto it says we have different kinds of jichis, in the forest, 
 the stones, they maintain nature’s equilibrium. They protect puquios,122 for 
 example. You can’t bathe in puquios with soap or with smelly things, those 
 are the enemies of the jichi, he doesn’t like that. If you go there with soap, or 
 wash clothes for example, the jichi will leave and the puquio will dry out.123 
 
 Out of the ten interviewees that talked about traditional practices and beliefs, six 
referred to the new moon, and its impact on planting and harvesting. They also explained 
that practicing particular rituals during the new moon would expel certain evils and bring 
good fortune, as explained by Don Pedro and Julio: 
 
 There are some beliefs. One is that to plant corn, if there is a new moon, they 
 say it will be no good. Cutting wood during a new moon, no good.124 
 
 One of the beliefs that still survives in all the [Monkoxt] communities is about 
 the new moon. During the new moon, our ancestors practiced rituals to ask for 
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 changes. For example, if you were my wife and we had a child, and our little 
 boy cried a lot, or was prone to sickness, when there’s a new moon we would 
 present it to the moon and hit him like this [with his hand, he models slightly 
 hitting a child’s bum while holding him up] like a ritual asking the moon to 
 take away the evil in the boy and to give us good things. You also have to be 
 very careful of planting when the moon is like that. You can’t plant at that  time. 
 One week before the new moon you can’t plant because it won’t be good. It will 
 grow, but if there’s a strong wind it will break, it’s too weak. You can’t harvest 
 corn or rice either. It will rot when you put it away. It won’t be any good.125  
 
 Doña Dolores regularly works in the chaco with her husband and is proud to 
know what she calls “origin stories.” For example, she explains, the tobacco plant used to 
be a woman, and should be treated as such: 
 
 The tobacco plant is a woman. That is why you can’t scratch the land around 
 it, take  away the plants that surround it or harm it [carpir]. If you do that, it 
 won’t be any good, any good. I used to have tons of tobacco here [points at 
 her garden] but then I  did it [yo lo carpí] and now I barely have any tobacco 
 left. That’s because tobacco is a woman. She [tobacco] told her husband: ‘you 
 hate me so much, don’t you? Hate me if you want. But I’m going to leave you 
 some day. And you are going to see me everywhere, in everyone’s mouth, in 
 other men’s mouths.’ The woman said. That’s how tobacco is, because it’s a 
 woman. That’s why when you harm it, she leaves, she goes somewhere else. 
 That’s it. It’s pretty, isn’t it? My dad told me this story, and my children wrote 
 it down in their notebooks for school, because when they have homework they 
 go and present on it.126 
 
 Dolores says that her children aren’t very interested in the stories, however, and 
they certainly do not believe in them. They are asked to collect them for school, but to 
them is only another part of their homework. Like Dolores, Doña Juana doesn’t think 
incorporating traditional Monkoxi culture to the schools’ curriculum is necessarily 
working: the young are simply interested in other things: 
 
 What makes us Monkoxt, from so long ago, is our culture, different from others, 
 how do you say, the collas, they are different. The language, that’s  what I think.  
 And now, that’s how I see it, teachers are trying to teach some Bésiro in schools, 
 but I don’t see any [results]. They still talk in Spanish. With our [traditional] 
 clothing too, we don’t wear it anymore, our daughters, like we used to before, 
 with our little dresses. Now, shorts, nothing else, or  trousers. They wear the dress 
                                                
125 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.11.2018. 
 
126 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.16.2018.  
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 because they must, to go to school. They put it on, go to class, it’s their uniform. 
 But then they come home and take it off, they are ashamed because their own 
 mothers don’t wear the [traditional] dress at home. The kids nowadays don’t want 
 to wear it.127 
 
Juana gave another example of a disappearing practice: the production of clay 
cántaros, a special type of clay pots: 
 
[...] Before we had cotton in the chaco, but not anymore. And other plants too. 
 Some still know how to make cántaros [type of clay pots], to make chicha. 
 How to prepare the clay, how to cook it... But it’s something that’s not valued 
 anymore. People... It’s being lost. People buy pots now.128 
 
Lourdes nodded and agreed with Juana: 
 
People don’t want [clay pots] anymore. Many don’t even know how to make 
 them. I have one drying right now. But most people don’t want them. ‘It  smells 
 like dirt,’ they say. They don’t want clay anymore.129 
 
 Luis pointed out to another changing practice: playing the traditional Monkoxi 
instruments. Nine other interviewees also mentioned the importance of these instruments, 
and the role they play in Monkoxt festivities: 
 
 Culture, we have a traditional culture... We play the fífano, the flute, the secu-
 secu, and the ioresomanque, all these instruments have a particular time when 
 they are played. The fífano is played during carnival. The secu-secu during 
 Easter celebrations. They are very important for our culture.130 
 
Women are also worried about the disappearance of traditional practices, as 
shown in the following reflection shared by Dolores. She also refers to the loss of 
traditional musical instruments. However, her explanation points to an interesting 
transformation in the practice: 
 
Nowadays our culture is being lost. Our culture is the cajita and the bombo 
 [traditional instruments]... now almost no one plays them. We say that when 
 the old  men die it’s only going to be speakers. That’s not our culture. Our  culture 
                                                
127 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.18.2018. 
 
128 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.18.2018. 
 
129 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.18.2018. 
 
130 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.20.2018. 
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 is the flute, the bombo... But now it’s only speakers. The young are not 
 interested in learning  anymore. That’s why I say it’s going to disappear, even 
 though we don’t want it to, and we want our children to learn [...] They only 
 learn because they have to in school,  they learn to play the flute, the secu- secu, 
 the bombo... That is how my son learnt. [...] Even women know how to play the 
 secu-secu now!131  
 
Dolores mischievously laughs, and her smile grows wider when I ask her if 
women played the secu-secu when she was younger, revealing an interesting 
conversation between her mother and her daughter:  
 
UUUh no! Our parents didn’t want us to play before. They would beat us. My 
 mother used to say: ‘do you have balls to be  playing the flute?’ She used to 
 say. She doesn’t like that her granddaughter plays. “Your job is to spin! That’s 
 not for  women.” She doesn’t like it, my mother. ‘What are you doing with 
 that, granddaughter? Do you have balls, or what?’ ‘Grandmother that’s what 
 we learn in school’ ‘Spinning is what they should be teaching you.’ My mother 
 didn’t let us play soccer. ‘That’s for boys,’ she said. [...] ‘You give  your daughter 
 too much freedom, playing soccer, playing the secu-secu... One they she’ll get 
 married and her husband won’t have a hammock. She doesn’t know how to spin, 
 is she going to make the hammock out of leather?’ She tells her ‘if one day I get 
 married I’m going to buy him a hammock to swing. There  is no way I’m going 
 to spend my time spinning!’ My mother would have beaten  me [if I had said that]. 
 She didn’t like that my daughter played soccer, but her father [Dolores’ husband] 
 said: ‘we can’t discriminate against the girl!  If she wants to play soccer...’ And 
 everywhere! Now [girls] all over the  country are playing soccer!132 
 
Male interviewees over forty worry about the disappearance of traditional 
practices and beliefs. However, many of these practices relate to women’s work, as 
women have traditionally made clothing, made clay cántaros, and prepared chicha. 
Women have also traditionally passed on the creational stories that are now slowly being 
forgotten.  
Interestingly, men consider that traditional Monkoxi music and instruments are 
disappearing, as the younger generations prefer to listen to “modern” music through loud 
speakers. However, women explain that although playing traditional music is certainly 
not as popular as it was before, the practice is transforming, since women are learning to 
play these instruments in school. 
                                                
131 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.16.2018. 
 
132 Interview with author, San Lorenzo de Lomerío, 07.16.2018. 
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In their discussion, males ignore these transformations, equating them to the 
disappearance of traditional culture. Women, however, have a two-sided attitude towards 
them. As Dolores’ discussion with her mother shows, they recognize that these 
transformations lead to the loss of certain traditions, such as making hammocks for their 
husbands. Older women are particularly resentful of these transformations. 
However, younger women embrace the transformations in these practices, as they 
entail subverting traditional gender roles. Women are now able to enter traditionally male 
spheres such as playing musical instruments, playing soccer, or getting a formal 
education, even if with more difficulties than men. 
As stated by Allan Pred (1992):  
 
Localized confrontations between some form of ‘tradition’ and some form of 
 ‘modernity’ are not likely to involve an automatic, unproblematic capitulation 
 of the former to the latter [...]. Instead, such confrontations between the 
 traditional and the modern are almost certain to generate cultural tension 
 between classes, groups, institutions, or gendered women and men with 
 different interests, almost certain to bring the cultural modalities of different 
 classes, groups, institutions, or gendered women and men into new forms of 
 opposition [...] such localized confrontations are almost certain to demand  some 
 translation, some reworking” (pg. 176-177). 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis has analyzed the different meanings attached to autonomy in Bolivia. 
Starting from a macro perspective, it examined the autonomy debate at the state level. 
Three main groups led the autonomy debate and defined the contents and shape of the 
2009 Bolivian Constitution: (1) social movement organizations, represented by Evo 
Morales’ MAS party; (2) identity based indigenous organizations; and (3) Media Luna 
elites.  
 These groups contended over the meaning of autonomy: was autonomy linked to 
self-determination, and therefore reserved to indigenous nations? Or, could autonomy 
also be claimed by regional governments? They also clashed over the use and 
management of natural resources. Should the exploitation of natural resources remain in 
the hands of the central state? Should it be transferred to regional governments? Or as 
part of indigenous nations’ territorial rights, should they be the ones to decide on the 
management of natural resources present in their territories?  
 For Identity based indigenous organizations, there could only be one type of 
autonomy: indigenous autonomy. They envisioned the re-funding of Bolivia through the 
creation of indigenous autonomies. These autonomies would be governed following 
traditional norms and customs, would not depend on any regional government, and would 
guarantee that indigenous peoples had absolute control over the natural resources present 
in the territories. Identity based indigenous organizations demanded a Constituent 
Assembly to reform the Constitution and include their understanding of autonomy in the 
Magna Carta. In their view, indigenous autonomy would therefore transform the 
traditional liberal republic, leading to a new, plurinational Bolivia (Garcés, 2010). 
 The autonomy project proposed by Media Luna elites was at the other end of the 
spectrum. Their autonomy proposal was created to counter identity based indigenous 
organizations, and it was based on giving more power to the regional governments that 
existed in Bolivia under the liberal state. It did not consider that indigenous nations were 
entitled to their own governments, claiming that it would be racist to grant them rights 
solely based on their ethnicity (Kohl, 2010; Webber, 2008b). According to their 
autonomy proposal, which called for the decentralization of extensive political and fiscal 
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competencies, departmental governments would be the only recognized regional entity 
and would decide how to manage and exploit the natural resources present in that 
department (Eaton, 2007).  
 Evo Morales’ government and party, MAS, built strategic alliances with both 
camps.  
During the early 2000s, social movement organizations and identity based 
indigenous organizations became political allies, demonstrating, marching, and 
protesting together against the neoliberal government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 
(Postero, 2007). At this point, their interests aligned: both types of organizations mostly 
identified as indigenous, and defended indigenous rights over land, territory, and 
expanded cultural recognition and protection; they opposed the neoliberal policies 
applied in Bolivia since the 1980s; they wanted to call a Constituent Assembly to re-fund 
Bolivia, and write a new Constitution that expanded the political and economic rights of 
all Bolivians.  
However, their core demands diverged. Social movement organizations’ main 
goals related to extending more economic rights to vulnerable Bolivians. They wanted to 
write a new Constitution to transform the political system. Although many of them 
identified as indigenous, their claims centered on economic and political claims based on 
Bolivian citizenship, not ethnic identity. Autonomy was not a central or nonnegotiable 
demand for this sector. On the other hand, identity based indigenous organizations 
wanted a Constituent Assembly to have their rights as indigenous nations, based on their 
ethnic identity, recognized and expanded. 
 In 2006 Morales and MAS formed their first government, and the time came for 
Morales and his administration to deliver the main promise of their campaign: calling a 
Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution.  
 However, at this point, and for the first time since Morales’ election, the interests 
of the new government diverged from the interests of identity based indigenous 
organizations. Morales chose to build an alliance with the representatives of the Media 
Luna elites in the Senate, and pass an electoral law to the Constituent Assembly based on 
party representation (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011). MAS trusted that this type of election 
system would earn them the votes of indigenous Bolivians and give MAS a majority in 
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the assembly. Although identity based indigenous organizations managed to get several 
representatives elected to the assembly, MAS’ strategy was successful.  
 The assembly, however, was extremely contentious and the Media Luna elites 
boycotted it and staged wide protests, bringing the process to a halt in several occasions. 
MAS and identity based indigenous groups allied to protest against Media Luna elites, 
and to promote their own transformative visions of the new Bolivia they wanted to create 
through the Constitution. Identity based indigenous organizations even staged hunger 
strikes against the departmental autonomy project of the Media Luna elites (Postero, 
2017; Webber, 2008b). 
However, once again, MAS decided to negotiate with the Media Luna elites to get 
a Constitution passed. They made concessions on the goals identity based indigenous 
organizations considered a priority. The new Constitution reduced the scope of the 
autonomy model proposed by indigenous organizations and included the demand of 
departmental autonomy proposed by Media Luna elites. Both models, watered down, 
would therefore be forced to coexist in the new Magna Carta. The Constitution also 
included protections for private property (Article 56) and latifundios (Article 315, 399) 
(Regalsky, 2010).  
  According to Morales, the goal of the new Constitution, finally passed in 
referendum in 2009, was to “vernacularize” the Western liberal state, leading to a 
decolonized, plurinational nation (Postero, 2017). However, indigenous autonomies, as 
set in the Magna Carta, are far from the constitutive entities of a decolonized, 
decentralized, plurinational state: although recognized, the central state retains the power 
of determining which territories can become indigenous autonomies, imposing liberal 
election systems rather than respecting traditional norms and procedures for electing 
representatives, and always under state supervision. (“Constitución Política del Estado,” 
2009). 
  Moreover, indigenous autonomies are not given control over the non-renewable 
resources of their territories. Although the central government will have to consult them 
before developing an extractive project in their territories, the consultation will be non-
binding and can easily be ignored by the central state (Jiménez Pimentel, 2010).  
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 The policies implemented by the first and second Morales administrations have 
further separated MAS from the interests defended by identity based indigenous 
organizations. Originally, Morales’ government was formed by members from the three 
sectors that had supported him in gaining the presidency: (1) the indigenista sector, 
formed by cabinet members belonging to identity based indigenous organizations; (2) the 
populista group, led by Evo Morales, representing social movement organizations; and 
(3) the estatista sector, representing the classical left (Laserna 2010). 
 The populista group and the estatista sector considered that the government’s 
priorities were to redistribute wealth in Bolivia, rolling back the neoliberal policies 
implemented since the 1980s. They also wanted to consolidate their political power 
throughout the country to secure control of the state. Both objectives were incompatible 
with the wide implementation of autonomy defended by the ministers from the 
indigenista sector: many of the cabinet members from this group have resigned or have 
been marginalized in the administration. 
 Morales’ governments have certainly implemented a wide array of social 
measures that have massively reduced poverty levels in Bolivia. However, the funding 
for these projects comes from extractive projects that exploit Bolivia’s natural resources, 
many of which are found in indigenous territories. MAS has taken advantage of the 
central government’s Constitutional right to exploit the nonrenewable resources in 
indigenous territories. They have even, as they did in the TIPNIS case, ignored 
indigenous nations Constitutional right to an informed consultation, implementing 
extractive projects without consulting the indigenous groups affected (Postero 2017).  
 In the regional and municipal level, MAS candidates have also opposed pro-
indigenous autonomy candidates and have even tried to block the implementation of 
indigenous autonomies (Cameron & Tockman, 2014). In most cases, once these 
autonomies are created, political parties play no role in the election of political 
representatives. This election model thwarts MAS’ objective of consolidating political 
power throughout Bolivia, explaining the resistance of MAS’ local representatives and 
supporters to the implementation of indigenous autonomy. 
 These tensions also explain the design, in 2010, of the LMAD, the Ley Marco de 
Autonomias y Descentralización (Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization). 
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The LMAD is the law that regulates the creation of autonomies in Bolivia. It establishes 
several paths and types of autonomy. Departmental autonomy, as agreed with Media 
Luna elites during the constituent process, is relatively easy to achieve, and although it 
grants more administrative capacities to the department, it does not suppose the creation 
of a new political entity within the state (Jiménez Pimentel, 2010).  
When it comes to indigenous autonomy, the LMAD has prioritized the municipal 
path, which has come to be known as the “quick” path. The process to achieve this type 
of autonomy is much shorter and less demanding, probably because once an autonomy is 
constituted, it does not modify the current administrative organization of the state. The 
municipality is governed by indigenous nations through their norms and customs, but it 
remains under the same regional government, under the same administrative system 
(Tockman, Cameron & Plata 2015).  
The other main path established in the LMAD, the territorial path, allows 
indigenous nations to become an autonomy based on their ancestral territories. Once 
autonomy is constituted, the administrative lines established by the state have to be 
redefined. This path has come to be known as the “long” path. It demands that indigenous 
nations follow an eleven-step process filled with bureaucratic hurdles and challenges. The 
Monkoxt of Lomerío, one of the first indigenous nations to start the bureaucratic 
procedures to have their autonomy recognized by the state, have still not complied with 
all the requirements, over ten years after they started the process.  
The design of the LMAD confirms MAS’ abandonment of the autonomy project 
as proposed by identity based indigenous groups. The law, for example, demands that 
indigenous nations obtain a state certification that declares them indigenous and 
recognizes their right to self-determination over their ancestral lands, a right already 
recognized in the Bolivian Constitution. It also forces indigenous nations to have their 
traditional norms and procedures certified and validated by the state, while imposing 
Western-style liberal referendums at several points during the autonomy process. 
Moreover, indigenous autonomies cannot, even after following all the turns and 
intricacies of the law, go over departmental borders. It does not matter that the 
Constitution recognizes indigenous nations’ right to territorial restitution, or their claims 
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to their ancestral lands: the structure of the liberal state supersedes their rights (Flores 
Gonzales, 2018). 
The impact of the 2009 Constitution and the LMAD in limiting indigenous 
groups’ understanding and implementation of autonomy is clear when we analyze the 
case of the Monkoxi nation of Lomerío. The Monkoxt faced astonishing bureaucratic 
obstacles during their autonomy process, exacerbated by the fact that they had begun 
their autonomy process –and drafted a first version of their autonomy statute– before the 
LMAD had been passed in 2010.  
 By 2016 –seven years after writing the first draft of their Estatuto– the Monkoxt 
were finally able to send their proposed statute to the Plurinational Constitutional Court 
of Bolivia (TCP) for revision and approval. The Court mandated the modification of 
nineteen articles of the statute. Most of the corrections related to the use and management 
of natural resources: the TCP forced the Monkoxt to recognize in their Estatuto that they 
could only manage the renewable resources of Lomerío, but that the central state retained 
the right to administer and exploit as it saw fit the nonrenewable resources of their 
territory (Flores Gonzales, 2018). 
Bolivia’s experience with indigenous autonomy, and the Monkoxt’s engagement 
with state legality, align with the general evolution of autonomy regimes in Latin 
America, and parallel their successes and challenges. Miguel González (2015), in his 
analysis of the literature’s considerations of different autonomy models throughout the 
region, identifies three main issues that have and will influence indigenous autonomy in 
the future: 
 
(i) first, the latitude of indigenous self-government institutions –or the  
challenges of self-governance– and to what extent governance models of 
 indigenous territorial autonomy are to be inserted in traditional state institutions, 
 or, if instead, institutional innovations will emerge, ones that might be able to 
 reflect the worldviews and identities of indigenous peoples; (ii) threats to self-
 determination and self-governance derived by the dominant extractive economic 
 model, militarization of indigenous territories, and by the new 
 developmental/universalist approach promoted by several states in Latin 
 America, and in which indigenous peoples are important majorities; and (iii) 
 the significance of the emergence of a paradigm that resembles a type of post-
 neoliberal governmental pluralism that accommodates indigenous territorial 
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 autonomies while at the same time restricts their potential as spaces for social 
 emancipation. (González, 2015, pg. 29). 
 
 The literature’s conclusions apply to the Bolivian case if we only analyze the 
autonomy debate at the state level. An analysis limited to this macro perspective would 
lead us to believe that the political control and the exploitation of natural resources in 
indigenous territories are the most salient understandings –and issues–, of autonomy in 
Bolivia. However, a closer analysis of dynamics that impacted the drafting of the 
Estatuto Autonómico of the Monkoxt of Lomerío shows the deficiencies of this analysis.  
 The autonomy process of the Monkoxt has been led by the CICOL, the Central 
Indígena de Comunidades Originaras de Lomerío (Indigenous Central of the Originary 
Communities of Lomerío), which is the indigenous organization that has represented the 
Monkoxt since the 1980s. The CICOL elected the committee that would write the first 
draft of their statute through its traditional norms and procedures, in an assembly that 
included representatives from the twenty-nine communities of Lomerío. 
Nevertheless, the elected representatives of CICOL had –and still have– a very 
specific profile: they had been involved with CICOL, or had shown a keen interest in the 
organization, and supported indigenous autonomy. Therefore, the views of those that 
oppose autonomy or simply did not participate in CICOL meetings were excluded from 
the process.  
Throughout the process to draft the statute and collect the documents necessary to 
validate it according to the LMAD, the CICOL received the support of the Santa Cruz 
nonprofit CEJIS, Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social (Center of Judicial 
Studies and Social Investigation). Experts from CEJIS, known as técnicos, provided 
essential technical and logistical support to CICOL.  
Their influence, however, greatly impacted the final statute. In accordance to the 
findings by Tockman, Cameron & Plata (2015), CEJIS técnicos privileged Spanish over 
Bésiro, the Monkoxt’s language, as they did not speak it or understand it. The técnicos 
also followed a set format to write the Estatuto, for which they did an important share of 
the writing.  
CEJIS técnicos did not have the intention of transforming the will of the 
Monkoxt, and did not want to manipulate their understanding of autonomy. They found 
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themselves in a difficult position. Having worked with CICOL for decades, CEJIS 
técnicos understood what hopes and goals the Monkoxt attached to autonomy, and the 
long struggle they had faced to finally be able to form their own local government run 
through their usos y costumbres. However, they also had the legal knowledge that most of 
the Monkoxt lacked, and understood that compromises would have to be made to adapt 
the Estatuto to the complex, bureaucratic demands of the LMAD.  
Therefore, CEJIS técnicos acted as brokers between the central state’s legality and 
the Monkoxt’s autonomy process. The Estatuto produced by the Monkoxt of Lomerío 
would have most likely taken a very different shape if CEJIS técnicos hadn’t participated 
in the process of drafting it and adapting it to the demands of the Bolivian Constitutional 
Court. However, it is also likely that the Monkoxt wouldn’t have been able to 
successfully and efficiently face the bureaucratic challenges of the LMAD without the 
técnicos’ support. 
 CEJIS and CICOL also worked to incorporate the comments and suggestions 
from different community members. However, those that attended autonomy related 
workshops were generally in favor of autonomy, and not critical of the process. Most 
attendees had very little knowledge of the legal demands to pass the Estatuto, and an 
important share of people over fifty years old in Lomerío have difficulties reading and 
writing.  
The drafting of the statute took place almost ten years ago, and therefore the 
younger generations and those that didn’t participate in the workshops are not familiar 
with the contents of the text. Moreover, and in my experience attending workshops 
organized by CICOL, 80% of attendees are men, with very few women attending, and 
even less actively participating.  
Therefore, and despite the efforts to make the Estatuto Autonómico de la Nación 
Monkoxt de Lomerío as representative of all views as possible, the final result was deeply 
influenced by the participation of CEJIS técnicos and the views and hopes of the CICOL 
leadership that was most involved in the autonomy process. Women’s views were also 
excluded due to their lack of representation in Lomerío’s assemblies and workshops.  
My interviews with eleven individual members of the Monkoxt nation, six men 
and five women, confirmed this conclusion. Most interviewees lived in the community of 
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San Lorenzo de Lomerío, although three of them lived or had been born in other 
communities, such as Puquio Cristo Rey. The oldest interviewee was eighty-two years 
old, while the youngest was twenty-seven years old at the time of the interview. Out 
eleven interviewees, six were over forty years old. While some interviewees had been 
actively involved in the autonomy process and with CICOL, others did not participate in 
political meetings and had no connection to indigenous autonomy. 
  The conclusions presented in this thesis constitute indications of what the 
majority of the Monkoxt may believe, and think, in regards to the autonomy project. 
However, the results cannot be generalized as they are based on eleven interviewees, 
certainly not enough to represent the whole population of Lomerío, and the general 
opinion of indigenous nations in Bolivia. However, the results open possibilities to new 
research projects, with more interviewees, to see if the results outlined in this thesis are 
applicable to the general Monkoxi nation, other Bolivian indigenous groups, and other 
indigenous organizations throughout Latin America. 
The interviewees understood autonomy as a practical tool, not an abstract 
concept. They did not refer to self-determination or the transformation of the liberal state 
to explain what autonomy meant to them. To explain their understanding of autonomy, 
they referred to the goals they hoped an autonomous government would help them 
achieve. The interviewees referred to four main goals:  (1) resource management; (2) 
rejection of political parties, since interviewees believed that autonomy would lead to the 
disappearance of political parties in Lomerío, and with them, the disappearance of 
political conflict; (3) freedom, related to a historical arc of overcoming exploitation; (4) 
cultural conservation, particularly of their language, farming lifestyle, and traditional 
tales and practices. 
 Although several referred to resource management, only two considered that a 
higher influence in the management of Lomerío’s natural resources was the most relevant 
goal of autonomy, indicating a big disjuncture with the autonomy debate at the state 
level. 
 Seven interviewees referred to political parties, but only one considered their 
elimination from Lomerío’s government an essential goal of autonomy. However, eight 
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interviewees referred to their ancestor’s quest to free themselves from slavery and 
exploitation as vital to their identity and their support of autonomy.  
 Their identity, and its conservation, was presented by the interviewees as 
synonymous to autonomy. Out of eleven interviewees, ten mentioned the conservation of 
their culture as one of the main goals of autonomy. Interestingly, the interviewees that 
discussed resource management and the disappearance of political parties to define 
autonomy also considered that these goals were tied to the protection and revitalization of 
their language, their ancestors farming techniques, and their traditional tales and 
practices.  
 There is therefore a wide disjuncture between the autonomy debate at the state 
level and the debate at the local level. But there are also relevant differences in the 
understanding of autonomy among individual actors at the local level, particularly 
between men and women. 
 Over half the women interviewed, from different age groups, felt excluded from 
the political process that has promoted indigenous autonomy, and also from political 
participation in general. They believed that their responsibilities in the home, raising 
children, and taking care of the elderly in the family made it impossible for them to 
engage in political participation in the same terms as men.  
 Like their male counterparts, the women interviewed were deeply concerned 
about the disappearance of their language and Monkoxi traditional practices. For men, 
speaking Bésiro and engaging in certain cultural practices is a source of communal 
power, a sing of “Monkoxtiness.”  
 Women do not derive communal or political power from their engagement with 
“traditional culture” and Bésiro, as their access to political institutions is still very 
limited. Therefore, their worries relate to their embodied experience of culture, and the 
practical consequences the loss of Bésiro and traditional practices produce. Women 
considered the generational barriers these transformations create, both between women 
and within families. However, because they are tasked with raising children and have an 
important role in the private sphere, women also showed that they internalize the blame 
for not passing on Bésiro and “traditional culture,” the markers of “Monkoxtiness,” to 
future generations. 
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Male interviewees were also concerned by the disappearance of traditional 
practices and beliefs. However, many of these practices relate to women’s work, as 
women have traditionally made clothing, made clay cántaros, and prepared chicha. 
Women have also traditionally passed on the creational stories that are now slowly 
disappearing.  
Interestingly, men simply reflected on the loss of these practices, and the need to 
engage younger generations in, for example, learning how to play traditional instruments. 
Again, women painted a much more complex picture. Although certain practices such as 
playing traditional music is certainly not as popular as it used to be, the practice is not 
fully disappearing, but transforming: while it used to be only men that played these 
instruments, nowadays young girls are also learning to play them in school. 
In their discussion, males ignored these transformations, equating them to the 
disappearance of traditional culture. Women, while recognizing that certain traditions 
such as making hammocks or clay cántaros are disappearing, also embraced some of the 
changes these transformations in traditional culture have brought. Women can now also 
play Monkoxi instruments, play soccer, and go to school, leading to an expansion of their 
worlds and a subversion of traditional gender roles.  
 This thesis has therefore shown a wide disconnection between the understanding 
of autonomy at the state level and the meaning and goals attached to autonomy at the 
local level. The representatives of indigenous nations at the state level presented 
autonomy as an embodiment of the self-determination rights of indigenous groups. 
According to their view, autonomy challenged the traditional liberal model of the state, 
and would lead to indigenous nations’ gaining the capacity to economically and 
politically control their territories.  
 The conclusions of my eleven interviews point towards a much more complex and 
practical understanding of autonomy at the local level, particularly in the case of the 
Monkoxi nation of Lomerío. To them, autonomy is a practical tool, not an abstract 
concept. To explain it, they referred to the goals they hoped an autonomous government 
would help them achieve. While the extended political rights and the control of natural 
resources –the two main understandings of autonomy at the state level– were mentioned 
by the interviewees, the capacity to maintain and protect their identity, their culture, and 
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their traditional practices, were by far the most salient understandings and goals of 
autonomy for the interviewees at the local level.   
Therefore, this thesis has confirmed the statement of Catalan anthropologist Pere 
Torra i Morell (2017) that autonomy in Latin America has become a significante vacío, 
an all-encompassing concept with different meanings and hopes attached to it by different 
groups and individuals. 
 The existing academic literature has widely analyzed the autonomy debate in 
Latin America, but from a macro perspective. Most studies fall on the legalistic side of 
the autonomy debate. They discuss its inclusion –and specific shape– in the constitutions 
passed since the 1990s, and the challenges faced in its implementation, particularly 
considering the extractive policies applied by many governments in Latin America. 
However, there is a gap in the literature, as there are very few discussions of the various 
understandings of autonomy from the ground.  
 This thesis certainly points to the need of analyzing the meaning individual 
indigenous community members throughout Latin America give to autonomy. As this 
thesis has shown, and as it’s the case among my interviewees in Lomerío, there might be 
wide disjunctures between the meaning given to autonomy by states, indigenous 
organizations, and academics, and the understanding of autonomy of different indigenous 
communities.  
 The Monkoxt interviewees, when discussing autonomy, gave a preeminent 
importance to identity and cultural conservation, together with the desire to protect 
traditional practices from a certain type of capitalist development. Both issues are not 
often discussed in the Latin American autonomy debate, which focuses on self-
determination and territorial rights.  
 A wide, careful analysis of individual community members’ experiences and 
understandings of autonomy will help us further understand the current state of 
indigenous autonomy. It will also allow us comprehend the future goals, challenges and 
transformations the concept of indigenous autonomy will have to face if it is to remain an 
aspirational goal for indigenous nations throughout the region. 
 Considering my findings, both analyzing the autonomy discussion at the state 
level and the meanings attached to the concept in Lomerío, dissatisfaction and 
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disappointment with the current implementation of indigenous autonomy in Bolivia seem 
inevitable. At the state level, identity based indigenous organizations were unable to 
include their understanding of autonomy in the 2009 Constitution. The state still has the 
power to determine which indigenous groups can constitute autonomous governments, 
and the central administration also retained the capacity to exploit the nonrenewable 
resources present in indigenous territories unilaterally. However, this failure may extend 
the validity of autonomy as an aspirational project: identity based indigenous 
organizations may identify the shortcomings of autonomy not as a failure of the project, 
but they may blame its deficiencies on the limited interpretation of indigenous autonomy 
incorporated in the 2009 Constitution.   
 At the local level, the expectations of the Monkoxt also go beyond the definition 
of autonomy set in the 2009 Constitution. The interviewees hope that autonomy will 
allow them to compel the younger generations to work the land, to use Bésiro in their 
daily lives, and to reject the charm of the big city: they hope it will compel younger 
generations to reject “modernity.”  
 However, the goals and understandings at the state level and at the local level may 
align in the future. If Evo Morales –or a new administration– was to implement an 
extractive project in Lomerío, the Monkoxt would most likely oppose both the project 
and the government implementing it. If that were to happen, interestingly, the autonomy 
debate at the local level may align with the demands of identity based indigenous 
organizations at the state level: individual community members would most likely claim 
their right to control the natural resources present in their territory, embracing the 
understanding of autonomy deployed at the state level. They would blame the limited 
interpretation of autonomy of the central government for the implementation of the 
extractive project, rather than blaming and rejecting the autonomy project as a whole. 
 Without the implementation of an extractive project, the disjunctures in the 
understanding of autonomy at the state level and at the local level will most likely 
continue. At the local level, and considering the novel implementation of autonomy, it 
may take the election and relative failure of one or two administrations before local 
supporters are disappointed with their autonomous governments. In that case, they may 
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censure a specific administration for not being able to apply the project properly, without 
rejecting autonomy as a desirable project. 
 Moreover, they may also consider that the autonomous government simply does 
not have the resources necessary to succeed in its goals. In that case, they may blame the 
central government for not transferring enough resources to autonomous governments. 
That interpretation may lead to a new alliance of indigenous groups, breathing new life in 
the autonomy project of identity based indigenous organizations. They may demand a 
deeper re-configuration of the state to further promote local, direct democracies vis a vis 
the central government, prompting a greater transformation of the Bolivian state into a 
more plurinational, decentralized entity.  
 Indigenous autonomies, and the Monkoxt autonomy if executed, may succeed in 
implementing a novel experiment in direct, assembly-based democracy. They may be 
able to build an alternative mode of governance, re-valuing and adapting the traditional 
decision-making practices of indigenous nations to the twenty-first century. However, as 
stated, the Monkoxt interviewees closely tie their identity, and its conservation, to their 
understanding of autonomy. They believe autonomy will allow them to counter a certain 
type of development that leads to the abandonment of the land and the traditional 
practices and beliefs attached to it.  
 It is unlikely that any autonomous government, no matter how well-managed, 
succeeds in reverting the cultural and social changes that have transformed Bolivia since 
the early 1980s with the implementation of neoliberal policies. Morales’ administrations 
have certainly applied projects to lift many out of extreme poverty, but they haven’t 
completely abandoned the neoliberal economic model, and certainly remain within the 
capitalist mode of production. 
 There is the possibility that the Monkoxt blame their economic and cultural 
grievances, as some have started to do, on the capitalist development model. In that case, 
the autonomy project, if it is to remain salient among indigenous Bolivians, will have to 
offer an alternative. It will have to, once again, expand its meaning to incorporate new 
demands of a more sustainable, equitable economic development. Otherwise, we might 
see the creation of new alliances based on economic and class parameters, rather than 
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ethnic or identity objectives, and an abandonment of the autonomy project as a desirable 
aspiration. 
 It remains unlikely, however, for the Monkoxt to abandon the autonomy project in 
favor of pursuing independence from the Bolivian state. The interviewees considered that 
their identity as Monkoxt was tied to being indigenous Bolivians, and did in no case 
question the compatibility of these two identities. 
 Women are also likely to play a key role in the future of autonomy. In the case of 
Lomerío, women feel excluded from the political process behind indigenous autonomy, 
and from political participation in general. If they are not incorporated in the future 
autonomous government, they may reject autonomy as a whole, particularly considering 
that women’s main concerns –related to the disjunctures created by the loss of traditional 
practices between different generations and within families–, are the concerns autonomy 
is less likely to be able to address. 
 On the other hand, the incorporation of women in the future autonomous 
government would present a new opportunity for women to subvert traditional gender 
roles and enter traditionally closed, male spheres. Younger women who have been able to 
pursue higher education have given great value and vehemently defended this newly 
earnt right – they might do the same for the autonomy project if they are able to fully 
participate in the election of representatives and the design and implementation of 
government policies. 
 However, the incorporation of women to traditionally male spheres has typically 
led their devaluation in the eyes of men. The incorporation of women to the expected 
autonomous government of Lomerío may seem the only path to fully make autonomy 
inclusive and representative of all. If not accompanied by a transformation of sexist 
attitudes and beliefs, however, it may also lead to the abandonment of autonomy as an 
aspirational project for the Monkoxt of Lomerío. 
 Autonomy in Latin America, and certainly in Bolivia, has to therefore be analyzed 
considering the tensions and disjunctures between the autonomy debate at the state and 
academic level, and the understanding of autonomy at the local level. It is crucial that we 
consider the impact of state legality on different autonomy processes.  
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 The Bolivian case constitutes an example of how the top-down implementation of 
autonomy generated incredible bureaucratic hurdles for indigenous groups. It also greatly 
constricted their ability to design an autonomy model that fit their desires and goals, 
being forced to adapt to the type of autonomy the central state had deemed acceptable. 
 Moreover, as this thesis has shown, we have to further analyze the power 
dynamics and inequalities that exist at the local level, within indigenous nations: these 
groups aren’t completely homogenous, conflict free paradises. As in any other 
community, different opinions lead to conflict, and some sectors –normally men–, have 
privileges and hold communal power, and therefore have had the critical capacity to 
define their community’s current relationship with autonomy.  
 The case of the Monkoxt constitutes an example of these dynamics. However, the 
patriarchal dynamics that appeared in my analysis, the great influence held by brokers 
with technical knowledge, and the constrictions of the state, are certainly not unique to 
the Monkoxt, to indigenous groups, or to Latin America. Experiences with participative, 
direct democracy bring to the foreground the inequalities present in most societies, and 
patriarchal structures of power are omnipresent in our world. 
 Indigenous autonomy –and its future development–, constitutes an opportunity to 
further challenge the power of the central state and to contest the limitations it imposes 
on local projects, such as autonomy, that dispute its power over the national territory. It 
constitutes an opportunity to face the inequalities that still exist among indigenous 
community members, to transform them, and to design and implement more equitable 
governance models that will hopefully lead to fairer societies.   
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